THE BERLIN-KOREA PARALLEL: BERLIN AND AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY IN LIGHT OF THE KOREAN WAR Author(s): DAVID G. COLEMAN Reviewed work(s): Source: Australasian Journal of American Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1 (July, 1999), pp. 19-41 Published by: Australia and New Zealand American Studies Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41018739 . Accessed: 18/09/2012 14:16 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Australia and New Zealand American Studies Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Australasian Journal of American Studies. http://www.jstor.org AUSTRALASIAN JOURNALOF AMERICAN STUDIES 19 THE BERLIN-KOREA PARALLEL: BERLIN AND AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY IN LIGHT OF THE KOREAN WAR DAVID G. COLEMAN The Korean War had a profoundimpact on the ways in which American policymakersperceived the Cold War.Nowhere was thismore fact evident than in the case of Berlin. Despite the geographicalseparation between the two countries,policymakers became concernedwith what theyidentified as the 'Berlin-Koreaparallel.' Holding the Soviet Union responsible for North Korea's aggression,Washington believed that in NorthKorea's attackit was witnessing a new Sovietcapability that could give theUSSR a decisiveedge in the Cold War. Until that time, US defence plannersdirected their effortstoward preparingfor the Red Armysweeping through Europe and forother equally absolute threats.The NorthKorean attack,however, cast into doubt their assumptions.'War-by-proxy', or the use of troopsfrom Soviet satellitesto probeWestern intentions and capabilitieswithout actually using Soviet troops, would add a new, less directdimension to the East-Westconflict. Every indicationled Washingtonto believe thatMoscow could and probablywould employthe 'Koreanmodel' in Berlin.Indeed, the War Departmentwarned US commandersin Europewithin days of theoutbreak of hostilitiesthat the North Koreanattack 'may indicateriskier Soviet policy henceforth of usingSatellite armedforces in attemptingto reach limitedobjectives for the expansionof Communism.'1Historian Ernest R. May putit moresuccinctly: the attack 'was widelyviewed as a rehearsalfor a comparableeffort in Europe'2. Ultimately,of course,the Soviet Union did not send East Germantroops to attackthe West's positionin Berlin,and morerecent sources have revealed that, quiteapart from the debate about Stalin's intentions, such a move was nevera viableoption. Yet theprospect - and it was theperception of a threatthat was the core issue - led to extensiverevision of existingnational security policy designedto maintainthe Americanpresence in the city.As it was eventually tabledin 1952, in the formof NationalSecurity Council (NSC) 132/1 'US Policy and Courses of Actionto CounterSoviet or SatelliteAction Against Berlin', Washington'sBerlin policy underwenta strikingshift during the 20 AUSTRALASIAN JOURNALOF AMERICAN STUDIES Korean War from relatively straightforwardplanning for the contingencyof another blockade, to defending against a more sophisticated and ambiguous threat- an attack on Berlin by recently formed East German paramilitary forces. This new policy reflected the intersectionof a conceptual shift and practicalexperience. This transformationhas, forthe most part,been neglected in the historiography of the Berlin issue. Diplomatic historianshave produced importantaccounts of the impact of the Korean War on NATO, particularlythe massive injection of funds and militarybuildup for which the war acted as a catalyst. There are many accounts of Washington's response to the Berlin blockade, and thereare numerousreferences on the crisis period from1958 to 1962, but the intervening period in relationto Berlin has been under-appreciated.5Yet the record clearly shows thatWashington did not simplyforget about the Berlin problem in 1949, after the liftingof the blockade, only to be reminded of the threat when Khrushchevpresented his ultimatumin November 1958. Moreover, the policy upon which the Eisenhower administrationbased its response to Khrushchev's challenge was very differentto that which had emerged immediatelyafter the blockade; in the interveningperiod was a crucial process of transitionthat has not been adequately explored. The relevantNSC papers, including the policy papers and memorandaof conversationsand action, are now fullydeclassified, as are the bulk of papers fromState, Defense, Intelligence,and White House sources. They make clear the depth of Washington's concern about the Berlin- Korea parallel