Mohammad Iqbal Chawla. Wavell and the Dying Days of the Raj: Britain's Penultimate Viceroy in India. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011. xi + 293 pp. $25.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-19-906275-1. Reviewed by Anirudh Deshpande Published on H-Asia (January, 2014) Commissioned by Sumit Guha (The University of Texas at Austin) Lord Wavell was destined to be the second-to- colony, the sun had set on the British Empire. The last viceroy of British India. A seasoned British two world wars exhausted Britain and made it f‐ imperialist soldier and an Old India hand, he was nancially and politically subservient to the United appointed to the post in 1943 and remained in of‐ States. In 1943, Britain did not have the political, fice until March 1947 when his famboyant suc‐ military, and fnancial means to ensure a smooth cessor Lord Mountbatten took over. Mountbatten and peaceful transfer of power to the Indians in succeeded Wavell in order to supervise the liqui‐ the troubled and anxiety-ridden 1940s. The ap‐ dation of the Raj. For various reasons, including pointment of a veteran soldier as the viceroy of his dashing personality and an interesting wife, India, after the Quit India rebellion was quelled Mountbatten has managed to attract more than by the Raj in 1942, failed to produce a negotiated his share of attention from scholars. In contrast, political settlement between the British and vari‐ Wavell, who tried in vain to keep India united be‐ ous Indian parties. tween 1943 and 1947, is almost a forgotten fgure Chawla examines the two plans drafted by of history. Wavell, the Wavell Plan and the Breakdown Plan. No doubt, history students know much more During the Second World War, the British realized about the Mountbatten Plan than the Wavell Plan. that they could not avoid the political decoloniza‐ The public, in general, has forgotten Wavell and tion of India in the immediate future and that this the plans that he devised for India in the twilight process was fraught with several dangers which of the Raj. In this book, Mohammad Iqbal Chawla British colonialism itself had produced in India. highlights Wavell’s plans, which became increas‐ Having kept India divided, the British now want‐ ingly impossible to execute in communally ed to leave it united in the overall interest of the charged postwar India. By the time Wavell be‐ British Commonwealth after World War II. Ulti‐ came the viceroy of Britain’s most important mately in India both imperialism and nationalism H-Net Reviews failed. Chawla analyzes the failures of the Cripps ate the league’s earlier stand on the plan and de‐ Mission, Wavell Plan, and Cabinet Mission Plan in clare the Direct Action Day on August 16, 1946. relation to the fuid political situation in India There was no turning back after that. during the 1940s. He underscores the shortcom‐ Beyond the copious specialized historical lit‐ ings of the various parties involved in the tortu‐ erature on the 1940s, we must also not forget that ous political events that led to India’s partition in the partition of Pakistan and its intractable con‐ 1947, and he takes the Indian National Congress, temporary political problems as well as the emer‐ in particular, to task for its intransigence on the gence of Bangladesh in 1971 have problematized Muslim question. This volume makes it clear that the two nation theory. But all this has left without understanding the political frustration of Chawla’s discussion of the Indian partition of Wavell we cannot comprehend the confusing sto‐ 1947 unaffected. This book is about the failure of ry of Indian independence and partition. Wavell, and thereby ultimately the whole of The book, a revised doctoral dissertation pub‐ British policy, to keep India united in the wake of lished by a Pakistani academic, adds to the enor‐ the Second World War. “Wavell thought of India mous literature available on the immediate histo‐ as a single geographic unit and, therefore, wished ry of the partition of British India in 1947. This lit‐ to maintain its unity. This led him not only to de‐ erature includes excellent books by such ideologi‐ nounce but even attempt to derail the demand for cally diverse scholars as David Page, Anita Inder Pakistan. Initially he thought of it simply as a bar‐ Singh, Ayesha Jalal, Penderel Moon, Mark Tully, gaining counter and believed that its creation Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, A .G. could be avoided. However, with the passage of Noorani, Ian Talbot, Patrick French, and others. time, after he had witnessed the rapidly rising The works by these scholars are well known, well support for the Pakistan demand and increasing cited, and easily available. Nonetheless Chawla’s popularity of Jinnah as the sole spokesman of the narrative, written from the perspective of the Muslims, he came to the conclusion that it needed Muslim League, refreshes our memory of India’s to be taken very seriously and dealt with