Document generated on 06/29/2020 6:40 a.m. Les ateliers de l'éthique The Ethics Forum Individualist Biocentrism vs. Holism Revisited Katie McShane Volume 9, Number 2, Summer 2014 Article abstract While holist views such as ecocentrism have considerable intuitive appeal, URI: https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/1026682ar arguing for the moral considerability of ecological wholes such as ecosystems DOI: https://doi.org/10.7202/1026682ar has turned out to be a very difficult task. In the environmental ethics literature, individualist biocentrists have persuasively argued that individual See table of contents organisms—but not ecological wholes—are properly regarded as having a good of their own . In this paper, I revisit those arguments and contend that they are fatally flawed. The paper proceeds in five parts. First, I consider some Publisher(s) problems brought about by climate change for environmental conservation strategies and argue that these problems give us good pragmatic reasons to Centre de recherche en éthique de l’Université de Montréal want a better account of the welfare of ecological wholes. Second, I describe the theoretical assumptions from normative ethics that form the background ISSN of the arguments against holism. Third, I review the arguments given by individualist biocentrists in favour of individualism over holism. Fourth, I 1718-9977 (digital) review recent work in the philosophy of biology on the units of selection problem, work in medicine on the human biome, and work in evolutionary Explore this journal biology on epigenetics and endogenous viral elements. I show how these developments undermine both the individualist arguments described above as well as the distinction between individuals and wholes as it has been Cite this article understood by individualists. Finally, I consider five possible theoretical responses to these problems. McShane, K. (2014). Individualist Biocentrism vs. Holism Revisited. Les ateliers de l'éthique / The Ethics Forum, 9 (2), 130–148. https://doi.org/10.7202/1026682ar Tous droits réservés © Centre de recherche en éthique de l’Université de This document is protected by copyright law. Use of the services of Érudit Montréal, 2014 (including reproduction) is subject to its terms and conditions, which can be viewed online. https://apropos.erudit.org/en/users/policy-on-use/ This article is disseminated and preserved by Érudit. Érudit is a non-profit inter-university consortium of the Université de Montréal, Université Laval, and the Université du Québec à Montréal. Its mission is to promote and disseminate research. https://www.erudit.org/en/ INDIVIDUALIST BIOCENTRISM VS. HOLISM REVISITED* KATIE MCSHANE COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY 2 0 1 4 ABSTRACT: While holist views such as ecocentrism have considerable intuitive appeal, arguing for the moral considerability of ecological wholes such as ecosystems has turned out to be a very difficult task. In the environmental ethics literature, individualist biocentrists have persuasively argued that individual organisms—but not ecological wholes—are properly regarded as having a good of their own . In this paper, I revisit those arguments and contend that they are fatally flawed. The paper proceeds in five parts. First, I consider some problems brought about by climate change for environmental conservation strategies and argue that these problems give us good pragmatic reasons to want a better account of the welfare of ecological wholes. Second, I describe the theoretical assumptions from normative ethics that form the background of the arguments against holism. Third, I review the arguments given by individualist biocentrists in favour of individualism over holism. Fourth, I review recent work in the philosophy of biology on the units of selection problem, work in medicine on the human biome, and work in evolutionary biology on epi- genetics and endogenous viral elements. I show how these developments undermine both the individualist arguments described above as well as the distinction between indi- viduals and wholes as it has been understood by individualists. Finally, I consider five pos- VOLUME 9 NUMÉRO 2 ÉTÉ/SUMMER sible theoretical responses to these problems. RÉSUMÉ: Quoique les perspectives holistes telles que l’écocentrisme exercent un attrait intuitif considérable, affirmer la considérabilité morale des touts écologiques comme des éco- systèmes s’est avéré une tâche très difficile. Dans la littérature en éthique de l’environ- nement, certains biocentristes individualistes ont argumenté de manière persuasive qu’un organisme individuel, mais pas un tout écologique, peut correctement être consi- déré comme possédant son propre bien. Dans le présent article, nous réexaminons ces 130 arguments et soutenons qu’ils sont voués à l’échec. Ce travail est divisé en cinq parties. Premièrement, nous nous penchons sur certains des problèmes que pose le changement climatique pour les stratégies de conservation de l’environnement et affirmons que ces problèmes fournissent de bonnes raisons