TRANSPERSONAL EMOTIONS:A STRUCTURAL AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE Louise Sundararajan Rochester,New York ABSTRACT.'This paper gives a structural and phenomenological account of transpersonal emotions. Structural investigation results in a topology of emotions consistent with the general framework of de Rivera's matrix of emotions (1977), More specifically, this topology shows that "being emotions" that reside in the psychological space of the transperaonal self are in mutually constraining relationships with other sets of emotions in the domains of the "material" and the "social" selves, On the phenomenological front, it is demonstrated through taxtual analysis of selected texts that a wide spectrum of "being emo­ tions" delineated by de Rivera may be considered various nuances of the Heideggerian angst, although certain Heideggerian nuances of angst, such as "awe" and "uncanny," are not fully developed in de Rivera's model. Primary texts used for this analysis will be two Chinese landscape poems by Hsieh Ling­ yiin (385-433). Implications of the structural analysis for future research on transpersonal emotions are discussed in the conclusion. In this article,I attempt to apply andextenda structural theory of emotions(deRivera, 1977)to an analysis of feelingstates usually associated with the spiritual or "transper­ sonal' dimensionof our lives,More specifically, I explorea set of transpersonal emo­ tionsin termsof both its contentand its structural relationship withothersets"of emo­ tions.This structural perspective is complemented by Heidegger's phenomenology of mood.I examineChinese philosophical and literary texts in light of Heidegger'sphe­ nomenology of Dasein and its characteristic mood,angst,as well as de Rivera's spec­ trum of "being emotions."Primarytexts used for this analysisare two Chineseland­ scapepoems by HsiehLing-yun(385-433). Implications of the structural analysisfor future research on transpersonal emotions are discussed in the conclusion. BELONGING,RECOGNITION,ANDBEING De Rivera divides human emotions into three sets-belonging, recognmon, and being-each inhabitinga particulardimensionof "psychological space,"which in turn corresponds to three aspectsof the self:material,social,and spiritual.The "belonging emotions"are saidto inhabit the psychological spaceof whatWilliam James referred to as the "material self;' namely,the selfthatis concerned with"everything thatcanbe called mine" (de Rivera, 1977,p, 52), such as "one's body, lover, children,home, etc.t'(p, 65). "Recognition emotions;' accordingto de Rivera (1977),"deal with what Theauthorwouldliketo thankProfessorJosephde Riveraforhis generouscritiqueof an earlierdraftof thispaper.I alsothankmyanonymousreviewersfortheirhelpfulsuggestions. Sendcorrespondence10:Dr.LouiseSundararajen,RochesterPsychiatricCenter,IIIIEImwoodAvenue,Rochester,NY 14620-3972 Copyright© 2000Transpersonallnsnture The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology; 2000, Vol. 32, No.1 53 James called the 'social' self-the self as recognized by the other-and involve one's honor, reputation, and morality" (p. 53). "Being emotions" are concerned with granting or denying being/meaning to self or other (de Rivera, 1977). As such, these emotions are postulated to inhabit the psychological space of the "spiritual" or, more appropriately,the "transpersonal"self. By "transpersonal"I refer to experiences"in which the sense of identity or self extends beyond (trans) the individual or personal to encompass wider aspects of humankind, life, psyche or cosmos" (Walsh & Vaughan, 1993,p. 203). This definition of the "transpersonal"is in keepingwith Heidegger's notionof Dasein, which literallymeans "Being-there." It refers to the uniquely transpersonal nature of being human, as Heidegger put" it, "Man is the there whose nature is to be open [to Being]" (cited in Richardson, 1967, p. 280). By Dasein, Heidegger makes it clear that the essence of being human consists in a "transpersonal" relationship to Being. As Macomber (1967) explains, "Dasein is rather a way of being than a being, and all its characteristicsas a being are grounded in the direct relation in which it stands to being,primarily its own" (p, 31).This transpersonalnature of Daseinis driven home by the following observa­ tion of Levin (1988), "To be sure, Heidegger's Dasein is historical;but it is, curiously, a being without biography,without any narrative of personal history.... Heidegger's Dasein is, as Derrida has noted, without gender ... " (p, 271). Implicit in the "transper­ sonal"connotationsofDasein,then, is a dialecticrelationshipbetweenthe transperson­ al self and the "personal" selves-the material and the social.At the level of the materi­ al and the social selves, however,this dialecticrelationship with the