98-669 F CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web NATO: Senate Floor Consideration of the Accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland August 10, 1998 (name redacted) Research Assistant Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division (name redacted) Senior Specialist in International Security Policy Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Abstract This report summarizes the key issues in the 1998 Senate floor debate on NATO enlargement. It includes as appendices the Resolution of Ratification approved by the Senate on April 30, 1998, a record of the final vote on the Resolution, texts of key amendments considered in the debate, and a summary of executive reporting requirements included in the Resolution. Other CRS reports relating to this topic include IB 95076, NATO: Congress Addresses Expansion of the Alliance and CRS Reports 98-214, NATO Policy: Selected Legislation in the 103d, 104th, and 105th Congresses; 97-708, NATO’s Evolving Role and Missions; and 97-1041, Senate Consideration of the North Atlantic Treaty and Subsequent Accessions: Historical Overview. This report will not be updated. NATO: Senate Floor Consideration of the Accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland Summary The 1998 Senate debate on the accession to the North Atlantic Treaty by the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland was spread across eight days from March 17 to April 30. Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was favored by the leadership of both parties, and during the debate the Resolution of Ratification was widely expected to pass. Opponents of NATO enlargement structured most of their arguments and amendments as expressions of concern about the future of the Alliance as it moves into the 21st century. The Senate gave its advice and consent on April 30, voting 80-19 in favor of ratification. The central point of contention between supporters and opponents of NATO enlargement was a disagreement over if and how NATO should change its Strategic Concept to fit the post-Cold War world. Supporters of enlargement generally believed the Alliance should continue its evolution into a versatile defender of Western interests. Opponents viewed such evolution as not conforming to the terms of the 1949 Washington Treaty. The American share of enlargement costs concerned Senators on both sides of the debate. Supporters tended to accept lower cost estimates and to declare that enlargement was a worthwhile expense. Opponents worried that the Senate was signing a “blank check” which could spiral out of control, and sought to lower the U.S. share of the NATO's common costs from the current level of around 25 percent. Two issues with open-ended implications played key roles in the debate. The first was Russia. Opponents were concerned that adding the three applicants would bolster extreme factions in Russia and strain United States-Russia relations. Most supporters cited Alliance efforts to engage Russia and to aid its transition to democracy; they argued that Russia would eventually see NATO's defensive nature. The second issue was how enlargement would affect European stability and U.S. security. Supporters focused on the need to maintain U.S. engagement in Europe and its ability to meet new security threats. Opponents warned of Russia becoming a regional destabilizer and argued that adding three countries to those the United States is committed to defend would further stretch what many considered an already overburdened military. Little debate took place about any moral responsibility the West might have concerning the past injustices done to the three applicants; these issues, however, were clearly important to many enlargement supporters. Many viewed enlargement as the fulfillment of American promises during the Cold War and a way by which the West could redeem itself for the abandonment of Eastern Europe in the wake of the Second World War. Two conditions on ratification were also debated by the Senate. The first mandated a three year pause before any future rounds of accession; the second linked NATO and European Union membership. The sponsors of the resolution of ratification argued that such conditions would limit NATO's effectiveness. Contents Introduction ......................................................1 Strategic Concept..................................................1 The Future of the Alliance .......................................1 Supporters ...............................................1 Opponents ...............................................2 Ashcroft Amendment...........................................3 Kyl Amendment...............................................4 Bingaman Amendment .........................................5 Costs / Burdensharing ..............................................6 Opponents ...............................................6 Supporters ...............................................8 Russia...........................................................9 Responses ...............................................10 European Stability / American Security ...............................12 Supporters ..............................................12 Opponents ..............................................14 Moral Responsibility / Historical Injustices ............................15 Moral Responsibility ......................................15 Historical Injustices.......................................16 Mandated Pause..................................................17 Arguments in favor .......................................17 Arguments in opposition ...................................18 Linking NATO and European Union Membership.......................19 Arguments in favor .......................................20 Arguments in opposition ...................................20 The Final Vote...................................................21 Appendix 1: Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic .........................23 Appendix 2: Amendments Relating to the Strategic Concept ..............35 Appendix 3: Amendments Relating to Costs and Burdensharing ...........38 Appendix 4: Warner and Moynihan Amendments .......................40 Appendix 5: Executive Responsibilities, as Stipulated in the Resolution of Ratification Passed by the Senate on April 30, 1998 ..................41 NATO: Senate Floor Consideration of the Accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland Introduction On April 30, 1998, the U.S. Senate, by a vote of 80-19, gave its advice and consent to the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to the North Atlantic Treaty. The wide-ranging debate included consideration not only of the qualifications of the three candidates but, perhaps more importantly, of the quality of the Alliance itself. Senators discussed NATO's evolving mission, cost and questions of burdensharing, relations with Russia and other matters. This report summarizes the main issues in the debate. Strategic Concept The question of how, if at all, NATO should adapt its mission to fit the security environment of the post-Cold War world sparked some of the Senate's most contentious debate. From the outset of the debate, enlargement was linked to the development of NATO's Strategic Concept and the degree to which it should focus on new missions beyond collective defense. Many supporters of enlargement believed a broader mission profile would strengthen NATO by ensuring its relevance in a new European security structure. Others argued that the redefinition of the Strategic Concept amounted to “treaty creep” -- that is, it would create a NATO organization beyond the scope of the North Atlantic Treaty. Senators John Ashcroft (R-Missouri), John Kyl (R-Arizona), and Jeff Bingaman (D-New Mexico) introduced amendments designed to give the Senate a voice concerning the Alliance's transition toward its new roles. The Future of the Alliance Supporters. Most Senators who advocated adding the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to the Alliance also supported using NATO to meet the new security challenges that have emerged since the end of the Cold War. Senator John McCain (R-Arizona) entered into the Congressional Record (CR) a statement by the New Atlantic Initiative, an organization composed primarily of former government officials. The statement declared that NATO has rightfully closed the door on its successful mission to prevent Soviet domination of Western Europe, but that “Its larger purpose of ensuring peace and freedom in Europe and the Atlantic region endures.” It outlined a new identity for NATO, as “an alliance aiming to promote peace and stability in the Atlantic region, devoted to the spread and consolidation of democratic ways in Europe, and capable of protecting Western interests against such CRS-2 future threats as may emerge.” The statement tied this vision of the future to the legislation at hand, pronouncing, “Crucial to this process of adaptation is NATO's willingness to admit new members ... Otherwise it will remain a relic of the Cold War of diminishing relevance to the contemporary world.” (CR, 18 March 1998, S2200) Senator John Kerry (D-Massachusetts) said that “NATO has already begun a kind of transition expanding its mission to include other tasks.” The Alliance, he said, “has an expanded vision of the range of potential rivalries within Europe to global threats, such as terrorism or nuclear proliferation, but also a greater