pragmatiques pour lesquelles chercher une meilleure compréhension du bien-être des touts écologiques. Deuxièmement, nous décri- vons les a priori théoriques de l’éthique normative qui sous-tendent les arguments contre l’holisme. Troisièmement, nous réexaminons les arguments de biocentristes individua- listes appuyant l’individualisme et rejetant l’holisme. Quatrièmement, nous explorons de récents travaux en philosophie de la biologie sur le problème de l’unité de sélection du biome humain en médecine et des éléments épigénétiques et viraux endogènes en bio- logie évolutionniste. Nous montrons en quoi ces conceptions minent à la fois les argu- ments individualistes susmentionnés et la distinction entre l’individu et le tout tel que compris par les individualistes. Finalement, nous considérons cinq réponses théoriques possibles à ces problèmes. TWO PROBLEMS CAUSED BY CLIMATE CHANGE Consider two much-discussed problems that climate change has posed for envi- ronmental conservation1. The first problem occurs within ecological restoration. Typically, the aim of restoration has been to undo damage or destruction caused to an ecosystem—to restore, as far as possible, that which was damaged or destroyed to the way it was previously2. The benchmark used is typically a his- torical one3. For example, where I live, at the edge of Colorado’s eastern plains, restoration projects often aim to return farmland or ranchland to shortgrass 2 0 1 4 prairie, which is what was there before the farmers, ranchers, and housing devel- opments arrived. Climate change has made—and will increasingly make—problems for this strat- egy4. First, as the climate changes, what existed in a place before might not be able to survive there anymore. For this reason, restoration done with some kind of historical benchmark might well become much more difficult, perhaps even impossible. Second, ecological restoration was initially taken to be a laudable environmental practice on the assumption that what did well in a certain place in the past is likely to do well there in the future. That is to say, the goals of his- torical fidelity and ecological welfare coincided5. But because of climate change, we can no longer assume this coincidence as we look to the future. The second problem occurs with species preservation6. The assumption used to be that species preservation was best accomplished through the preservation of native habitat—in situ preservation7. But as the climate changes, many species will not be able to survive in situ. Those that are not able to move to new, more VOLUME 9 NUMÉRO 2 ÉTÉ/SUMMER suitable, locations face extinction. For this reason, some conservation biologists have begun to advocate assisted colonization (sometimes called ‘assisted migra- tion’ or ‘assisted dispersal’) as a strategy for species preservation8. If we want to preserve a species, and if its members cannot survive where they currently are, then the best solution may be to move them to a place where they will do better. Of course in doing that, we would be significantly changing the ecology of the new location, and it is important to consider whether that would be a change for the better or for the worse. Although previously a concern to preserve species and a concern to avoid ecological harm went hand in hand, now in some cases they 131 seem to be coming apart, and we may need to decide which should take priori- ty in cases where they conflict. In both cases, aims that used to coincide (historical fidelity and ecological wel- fare; species preservation and ecological welfare) are beginning to diverge, and conservationists face some difficult questions about what to do. There is a grow- ing literature on this topic in conservation biology9, but my concern here is a philosophical problem underlying many of these discussions, namely the ques- tion of what we might plausibly mean by ‘ecological welfare.’ When we ask what kind of ecosystem will do best in the new climate in some location, when we ask whether the introduction of a new species will harm or benefit an existing ecosystem, what exactly are we asking? Is this a question of what is good for an ecosystem, or is it really a question of what is good for us (or good for sentient beings, or good for individual organisms) with regard to an ecosystem? The above examples show why this question has practical importance today more than ever. While before we might have been able to use ‘restoration to historical conditions’ or ‘preservation of an endangered species’ as proxies for ‘promotion of ecosystemic welfare,’ we can no longer do so with confidence. This means that we will either have to learn how to talk about ecosystemic welfare directly, or else 2 0 1 4 give up on the idea that there is anything in the world answerable to the idea of the flourishing of ecological communities as such. Interestingly, while environmental policy seems increasingly to need a concep- tion of ecological welfare, environmental ethicists these days tend to regard the very idea of the good of an ecological whole as a kind of conceptual mistake10.