Moments in U.S. Diplomatic History 444 Days: Memoirs of an Iran Hostage More Moments in U.S. Diplomatic History Categories 12 A Moment in U.S. Diplomatic History More than thirty years later, the Iran Hostage crisis still ranks as one (486) of the most traumatic diplomatic events in U.S. history. Dissatisfied Africa (87) with the corrupt and ineffective regime of Reza Shah Pahlavi, many China (36) Iranian citizens began protesting the Iranian government in 1977. In Cold War (126) 1979 after nearly two years of protests and strikes, the Shah was Consular (74) exiled from Iran and was succeeded by the radical Ayatollah East Asia and Pacific (77) Ruhollah Khomeini as Supreme Leader of the newly established Espionage (29) Islamic republic. The Shah sought asylum and medical care from his Europe (140) erstwhile allies, particularly the United States, which agreed to help. Foreign Service (129) Enraged members of the Iranian Revolution insisted on his return so Hostage (39) that they could prosecute and punish him for his actions. The Human Rights (107) 444-day-long crisis began on November 4th when some 3,000 militant Iranian students stormed the Humorous (121) United States embassy in Tehran, taking nearly sixty diplomats hostage. Middle East (104) Military (204) Revolutionaries demanded that the U.S. return the Shah to Iran. Public Diplomacy (59) After much internal debate, President Jimmy Carter decided not Russia/Soviet Union (89) to do so, given the Shah’s medical condition and his many years as South Central Asia (38) a stalwart American ally. Spouses and children (36) Terrorism (79) Shows such as ABC’s “Nightline” with Ted Koppel had daily The Stump (13) updates on the crisis and counted the days of “America Held Vietnam Conflict (1) Hostage.” Ultimately, the long grind of negotiations and bad Western Hemisphere (77) publicity took its toll on the American psyche and the Carter Women and Minority FSOs (66) presidency; he lost to Ronald Reagan and his campaign for “Morning in America” in the 1980 elections. Tags In these excerpts from his oral history, John Limbert describes how the mob of Iranian Revolutionaries attacked the embassy, his “stupid” attempt to calm the crowd, his initial days of captivity, and a mock execution. Part II on the End Game can be found here. You can also read the admin AFSA Memorial Plaque account by Chargé d’affaires Bruce Laingen, who had a much different experience as a captive at the assassination Carter CIA Foreign Ministry and that of Mike Metrinko, another hostage who spent most of his time in solitary confinement. Congo Diplomats behaving badly Eisenhower embassy security “All these people want to do is read a statement and leave” evacuation Kissinger Korea LBJ Leadership massacre LIMBERT: I had been, for about the week before, traveling outside of Tehran, so I wasn’t completely McCarthyism movies up to date on what was going on in the capital, but Sunday morning as I say was the beginning of our work week. [Chargé d’affaires] Bruce Laingen and Victor Tomseth, head of political section and negotiations Nixon number two, plus one of our security officers, went to the Foreign Ministry on an appointment that Oops! Operations Center they had been seeking for a week before that, so it wasn’t specifically related to embassy security. In the morning, groups had been marching by the embassy, going to a demonstration scheduled at the Podcast Reagan Shultz Today university. One of the parade routes for demonstrations at the university went by the front gate of the embassy. About 10:30 in the morning one of the groups stopped in front of the embassy, and began in History Vietnam We shouting slogans. That wasn’t unusual but instead of continuing to march towards the university the Didn't Start the Fire World demonstrators attacked the front gate. War II We had some local security in police uniforms. Whoever they were, if they were actually police, Iranian police or just neighborhood vigilantes dressed up in police uniforms, they melted away. They were not going to confront the crowd. They came into the compound, they breached the gates. The Our Sponsors gates were nothing like today’s security arrangements, the barriers were nothing like you see today in embassies, with all the high-tech stuff and the razor wire and the bollards and all that sort of thing. It was essentially an ornamental fence. And they came into the compound. We shut down the doors of the chancery. We shut down the doors of the consulate building. The embassy is a series of buildings spread over about thirty acres in the middle of town. And figured that the best thing to do would be to shut them out physically, and keep them out until the host government could respond. As they had responded some nine months earlier, on February 14th, when a group had also attacked and the authorities did respond, and sent a force in to kick out the attackers. So we figured they would do something similar and in the meantime the best thing to do was to shut down and lock down the building. I was in the main chancery. We were on the phone with Washington. It was like two or three in the morning, Sunday morning in Washington. It’s an example I’ve always used. We got the Operations Center, they patched us through to either Hal Saunders, the assistant secretary for Near East, or one of the deputy assistant secretaries. I’ve used that example since when I noticed that recently some of our bureaus have appointed less than experienced people to be deputy assistant secretaries. I said, Are you interested in sponsoring “Look, in a situation like that we needed somebody with judgment and experience on the other end of ADST? We are an independent, the line. I don’t care how damn brilliant they are or who they know. We need somebody good.” You nonprofit organization dedicated to can see of course by the results how effective that has been. But that’s parenthetical. preserving our nation's diplomatic We were on the phone with Washington. Ann Swift, who was our number two political officer, was history and providing educational the ranking Foreign Service person in the embassy at the time. She was on the phone with materials to the Department of State Washington. I got on the phone with the Iranian government. Mike Metrinko got on the phone with and the public. Contact Us for more some of his contacts. First I called was the Foreign Ministry, then the prime minister’s office. The information. Foreign Ministry was surreal. First of all I called and the woman at the other end thought I was Would you like to make an individual Metrinko. We were two of the Persian speakers there and before I could describe what was going on, contribution? Visit our donations she said, “Oh, Mr. Metrinko, it’s nice to talk to you. Those passports we sent over, are the visas ready page for more information. yet?” And all I could say was, “Lady, one this isn’t Metrinko, two if you don’t do something about this situation you can kiss those visas of yours good-bye. You’re never going to see them.” I don’t know if they ever saw them or not. But that was the tenor of the time. “I want my visa and I can shout my anti-American slogan at the same time.” I called the prime minister’s office and they reassured us me that, “Oh, don’t worry, we’re going to send some help. All these people want to do is read a statement and leave.” I said, “That’s fine. Let ‘em read it quickly and get out of here before something happens.” I kept reminding them, “Listen, you are responsible. This is your responsibility. Our safety, the safety of this compound, is your responsibility. If there is bloodshed, if somebody gets hurt, you will be responsible.” That made no impact at all. They said that there’s a force on the way or some group on the way to get these people out, and it will be there at any time, very soon. After a short period of time it became clear that no force was on the way, there was none one coming to help. So I called back, I pressed them, I said, “I don’t see any evidence of this.” “Oh, no, no, don’t worry.” And I said, “Well, tell me what you are doing about this.” And they said, (this is about eleven o’clock in the morning) “Oh, well, for this afternoon we’ve scheduled a meeting to decide what to do about it.” I just hung up on this guy. I remember saying to Ann Swift, I said, “Ann, we’re on our own. Whatever happens is here.” Again, presumably, had there been a functioning government able to do something, Hal Saunders in Washington could have woken up somebody at a high enough level to call someone in the Iranian government to get these people out and remind them of the seriousness. But there was no one to talk to. There was no one to answer the phone at the other side. All you could get was a lot of hand wringing. The mob enters the embassy Q: Well what was happening while you were making the call? Were people pounding on the door? LIMBERT: First they were outside the main building and then they got into the main building.