accord‐ partition and the making of Pakistan. While deal‐ ingly” (emphasis added) (pp. 262-263). ing with the failure of the Rajaji Formula, Gandhi- While dealing with the political questions Jinnah Talks, Shimla Conference, Wavell Plan, and raised by the 1947 transfer of power and partition Cabinet Mission Plan, this book does not fail to in the Indian subcontinent, Pakistani scholars blame Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, and blame the Congress for the violent partition of the Congress for the political impasse created in 1947. This book is not an exception. India during and after the Second World War. The Several ironies underlined the moment of In‐ author makes it clear that the Cabinet Mission dian freedom and partition. Since its inception, Plan was the last chance for keeping India united and especially after the political watershed of and the Congress, led by Nehru in 1946, was re‐ 1857, British political and educational policies had sponsible for its demise. The Muslim League ini‐ encouraged religious, caste, and regional divi‐ tially accepted the provinces grouping scheme sions among Indians. The success of British colo‐ suggested by the Cabinet Mission because the nialism was predicated on these divisions and the measure of grouping Muslim majority provinces maintenance of the princely states as a bulwark in India in the east and west was conducive to its against Indian unity and nationalism. The politi‐ idea of creating Pakistan in the foreseeable fu‐ cal fruits of this policy of “divide and rule” ture. Gandhi’s ambivalence toward the plan and ripened in the 1920s and 1930s, threatening India Nehru’s intemperate public utterances on the with civil war, political dissolution, and cultural question forced Muhammad Ali Jinnah to repudi‐ 2 H-Net Reviews destruction in the near future. Nonetheless the country united despite being the most popular po‐ British, hoist with their own petard in 1945 as litical party of the period. The creation of Pakistan they were, dreamt of keeping India united within was a slap in the face of the theoretical secular the Commonwealth after World War II. nationalism championed by the Congress. It is This book highlights the fact that Wavell op‐ well known that during the 1930s and 1940s, the posed the partition of India, drafted the Wavell Congress increasingly came under the influence Plan, and called the Shimla Conference (1945) to of the Hindu right wing and alienated the Muslim resolve the political differences among the Indian masses. At the same time, its radical sounding leaders. The Wavell Plan envisaged an enlarged anti-zamindari (anti-landlord) rhetoric alarmed all-Indian executive council, with the Indians the Muslim landlords in both British and princely holding the important portfolios hitherto denied India. This widened the ideological appeal of Pak‐ to them by the Raj, which would work within the istan and forged a unity among Muslims cutting constitutional framework provided by the Gov‐ across class lines. By the time Wavell began to ernment of India Act of 1935. Wavell wanted to grapple with the Indian problem, a substantial keep India united by making the Indian elites co‐ number of Muslims had started supporting the operate in the governance of the country, but the idea of Pakistan. The Muslim parties that were ap‐ plan failed because the Indians disagreed on the prehensive of partition were swept away by the question of representation within the proposed violent orgies of communalism, which began with council. On the one hand, B. R. Ambedkar was the Direct Action Day in August 1946. Chawla doc‐ averse to the Congress nominating members of uments the process that led to this from 1943 to the “Depressed Castes” to the council and Jinnah 1947. desired a monopoly right to select Muslim mem‐ The third irony of Indian partition must be bers of the council. Both leaders, deeply suspi‐ seen in the success and failure of the All-India cious of Gandhi, were aware of the clout the Con‐ Muslim League even as Jinnah secured the state gress had with the British. Gandhi, on the other of Pakistan. Jinnah was a liberal democrat who hand, had always opposed any move to split the used religious nationalism to carve his place in Hindu vote along caste lines, and his presence in history. Potential readers of this book should be Shimla caused great discomfort to his detractors. reminded that the elitist moderate lawyer, who Wavell found Jinnah’s position unreasonable, and personally disliked religiosity and the populariza‐ the Shimla Conference failed to resolve the com‐ tion of politics, had once been an important Con‐ munal and caste deadlock in India. Chawla tells gress leader. In 1906, the future Qaid-e-Azam had us once again in admirable detail why that hap‐ scoffed at the founding of the organization that he pened, although his league-friendly narrative would one day lead and plunge into unprecedent‐ does not explain why Jinnah should have been ed bloodshed.