EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN BRIEF POLICY RELATIONS ecfr.eu ENGAGINGWITH FRIENDS WITH LIKE IRAN: THESE: ATURKEY, EUROPEAN RUSSIA, AND AGENDA THE END OF AN EllieUNLIKELY Geranmayeh ALLIANCE Asli Aydintasbas Two resurgent powers with regional ambitions, powerful leaders, rising nationalism, and a deep suspicion of the West – there was every reason for Russia and Turkey to form a SUMMARY lasting alliance. Had the friendship between Russia’s Vladi- • Turkey and Russia’s burgeoning friendship mir Putin and Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan resulted in a came to an abrupt end when Turkey shot down a more lasting alliance, they could have created a formidable Russian fighter jet over Syria in November 2015. counterbalance to the Western axis in Eastern Europe and • Since the rupture, Ankara has moved back the Middle East. towards the transatlantic security architecture, while Moscow has stepped up its links with the But history rarely unfolds as expected. Turkey’s downing Kurds, fuelling suspicion in Turkey, while the of a Russian jet over Syria in November 2015 led to a sud- two moved towards a proxy war in Syria. den and traumatic rupture in the burgeoning relationship. Economic ties nearly collapsed; Russian animosity towards • The EU cannot afford to watch from afar: Syria, the Ankara spilled over into Syria; harsh rhetoric from leaders refugee crisis, and the Kurdish question are deeply was matched by public outrage. intertwined. Turkey is a NATO member and a key part of planned Russian energy routes to Europe. This paper examines the rise and fall of the Turkey-Russia • The chance of a direct military confrontation friendship during the Putin-Erdoğan era. Was it doomed between the two powers in Syria seem to have to fail? Were the differences over Syria impossible to over- receded, as Turkish forces avoid Syrian airspace come? Are Turkey’s regional aspirations as a Sunni power and Ankara has moderated its ambitions for incompatible with Russia’s new wish for a role in the Middle regime change. Still, a return to normal will take East? And, most importantly, is there a possibility of direct a long time. confrontation between Turkey and Russia? • A Turkey-Russia confrontation is not in These questions matter greatly to European decision makers anyone’s interests, but nor would it help Europe for a number of reasons, the most pressing being the need for Turkey to adopt the Russian model of to prevent a direct confrontation between two major pow- authoritarian crony capitalism. Europe should ers on Europe’s periphery. Despite its troubled relationship develop its own Kurdish policy, help dampen a with the European Union, Turkey is still a candidate country Turkey-Russia proxy conflict in the Caucasus, and a NATO power. Its relationship with Russia affects Eu- and encourage Turkish energy diversification rope’s energy policies, since Turkey sits at the crossroads of away from Russia. Eurasia and plays a prominent role in plans for new Russian energy supply routes to Europe. More importantly, the conflict between Turkey and Russia in the Antalya area alone.2 Loss of tourism revenues range has a significant impact on the evolution of the Syrian war, anywhere from $5-10 billion, according to news reports particularly in terms of Russian support for Kurdish forces and various experts. Despite former Prime Minister Ahmet in northern Syria and Turkey’s reaction to this support. The Davutoğlu’s prediction in February that Russian tourists EU cannot afford to simply watch from afar: the refugee cri- “would not give up on Turkey”, an official boycott on tours sis, the Syrian war, and the Kurdish question are all inter- and charter flights to Turkey remains in place. twined on a deep level. The liberation of territory from the Islamic State (ISIS) in northern Syria and the post-ISIS po- Overnight, Turkey turned from a friend to a foe in the Rus- litical transition in these zones are key components in mak- sian media, with stories appearing accusing it of support for ing Syria a viable place to live for its citizens who are now jihadists and ties with ISIS. Turkey initially tried to de-esca- seeking refuge in Europe. These are also necessary steps for late, and Erdoğan noted a few days after the incident: “We curbing terrorism inside Europe. feel really saddened about this incident. We would not like such a thing to happen, but unfortunately it did.”3 There are already the beginnings of a Turkish-Russian proxy war in Syria. Europe has a strong interest in avoiding this, But the Russian propaganda campaign was now directed not least due to the impact of refugee flows from the region. against Erdoğan and his family, with allegations that the EU institutions and member states should take an active president’s son or son-in-law were