57 The Proliferation Axis: Beijing-Islamabad-Pyongyang Mohan Malik* Abstract This article discusses major proliferation trends in Asia and analyses the motivations, objectives and interests of China, Pak- istan and North Korea behind WMD proliferation. It argues that China and its proxies continue to be instrumental in fueling major proliferation crises, large and small, imminent and somewhat more distant. The North Korean-Pakistan nukes-for-missiles barter deal illus- trates how China is now facing the consequences of its own short- sighted policies. While China’s support for North Korea has its roots in the Cold War, Beijing’s support for Pakistan has its roots in China’s hostility toward and rivalry with India. Nuclear pro- liferation through networking among second-tier nuclear states and nuclear aspirants has opened a Pandora’s Box of a nuclear arms race. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons exports to North Korea not only impinge on US security interests in Northeast Asia and the Pacific, but also raise the specter of the likelihood of nuclear weapons/mate- rials/know-how being passed on to non-state actors. The last section provides an analysis of the implications of WMD proliferation for the Asian balance-of-power, especially for the Sino-US-Japanese triangular relationship and Sino-Korean rela- tions. It concludes that in the absence of great power consensus and coordinated strategy, nuclear and missile proliferation may well be unstoppable in the Asia-Pacific. * The views expressed in this article are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Asia-Pacific Center, the Department of Defense or the US government. The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XV, No. 1, Spring 2003 58 The Proliferation Axis: Beijing-Islamabad-Pyongyang Introduction Recent media reports of Chinese and Pakistani assistance to North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs have not only once again drawn the international community’s attention to the chal- lenges facing the global nuclear non-proliferation (NNP) regime but also made public what has long been common knowledge in the intel - ligence and policymaking community. Amongst the first-tier five declared Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), the commitment of the Peo- ple’s Republic of China (PRC), the last signatory to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to the cause of non-proliferation has long been the subject of comment and criticism.1 Despite Beijing’s numer- ous pledges, assurances and legal commitments to the contrary, intel - ligence reports suggest that “the China shop” for nuclear and mis- sile technology sales remains open for business.2 China has been held responsible for aiding, either directly or indirectly, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on the Korean Peninsula, and in South Asia and the Middle East—the world’s most flammable regions.3 The nuclear weapons technology involved in North Korea’s 1 See Shirley A. Kan, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues (Washington, DC: Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Dec. 4, 2002), available at http: //www.fas.org/spp/ starwars/crs/RL31555.pdf; J. Mohan Malik “China and the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Regime,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Dec. 2000), pp. 445–478; Mohan Malik, “China plays ‘the proliferation card’,” Jane’s Intel- ligence Review [hereafter JIR], Vol. 12, No. 7 (July 2000), pp. 34–37. 2 CIA report to the US Congress on WMD proliferation for the period of July 2001 to December 2001 was submitted in January 2003. See US Department of State, “CIA Report Documents Weapons Proliferation Trends,” Jan. 7, 2003; Bill Gertz, “CIA Says N. Korea Tried To Buy Nuclear Gear In 2001,” Wash- ington Times, Jan. 8, 2003, p. 3. 3 According to the Director of Central Intelligence, the PRC remains a “key supplier” of technology inconsistent with nonproliferation goals–particularly missile or chemical technology transfers. See Kan, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles. In its report released in July 2002, the US-China Security Review Commission stated: “China provides tech- nology and components for weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems to terrorist-sponsoring states such as North Korea, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Sudan.” Mohan Malik 59 program—including large numbers of centrifuge machines to produce weapons-grade uranium—has its origins in Chinese assistance to Pak- istan’s nuclear program. To make matters worse, long-time recipients of WMD and missile-related technology from China, second-tier pro- liferators, such as Pakistan and North Korea, are now disseminating WMD technologies and expertise to third-tier nuclear aspirants such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and Libya.4 More importantly, Chinese assistance to Pakistan and North Korea and Islamabad’s nukes-for-missiles barter trade with Pyongyang epit- omize the emergence of a set of mutually reinforcing proliferation linkages while highlighting the global nature of the nuclear problem and the blurring of the distinctions between Northeast Asian and South Asian security complexes. