University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 2008 The Intellectual Property-Antitrust Interface Herbert J. Hovenkamp University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, Judges Commons, and the Legal History Commons Repository Citation Hovenkamp, Herbert J., "The Intellectual Property-Antitrust Interface" (2008). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1789. https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1789 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Intellectual Property-Antitrust Interface , in 3 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1979 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2008) Chapter 79 _________________________ THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY- ANTITRUST INTERFACE Herbert Hovenkamp * This historical overview examines the relationship between antitrust policy and intellectual property in the United States since 1890. Over most of this history, judges imagined far greater conflicts between antitrust policy and intellectual property rights than actually existed, or else relied on sweeping generalizations rather than close analysis. For example, they often assumed that the presence of an intellectual property right led to anticompetitive effects where there was no basis for finding any injury to competition at all. At the other extreme, they often concluded that an intellectual property right immunized seriously anticompetitive conduct even when the intellectual property statute at issue did not authorize the challenged practice. True conflicts between antitrust and intellectual property rights are relatively rare. 1. Introduction The relation between intellectual property (IP) and antitrust policy has always been unstable and problematic. Courts have seen an inherent conflict between the two legal regimes. 1 While both sets of policies seek to promote economic welfare they do so in different ways. In economics, antitrust is myopic. It looks mainly at the short run and promotes practices that tend to drive prices toward cost, squeezing excess profits out of the economy. In order to achieve this, antitrust develops rules that encourage entry and duplication. As a general proposition, the more firms that offer a product the more competitive will be its output and price. By contrast, the policy of the IP laws is to take a longer view and encourage innovation by giving people limited periods of exclusive rights, or freedom from copying. In at least some situations, the result is that firms earn profits considerably higher than short run costs, and IP rights have enabled a few firms to earn monopoly profits for very long periods. The potential for conflict becomes even more pronounced when IP right holders enter into agreements or engage in practices that are not expressly authorized by the IP statutes but that seem to have anticompetitive effects. Notwithstanding these differences in economic perspective, the conflict between IP and antitrust law is easily exaggerated, and the courts have been too ready to find conflicts where none existed. In order to have a true conflict, one must have both an IP * University of Iowa. 1. E.g. , SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981): The conflict between the antitrust and patent laws arises in the methods they embrace that were designed to achieve reciprocal goals. While the antitrust laws proscribe unreasonable restraints of competition, the patent laws reward the inventor with a temporary monopoly that insulates him from competitive exploitation of his patented art. 1979 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1287628 1980 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY practice that poses a real threat to competition and also a realistic argument that the practice furthers an interest protected by the IP laws. Historically, many of the IP practices condemned by courts as antitrust violations or anticompetitive “misuse” were not anticompetitive at all. This was true of most of the tying and resale price maintenance cases but also of some of the horizontal restraint and refusal-to-deal cases. If competition is not significantly threatened by a practice, there is no IP-antitrust conflict. Other practices have posed significant threats to competition but have not furthered any interest that the IP laws were intended to protect. Once again, in such cases there is no conflict. 2 In 1995 the Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission issued licensing guidelines that reflected this balance. 3 While the Intellectual Property Guidelines are not analyzed here, it should be noted that they served to move public policy away from the antitrust aggressiveness of the 1960s and 1970s 4 to a framework that focused on identifying serious threats to competition that were not justified by explicit provisions of the IP laws. Another important institutional development, not discussed here in any detail, was the creation of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, whose exclusive appellate jurisdiction of claims arising under the Patent Act has served to unify patent law and, to a lesser extent, antitrust rules applied in cases where the primary claim arises under the Patent Act.5 2. E.g. , Walker Process Equip. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) (filing infringement action based on fraudulently obtained patent). 3. U.S. DEP ’T OF JUSTICE &FEDERAL TRADE COMM ’N,ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,132 (1995). For analysis, see 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA ,HERBERT HOVENKAMP &EINER ELHAUGE ,ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1782 (2d ed. 2004). 4. For example, see the list of “nine no-nos,” which the Antitrust Division promulgated in 1972. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement on Patent Licensing (Sept. 21, 1972), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,126. The list included (1) licenses requiring the purchase of unpatented products or preventing the licensee from dealing in products outside the scope of the patent, (2) grantback agreements requiring the licensee to assign back to the licensor any improvement patents developed by the licensee, (3) restrictions on the resale of the patented product, (4) preventing the licensee from dealing in products outside the scope of the patent, (5) agreements by licensors not to grant further licenses to others, (6) mandatory package licenses, (7) royalty provisions not reasonably related to sales, (8) restrictions on the licensee’s use of a product manufactured by a patented process, and (9) resale price maintenance of licensed products. Subsequent Justice Department statements issued prior to the 1995 Guidelines had already repudiated many of the “no-nos.” See, e.g. , Charles Rule, The Antitrust Implications of International Licensing: After the Nine No-Nos (1986), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,131 (1995) (“For eachof thenine no-nos . thereare at least as many potential procompetitive explanations” that “in the great majority of cases . will outweigh any anticompetitive threat.”). 5. For further reading, see 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ,MARK D. JANIS &MARK A. LEMLEY , IP AND ANTITRUST :AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ch. 5 (2001 & Supp. 2008); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance , 152 U. PA. L. REV . 1105 (2004); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution , 11 SUP .CT.ECON . REV . 1 (2004); Daniel J. Meador, Retrospective on the Federal Circuit: The First Twenty Years—A Historical View , 11 FED .CIR . B.J. 557 (2002). See also Symposium on the Federal Circuit and Antitrust , 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 627 (2002). Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1287628 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-ANTITRUST INTERFACE 1981 2. The shifting ground of the IP-antitrust relationship This chapter takes a bird’s eye view of the most important themes that the courts have seen as dominating the relationship between IP policy and antitrust policy. Current law takes a relatively broad view of IP protection and a relatively narrow view of antitrust. But this has not always been the case. The Supreme Court has gone through periods in which it held expansive views of antitrust but was hostile toward patents and inclined to view them as inherently anticompetitive. The result has been a great deal of instability in antitrust-IP jurisprudence. Ever since the antitrust laws were passed, antitrust and IP have had to accommodate one another, but they have done so in different ways in different periods. The early twentieth century was an era of IP expansion and antitrust accommodation. During this period even when the Supreme Court saw fit to make IP yield, it frequently did so on “misuse” rather than antitrust grounds. By contrast, beginning during the New Deal and extending through the Warren era, the Supreme Court was more inclined to view patents as inherently anticompetitive and to interpret the antitrust laws expansively. The result was overly aggressive and sometimes even silly antitrust rules, such as those for patent ties, that found antitrust violations when the defendant had no real power and there was no realistic prospect of economic harm. Today, we once again live in an era of IP expansionism. Indeed, the IP laws, particularly the Copyright Act, bear the marks of significant special interest capture. The result is provisions that are much more likely to protect IP holders’ profits than to serve the constitutional purpose of the IP laws, which is to encourage innovation by searching for the right balance between the right to exclude and the need of every innovator to build on the work of others.