British Imperial Policy and the Indian Air Route, 1918-1932 CROMPTON, Teresa Available from the Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at: http://shura.shu.ac.uk/24737/ A Sheffield Hallam University thesis This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author. The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author. When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. Please visit http://shura.shu.ac.uk/24737/ and http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html for further details about copyright and re-use permissions. British Imperial Policy and the Indian Air Route, 1918-1932 Teresa Crompton A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Sheffield Hallam University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy January 2014 Abstract The thesis examines the development of the civil air route between Britain and India from 1918 to 1932. Although an Indian route had been pioneered before the First World War, after it ended, fourteen years would pass before the route was established on a permanent basis. The research provides an explanation for the late start and subsequent slow development of the India route. The overall finding is that progress was held back by a combination of interconnected factors operating in both Britain and the Persian Gulf region. These included economic, political, administrative, diplomatic, technological, and cultural factors. The arguments are developed through a methodology that focuses upon two key theoretical concepts which relate, firstly, to interwar civil aviation as part of a dimension of empire, and secondly, to the history of aviation as a new technology. With regards to empire, the thesis investigates the imperial and economic value of imperial aviation, perceptions of Britain’s imperial potency, and the nature of Britain’s long-term policy and administrative arrangements in London, Delhi, Persia, and on the Trucial Coast. In relation to technology, the thesis examines the choices made by the British. In connection with both empire and technology, the thesis considers the character and effects of the ‘official mind’ responsible for civil aviation policy. The research shows that, in relation to aviation, British imperial policy-making was in general neither confident nor proactive. In terms of the India route, British imperial administrators displayed weakness, in that they were unable to impose their will sufficiently strongly to drive through the route either rapidly or effectively. The impetus for imperial aviation came from the empire’s core, and the causes of the route’s delay were therefore located within the core. The primary cause was Britain’s resistance to providing financial support for air transportation. As the First World War ended, the development of imperial aviation depended upon that of civil aviation. With private capital investment not forthcoming, the Government reluctantly took on responsibility but not until 1924, when, provoked by Germany’s air progress and lured by the promise of imperial prestige, was the Government forced to provide financial support to civil aviation. It subsidised Imperial Airways, but in pursuing the policy of wholly funding the R101 airship project it made the wrong technological choice. The Imperial Airship Scheme only diverted public money away from the aeroplane development on which future civil aviation would depend. In the second half of the 1920s, as the British attempted to develop the India route via Persia and then the Trucial Coast, their long-term policy in the region seemed to promise diplomatic advantage in negotiations. However, as aviation represented an unwelcome incursion into local sovereignty, it caused local opposition. Unable to resort to their traditional ‘gunboat diplomacy,’ the British found their influence greatly below what they had presumed. When they were forced to develop a collaborative relationship with local elites, it became apparent that a balance of power had emerged. While undoubtedly showing the limitations of British imperial policy-making, the protracted history of the establishment of the Indian air route demonstrates that to some extent the British ‘official mind’ was flexible, and capable of adapting to changed conditions. Acknowledgements First and foremost I thank my supervisor, Merv Lewis, for both encouraging me and for challenging me academically. His advice – always incisive and pertinent - was crucial to the success of the thesis. I also thank Sheffield Hallam University for funding my research in the India Office archives. Thanks are due, too, to Gordon Pirie for giving me pointers along the way. Finally, I am grateful to my husband, Peter Crompton, for his willingness to discuss many fine points and obscure aspects of British imperial