transpersonalself may be expressed as mutual exclusiveness.This point is illustrated in a Taoist story from Chuang-tzu:The Marquis of Lu was so impressedwith the remarkablebell-stand made by the woodcarver Khing that he inquired of the latter about his art. Thereupon Khing proceeded to describethe elaboratepreparationshe went throughfor his work: After fasting for three days, I did not presumeto think of any congratulation,reward,rank, or emolument.... Afterfastingfive days, I did not presumeto think of thecondemnationor commendation(whichit wouldproduce),or ofthe skillor want of skill (whichit mightdis­ play).At the endof the sevendays,I had forgottenall aboutmyself-myfourlimbsandmy whole person .... ThenI went into the forest,andlookedat the natural formsof the trees. When I saw one of a perfectform,then the figureof the bell-standroseup to myview,and I appliedmy handto the work. (Legge, 1959,p. 462) In the present context, this Taoist parable suggests that the transpersonal self is made accessibleby shedding, through rituals of purification,both the social self that is con­ cemed about performance and its consequencesof reward and punishment,as well as the material self that is concernedwith "my four limbs and my whole person," In light of such a dialecticalrelationshipbetween the transpersonalself and the personalselves, the being emotions would be in a mutually exclusive relationship with the other two sets of emotions, belonging and recognition. DIALECTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BEING EMOTIONS ANDTHE REST OF THETRIAD The mutually exclusive or dialectical relationship between the three sets of emo­ tions can be considered in light of an experimental study by de Rivera, Possell, Verette, and Weiner (1989). The investigators devised a "wishing versus hoping" 54 TheJournal of TranspersonalPsychology,2000, Vol.32, No. J construct to tease apart elation and gladness. They proposed that elation "entails the fulfillment of a wish. This fantasylike wish involves the self, and the outcome is unexpected" (de Rivera et al., 1989, p. 1016). Gladness, in contrast, entails the ful­ fillment of a realistic "hope." Hoping "does not involve the fantasy inherent in wish­ ing. Rather, it includes waiting for something that has a real possibility but present­ ly is uncertain" (de Rivera et al., 1989, p. 1016). The contrast between elation and gladness is summed up succinctly by the researchers in the following definitions of wishing and hoping: Wishing occurs on a fantasy level, as it involves dreaming beyond what is realistically possible. Wishes are not expected to come true, and, therefore, wishing does not entail patient waiting and Iacks doubt or worry. Hopingdoesnot occuron a fantasy level, and, therefore, is more "grounded" in reality. Hopes are expected to be fulfilled, although it is never absolutely certain that they will come true. Consequently, hoping involves doubt or worry, and also entails patient waiting for the hopes to be fulfilled. (De Rivera et al., 1989, p, 1021) Extending the antithetical relationship between wishing-elation and hoping-gladness, a mutual exclusiveness can be shown to be likewise true of the relationshipbetween the transpersonalemotion of joy (de Rivera, 1977) and the egoist emotions of elation and gladness. For illustration, I offer a detailed analysis of a poem by the ninth-century Chinese poet/critic Ssu-KungT'u (837-908). Solid World The words employed are extremely direct, The formulation of thought does not go deep; Suddenly one meets a recluse- It is as if seeing the mind of the way [Tao]. The bends of clear torrents, The shade of emerald pines: One fellow carries firewood. Another fellow listens to a zither. The perfection of [human] nature and the affections Is so subtle it cannot be sought. One chances on it as Heaven wills- Delicate, the faint and rare tones. (Owen, 1992, pp. 341-342) This is one of Sse-Kung T'u's 24 poems, each dedicated to one particular poetic mood. The (poetic) mood described in this poem seems to be joy, as we shall see. In joy, accordingto de Rivera (1977), "the person experienceshis existenceas meaningful, as coming closer to the self that he 'really is" (p, 64). This sense of being in reality or truth (the Tao) is suggestedby the title "Shih (solid/real)Ching (world)," rendered by Owen (1992) as "solid world"(p. 341), and by Yu(1978)as "reality" (p, 88). Given the Taoist binary opposition between the natural and the artificial/falsehood,Yang and Yang's (1963) translation of the title as "the natural mode"(p. 74) is also appropriate. Joy has two basic components:first, meeting an other,and second,a sense of the mean­ ingfulnessof life. "Suddenly one meets a recluse" (line 3) capturesthe first component Transpetsonal Emotions: A Structural and Phenomenological Perspective