profiting from the illegal role in preventing an escalation and facilitating dialogue be- sale of ISIS oil. Stories surfaced across Russian media about tween the two sides. corruption allegations from 2014 against Erdoğan and his in- ner circle, Turkish prosecutions of journalists, and the deteri- The downing of the fighter jet orating human rights conditions of Kurds. In December 2015, Putin made a distinction between Turkey and Erdoğan: “It is On the morning of 24 November 2015, the Turkish Presi- a good and hardworking nation. In Turkey, we have a lot of dency announced that the air force had downed a Russian friends. They must understand that we do not put an ‘equals’ 4 SU-24 that violated Turkish airspace – perhaps the most sign between them and supporters of terrorists.” WITH FRIENDS LIKE THESE: TURKEY, RUSSIA, AND THE END OF AN UNLIKELY ALLIANCE RUSSIA, AND THE END OF AN UNLIKELY WITH FRIENDS LIKE THESE: TURKEY, public clash between Russia and a NATO country in decades. Seven months after the incident, Turkey and Russia are still Initially, the response from Turkey’s pro-government media locked in a bitter dispute, showing no signs of reconciliation and commentators was nationalistic to the point of giddy. or even effective dialogue. But soon afterwards, when a video surfaced showing Syrian opposition forces killing one of the pilots as he was descend- Historic foes become business partners ing by parachute, the official tone became more defensive, talking about Russian violations and Turkey’s “rules of en- To understand what the downing of the fighter jet means gagement”. In a letter to the United Nations Security Coun- for Russia and Turkey, and what will come next, we need cil, Ankara explained that the bomber had been warned for to examine the history of the two countries’ relations. The almost five minutes as it approached Turkish airspace, and first question is where to start the timeline. Should it go back then crossed into it for 17 seconds. NATO was also notified. to the Ottoman and Russian empires, which fought 17 wars from the fifteenth century onwards – all instigated and won In the meantime, the downing of the jet and the brutal kill- by Russia?5 Or should it start from the Erdoğan-Putin era, ing of the pilot unleashed a patriotic rage in Russia far be- which reversed decades of Cold War freeze and ushered in yond Ankara’s imagination. Putin warned of “serious con- an era of economic cooperation, with Russia even at one sequences” for what he described as “a stab in the back” by point becoming Turkey’s top trade partner? “terrorist accomplices”. “It appears that Allah decided to punish Turkey’s ruling clique by depriving them of wisdom Wherever the inquiry begins, historical baggage will always and judgement”, he commented.1 be a factor in Turkish-Russian relations. At times, the weight of the past has led Turkey to make critical choices, such as The escalation in rhetoric was followed by a series of harsh joining NATO in 1952 to counterbalance the Soviet Union. www.ecfr.eu economic measures against Turkish companies and exports. Relations unravelled at lightning speed. Over the next days, Turkey and the Soviet Union were on the opposite sides of weeks, and months, the two countries effectively froze diplo- the Iron Curtain throughout the Cold War, and relations matic ties; hostility prevailed in the public domain; and the were slow to kick off in the post-Cold War era. For much absence of some 4 million Russian tourists dealt a signifi- 2 Norman Stone, “Turkey and Russia – friends for a while, now foes once again”, Financial cant blow to Turkey’s tourism industry. Combined with the Times, 11 March 2016, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/70578676-e627-11e5- a09b-1f8b0d268c39.html. declining number of European tourists due to ISIS attacks, June 2016 3 “Turkey ‘saddened’ about Russian jet’s downing, Erdoğan says”, Hurriyet Daily News, Turkish tourism suffered its worst period since the Iraq war. 28 November 2015, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-saddened- about-russian-jets-downing-erdogan-says.aspx?PageID=238&NID=91807&NewsCat Media reports suggest that more than 400 hotels are for sale ID=510. 4 Vitalii Petrov, “Putin: U Rossii net i ne budet nenavisti k turetskomu narodu”, RG.ru, 3 December 2015, available at http://rg.ru/2015/12/03/narod-site.html. 5 Soner Cagaptay and James Jeffrey, “How Will the Turkey-Russia Crisis Affect Ankara’s ECFR/178 NATO Ties?” PolicyWatch 2530, Washington Institute for Near East Studies, 9 December 1 “Putin – Allakh reshil nakazat’ pravyashchuyu kliky v Tyrtsii, lishiv ee razuma i 2015, available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-will- 2 rassudka”, NTV.ru, 3 December 2015, available at http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/1579747.