interwar aviation during my years of research. The thesis is dedicated to my father, Alan Crawford, from whom I must have got history. Contents List of Figures Contents Chapter One: Introduction 1 Chapter Two: Imperial Aviation: Context and Policy to 1921 11 Chapter Three: ‘A Dangerous Gamble’: Formulating Imperial Aviation Policy, 1921- 1930 64 Chapter Four: ‘His Majesty’s Government have No Levers’: the Air Route through Persia, 1924-1932 116 Chapter Five: The Struggle for the Arabian Route, 1926-1932 172 Chapter Six: Force Majeure: the Sharjah Solution, 1932 212 Chapter Seven: Retrospect and Conclusion 251 Bibliography 258 List of Figures (Sources are given in footnotes in the text) Chapter Two Fig. 2.1. Frederick Sykes, 1919. A portrait by William Orpen. Fig. 2.2. The Vickers Vimy biplane in which Alcock and Brown crossed the Atlantic, 1919. Fig. 2.3. Winston Churchill, 1921. Fig. 2.4. Touting for ‘Peace enquiries’ – a Westland Aircraft Works company advertisement, 1919. Fig. 2.5. Instone airline publicity material, c. 1924. Fig. 2.6. March 1919. Britain’s R34 airship was 196 metres in length, with a diameter of 24 metres and a volume of 5,5218m3. With a maximum speed of 99.7 kph., the R34 was powered by five 275 hp. (205 kw.) engines and had a ‘useful lift’ capability of 26,417 kg. Map 1. Air routes between Cairo and Karachi under consideration by the Government in 1919. Map 2. The British Empire in 1921 (marked in red). Chapter Three Fig. 3.1. Frederick Guest (c. 1910-1915). Fig. 3.2. The wreck of the R38 airship in the Humber Estuary. Fig. 3.3. Samuel Hoare demonstrates commitment to aviation. Fig. 3.4. Lord Thomson boards the R101: a trial flight, October 29. Fig. 3.5. Brancker, Cobham, and Elliot (mechanic) with the de Havilland 50 aircraft in which they flew to India. Fig. 3.6. An advertisement for Imperial Airways’ services to ten Continental destinations, 1925. Fig. 3.7. The R101 under construction at Cardington. A gas bag has been inflated inside the metal framework (undated, 1920s). Fig. 3.8. The R100 tethered to its mooring mast at St. Hubert airport, Montreal, Canada, August 1930. Fig. 3.9. The LZ127 Graf Zeppelin operated commercially from 1928 to 1937. Publicity pictures for the R101 made the British ship seem Spartan and flimsy in comparison with the German one, which was comfortably upholstered and attractively decorated. Chapter Four Fig. 4.1. Sefton Brancker, March 1921. Fig. 4.2. Sir Percy Loraine, about 1933. Fig. 4.3. Reza Shah (undated). Fig. 4.4. A cartoon showing Samuel Hoare, 1929. The cartoonist reflects Hoare’s role as Secretary of State for Air both in the representation of an aeroplane and in the blue shadow. The latter suggests not only Imperial Airways’ ‘Speedbird’ logo, but also the grainy blue print of an airmail label. Fig. 4.5. Teymourtash and his wife, Tatyana. Fig. 4.6. The topography of the Persian Gulf, showing the mountainous interior of Persia on the Gulf’s north side and the flatter Arabian side. The Hajar Mountains form a rocky projection into the Gulf, creating the narrow neck of the Strait of Hormuz. Fig. 4.7. Teymourtash arriving at Moscow Railway Station, 1926. Fig. 4.8. Reza Shah checks that his train runs on time (undated). Fig. 4.9. A Persian Air Force pilot, 1930s. Fig. 4.10. Junkers F13 aeroplanes in Persia (undated). Map 3. Modern map of the Middle East. The Persian Gulf route, firstly via Persia (Iran) and the Trucial Coast (United Arab Emirates) linked Europe and Britain’s air terminus at Karachi British India (now in Pakistan). Map 4. Junkers air routes in Persia. From a Junkers brochure (date unknown). Chapter Five Fig. 5.1. The Hajar Mountains, United Arab Emirates, 2004. Fig. 5.2. The Bushire Residency (undated). Fig. 5.3. HMS Bideford, one of the British sloops that patrolled the Persian Gulf (c. 1931). Fig. 5.4. Old watchtower at Rams, United Arab Emirates, 2004. Fig. 5.5. Supermarine Napier Southampton flying boat, 1930 Fig. 5.6. One of the Handley-Page HP-42 craft that operated the Persian Gulf air sector from 1931 (shown at Gaza - undated). Map 5. Imperial Airways routes radiating from Cairo. Three routes through the Persian Gulf were considered: the ‘Proposed’ Central Persian route, the Persian coast route, and the Arabian shore route. While the Persian shore route was operated from 1929, the Arabian route would be adopted in 1932. Map 6. Showing the Trucial Coast area, 1866-1935. Chapter Six Fig. 6.1. Francis Shelmerdine (undated). Fig. 6.2. Boy with toy boat, Sharjah Creek, 1926. Fig. 6.3. Sheikh Saqar (left) in Sharjah Rest House, early 1940s. The Residency Agent is on the right. Fig. 6.4. RAF Westland Wapiti aircraft in formation over Iraq, 1930s. Fig. 6.5. Harold Dickson after a game of polo (undated). Fig. 6.6. Charles Dalrymple-Belgrave (undated). Fig. 6.7.