and that this situation led directlyto America's Berlin policy being revised and re-written.Specifically, the experience of the Korean War led to more sophisticatedUS policy that accounted for a much broader range of contingencies. In his internationalhistory of the Korean War, William Stueck pointed out that 'the [Korean] war's impact was global, despite the limitedgeographical scope of the fighting'.6Essential elements of the experience of the Korean conflict were not limitedin application to the Far East; rather,they remained valid for situationson otherparts of the globe. In thisrespect, the 'lessons of Korea' were valuable to Americanpolicymakers in what theyseemed to reveal about Soviet capabilities,and in respect to the practicalimplementation of containment.The accuracy of American estimates of Soviet militarystrength in the early Cold War, and the influencethese assessments exertedon the policymakingprocess was, and remains,contentious. However, most contemporaryestimates rested upon the assumption that the threat was a World War H-style invasion of AUSTRALASIAN JOURNALOF AMERICAN STUDIES 21 Europe in which Moscow would risk all. A Soviet preponderanceof conventionalmilitary forces, compounded by a new albeit incipientatomic capability,posed a seriousthreat for which military planners strove to account. 'War-by-proxy',however, could effectivelyrender meaningless American assessmentsof Sovietmilitary strength, irrespective of how accuratethey were. In short,in themid-1950s Washington recognised that, despite the tremendous resourcesit had devoted to assessing Soviet militarystrength, it had not preparedto face a threatto its vital interestsin Berlin modelled on the Communistinvasion of SouthKorea. The originsof theKorean War were a complexinterplay of Korean,Chinese, Soviet,and Americaninfluences.8 Bruce Cummings, in his seminalstudy of the originsof theKorean War, even wentso faras to arguethat 'Who startedthe KoreanWar?' was a questionbest not asked.9But Americanpolicymakers in 1950 did need to ask and felt certainthey had the answer. Seen from Washington,the march of NorthKorean Communist troops on SouthKorea on 25 June1950 could be nothingother than International Communism's military aggression,carefully orchestrated by theKremlin.10 Whetherthe 'Kremlin'sKorean venture'was the openingmove in a global offensivewas less certain.What Washington did knowwas thatthe Korean War could signal the startof a global offensive.What was more, the military aggressionof the NorthKoreans revealed a dangerousnew Soviet capability; and foran administrationincreasingly framing policy on Soviet capabilities ratherthan intentions this demanded attention.11 Even if the threatof further Sovietaction on manygeographical fronts seemed logistically questionable, it was certainlyreal enoughto warrantconsiderable study and planningby the highestpolicymaking bodies in the administration,including the National SecurityCouncil. Even CharlesBohlen, who believed manyin Washington wereover-reacting to the situation,had to concedethat 'there is not sufficient evidenceto justify a firmopinion that the Soviet Union will not take any one or all of theactions which lie withinits militarycapabilities'.12 Secretary of State Dean Achesonagreed. In fact,he said,the next crisis might come at anyone of a dozenplaces.13 Assuminga monolithicand coherentstructure of InternationalCommunism controlledby the Kremlin,Washington feared that Moscow mightemploy in Europe a methodof aggressionmodelled on Korea. The NorthKorean's invasionhad been unexpectedfor many reasons, not the least of whichwas the 22 AUSTRALASIAN JOURNALOF AMERICAN STUDIES assumption,long-held in policymakingcircles, that any conflictwith the Communistworld would come as blatantaggression from the Soviet Union, and would face Soviet militaryforces against US militaryforces; an assumption HenryKissinger identified as 'themajor flaw' of containment.14In early 1950, however,policymakers were beginningto recognise a new threat.The administration'scomprehensive Cold War policy blueprint,NSC 68 'United StatesObjectives and Programsfor National Security', dismissed global waras a Soviet intention.15It was unlikely,therefore, that Moscow would initiate directmilitary aggression with the riskof uncontrolledescalation it entailed. Yet at thesame time,NSC 68 warnedof thedangers of 'piecemealaggression' wherebythe Soviets could threatenAmerican interests without resorting to directmilitary confrontation. By exploitingWashington's unwillingness to engagein atomicwar unlessdirectly attacked, Moscow mightpose