SYRIA WORKSHOP SERIES June 2013 THE CHALLENGE OF SYRIAN UNITY: REASSURING LOCAL COMMUNITIES AND FRAMING NATIONAL CONSENSUS BROOKINGS The Brookings Institution is a private non-profit organization. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s) and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its scholars. Copyright © 2013 Saha 43, Building 63, West Bay, Doha, Qatar www.brookings.edu/doha A LETTER FROM THE CONVENER Dear friends and colleagues, an international third party. Such discussions, they said, should work to define intra-Syrian and inter- Two years into the uprising against Bashar al- national guarantees for the provision of security Assad, large swathes of the Syrian population and the protection of certain rights. have yet to embrace an opposition they see as divided, partisan, and lacking a clear political This workshop also created an opportunity for project. From April 22 to 24, 2013, the Brookings different Syrian constituencies to engage with Doha Center, in collaboration with the Democracy high-level representatives from France, the Council of California, held a closed-door work- United States, the United Kingdom, and Turkey. shop in Paris focused on exploring the concerns Participants expressed frustration regarding an and interests of this “grey area” of the population. international response which they saw as insuf- Participants included prominent members of the ficient and misguided. Alongside the political Alawi, Christian, and Druze communities, Kurdish process outlined above, they said, there must be and tribal leaders, as well as representatives from increased military support from Western govern- the National Coalition of Syrian Opposition and ments in order to change the balance both on the Revolutionary Forces (SOC). ground and in any future negotiations with the regime. For their part, international representatives A number of key points emerged throughout the stressed that in order to obtain further support from course of our discussion. The dialogue made clear, the international community, the Syrian opposition first of all, that Syrian minorities are increasingly had to focus both on broadening its membership fearful of the rise of sectarianism and extremist and on building effective political and military groups across the country. Participants complained institutions inside the country. This effort, they that not enough is being done by the SOC to address said, should concentrate on ongoing attempts to the concerns of those minorities and factions that establish an interim government in “liberated have in large part either sided with the regime or areas” and on improving communication and col- been reluctant to join the revolution. laboration with local actors on the ground. Furthermore, they stressed that opposition groups It is with great pleasure that we present the fol- have repeatedly failed to establish a clear political lowing event briefing based on what was a revealing vision with the buy-in of a majority of Syrians. In and thought-provoking workshop. The document order to acquire greater legitimacy and support comprises a summary of the major themes and inside the country, participants said the Syrian findings of the discussion, as well as a closing opposition must work to develop an effective polit- statement issued jointly by all the Syrian partici- ical solution – a solution that, over the course of the pants (see Appendix). The debate was held under discussion, took the shape of a unifying national the Chatham House Rule and the views expressed compact. The compact advocated by participants are those of the participants. was one built on a process of power-sharing and broad consensus. It should appeal to elements inside and outside the opposition, they argued, Sincerely, allowing each Syrian constituency to define and defend its interests within a unified Syria. Participants suggested that this Syrian national compact be based on processes of dialogue between opposition elements and community representa- Salman Shaikh tives, perhaps under the oversight or facilitation of Director, Brookings Doha Center THE CHALLENGE OF SYRIAN UNITY: REASSURING LOCAL COMMUNITIES AND FRAMING NATIONAL CONSENSUS SYRIA IN FRAGMENTS Syrian military. On a similar note, a former advisor to the Assad regime contended that “Alawis do In a discussion of the current state of the crisis, the not defend the regime, they defend themselves.” majority of participants singled out sectarianism as Motivated primarily by self-preservation, Syrians their greatest concern, describing it as an existential are increasingly turning to their immediate commu- threat to a united Syria. Many emphasized the role nities – whether ethnic or sectarian – for protection of the Assad regime in fomenting sectarian strife and strength. This impulse leads to further dangers, and seeking to transform the revolution into an an Alawi activist warned, as “fear of a massacre outright sectarian conflict. By playing one faction could itself push people to commit a massacre.” against the other and capitalizing on sectarian fears, they said, the regime had relied on a strict policy of Participants emphasized the need to reassure “divide and rule.” minorities and build trust among different com- munities and factions. As one international According to an Alawi officer who had defected observer pointed out, unless the opposition has the from the Syrian military, the regime is “comfortable support of key minority groups, “Assad will con- with” and directly benefits from the growing tide of tinue to feel safe.” A member of the Syrian Muslim extremism in the east and north of Syria. President Brotherhood said that “only the Alawis can free Assad, he said, was for now happy to allow “liber- Syria from Bashar,” pointing to the urgency of ated areas,” such as Raqqa, to remain under the control of extremist forces whose prominence engaging this community. According to an activist reinforces the regime’s narrative of “terrorist insur- from Lattakia, however, Alawis attempting to rebel gency.” Some even went so far as to speculate that against the regime – including in Assad’s home Assad had previously cooperated with extremist town of Qardaha – had actually been discouraged, groups in Iraq and was now deliberately supporting even “threatened,” by certain Islamists within the jihadi groups, such as Jabhat al-Nusra, to “give the opposition. Furthermore, he said, their efforts had Syrian opposition a bad name” and block financial received only scant attention in anti-regime media. support to the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Participants made clear that cycles of violence and Many said that a fear of Islamist insurgents coming sectarianism are leading the country toward further to power was stopping minorities from joining the fragmentation, both political and military. Syria is revolution, wary that the revolt was undergoing a slow process of “can- heading in the wrong direction. Unless the opposition tonization,” some warned, with one More importantly, this fear was pre- saying, “We are heading toward a cluding consensus on what the fate has the support of Sunni, Kurdish, Alawi, and Druze of the Assad regime should be. Only key minority groups, division of Syria.” Furthermore, the 20 percent of the population is cur- “Assad will continue to revolution had also deepened the rently fighting to uproot the regime, rift between the rural poor and the one participant said. The remainder feel safe.” urban middle classes. Born out of – including a majority of Alawis, rural villages now under the control Kurds, Druze, and Christians – of rebel militants, the culture of the form a “big silent bloc between … the regime and revolution is “largely alien to the urban bourgeoisie” the opposition.” of Damascus and Aleppo, a Kurdish academic explained. As one senior Druze leader explained, the Druze of Sweida are afraid to join the revolution, fearing Participants voiced concern for the lack of polit- regime reprisals from shabbiha militiamen or the ical initiatives that might stop the trend toward 1 THE CHALLENGE OF SYRIAN UNITY fragmentation. They admitted that Syrians have Tilting the military balance in this way would also not yet devised an effective political formula for encourage further defections, especially among the maintaining Syrian unity while ending the crisis “70 percent of the army that is Sunni,” a former and guiding the country toward a stable transition. air force officer said. He spoke of “four Alawi Thus far, one international representative insisted, republican guards who were willing to join in the “the opposition has not done its job” in agreeing on transition” but said that such figures needed incen- and popularizing such a plan. A veteran Christian tives to defect and must do so at the right moment. politician said, “We are divided as an opposition,” Under current circumstances, he said, such defec- adding that “every sect is presenting a different tors would be easily replaced by other loyal recruits. program.” He, along with others, argued that it was necessary to establish an inclusive process to articu- Ultimately, the trajectory of the military conflict is late such a plan, “starting with collective steps.” central to shaping attitudes among Syrians about the nature of any political settlement to the