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to and from radicalized and volatile Pakistan or the unpre- dictable, Stalinist regime of North Korea or “Saddamized” Iraq and “Khameini-ized” Iran or Wahabi clergy-dominated Saudi Arabia, could see a proliferation chain being transformed into an interactive, multi-dimensional, interlinked chain, stretching from Israel to North Korea in the coming decades. Even more alarming is the prospect of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan reconsidering their non-nuclear weapons stance to counter what they may perceive as the China-led bloc of nuclear powers. This article discusses major proliferation trends in Asia and ana- lyzes the motivations, objectives and interests of China, Pakistan and North Korea behind WMD proliferation. It argues that China and its proxies continue to be instrumental in fueling major proliferation crises large and small, imminent and somewhat more distant. North Korea and Pakistan, with their limited scientific and industrial capa- bilities and collapsing economies, could not have developed weapons 4 According to the CIA, during the second half of 2001, “North Korea ... export [ed] significant ballistic-missile–related equipment, components, mate- rials and technical expertise to the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa.” See Michele Lerner, “North Korea Weapons A Nuclear Nightmare,” Washington Times, Jan. 17, 2003, p. 1; Gaurav Kampani, “Second-Tier Prolif- eration: The Case of Pakistan and North Korea,” Nonproliferation Review (Fall/Winter 2002), pp. 107–116; Anwar Iqbal, “US studies Pakistan, Saudi N-ties: Report,” Dawn (Karachi), Aug. 2, 2002, p. 1. 60 The Proliferation Axis: Beijing-Islamabad-Pyongyang of mass destruction without substantial technical and financial assis- tance from China and some of the Middle Eastern countries. Nor is it a sheer coincidence that the United States, Japan, South Korea, and India—countries that either see China as their rival or have strained ties with China—find themselves subjected to nuclear blackmail, ter- rorism, intimidation, and coercion by countries —North Korea and Pakistan—that happen to be China’s allies. The last section provides an analysis of the implications of WMD proliferation for the Asian balance-of-power, especially for the Sino-US-Japanese triangular rela- tionship and Sino-Korean relations and the future of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime It concludes that in the absence of great power consensus and coordinated strategy, nuclear and missile pro- liferation may well be unstoppable in the Asia-Pacific. WMD Friendship Store: Dangerous Liaisons China bears a great deal of responsibility for recent nuclear pro- liferation in Asia given the assistance it has provided to Pakistan’s and North Korea’s nuclear/missile efforts over the years.5 China’s nuclear and missile technology transfers to Pakistan and North Korea have further implications for secondary, or retransferred, proliferation, since these two reportedly have supplied technology to Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.6 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the United States sought to persuade China to stop WMD pro- liferation activities but to little or no avail.7 Critics contend that if the so-called “Axis of Evil” (“AoE”) countries have one thing in common, it is their “China connection.” They argue that going by the “AoE” 5 See E. Ahrari, “Sino-Indian Nuclear Perspectives,” JIR, Aug. 1998, p. 33; and Mohan Malik, “Nuclear Proliferation in Asia-The China Factor,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 1 (April 1999), pp. 31–34. 6 Information here draws on Steve Doll, “China’s Record of Proliferation Mis- behavior,” Issue Brief, Nuclear Control Institute, Washington, Sept. 29, 1997. 7 Proliferation: Chinese Case Studies, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Inter- national Security Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 105th Congress, 1st Session, April 10, 1997, pp. 8–12. Mohan Malik 61 criteria (non-democratic/militarist regimes, hostility to the United States and its allies, track record in promoting proliferation and/or terrorism and, their capability to do terrible things), if North Korea is a card-carrying member of the “AoE,” then Pakistan or China should also be included in President Bush’s “Axis of Evil.”8 Unfortuantely, those China-watchers