“We Say All the Real Things. And We Believe Them:” The Establishment of the United States Information Agency, 1953 by Matthew J. Logan B.A., University of Victoria, 2009 A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of History © Matthew J. Logan, 2012 University of Victoria All rights reserved. This thesis may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without the permission of the author. ii “We Say All the Real Things. And We Believe Them:” The Establishment of the United States Information Agency, 1953 by Matthew J. Logan B.A., University of Victoria, 2009 Supervisory Committee Dr. Jason M. Colby, Supervisor (Department of History) Dr. Greg Blue, Departmental Member (Department of History) iii Supervisory Committee Dr. Jason M. Colby, Supervisor (Department of History) Dr. Greg Blue, Departmental Member (Department of History) Abstract As the world became at once more interconnected and more polarized during the twentieth century, the need for the major powers to effectively communicate their perspective to the rest of the world through propaganda grew stronger. However, although the United States was undeniably gaining prestige and influence by the late 1930s, the upstart global power struggled to implement a lasting and successful propaganda program. In the years immediately preceding the Second World War, when the United States was targeted by both Axis and Soviet propaganda, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt proved reluctant to implement a peacetime state- sponsored propaganda program. Roosevelt’s successor Harry Truman, on the other hand, did not share this reluctance and throughout the first years of the Cold War sanctioned the establishment of several peacetime programs. However, because of Truman’s lack of understanding of and personal commitment to the use of propaganda, U.S. efforts in this field were uncoordinated, expensive, and largely ineffective. As a result, the highly centralized Soviet propaganda iv machine constantly tried to divide the United States and its allies and draw more countries into the communist camp. It was not until Dwight Eisenhower, arguably the first true psychological warrior to become president, took office in 1953 that U.S. Cold War propagandists began to match the efforts of their Soviet counterparts. Eisenhower used his organizational talents and military experiences with psychological warfare to restructure U.S. foreign information services into highly coordinated, cost-effective, and efficient Cold War weapons. With the establishment of the United States Information Agency in October 1953, the United States gained more control of its image abroad, casting both U.S. domestic and foreign policies in as favourable a light as possible while simultaneously condemning communists as disingenuous, autocratic imperialists. While U.S. officials struggled to implement effective psychological warfare programs, they were inevitably forced to confront difficult questions concerning the role of propaganda in a democratic society. Whereas a majority of Americans in the interwar period regarded propaganda as anathema, and a tool to which only fascists and communists resorted, by the time Eisenhower took office a growing number of officials had concluded that the stakes in the Cold War were simply too high to leave anything to chance. As a result, these officials argued, it was imperative that the U.S. government target not only international, but also domestic audiences with state-sponsored propaganda in order to ‘educate’ the public on U.S. Cold War objectives and the perils of communism. v Table of Contents Supervisory Committee .................................................................................................................. ii Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iii Table of Contents………………………………………………………………………………….v List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ vi List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................................... vii Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... viii A Word on Terminology ................................................................................................................. x Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1: New Beginnings (1940-1945) ..................................................................................... 11 Chapter 2: New Beginnings Redux (1945-1952).......................................................................... 36 Chapter 3: “Skillful and Constant Use of the Power of Truth” .................................................... 63 Afterword ……………………………………………………………………..……………..... 101 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 107 vi List of Figures Figure 1. Committee on Public Information posters from the First World War ........................ 15 Figure 2. Office of War Information posters from the Second World War ................................ 33 Figure 3. “Our Treadmill Foreign Policy: A Cartoonist View” .................................................. 59 Figure 4. Combat leaflet ZG 73 K from the Second World War ................................................ 75 Figure 5. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and C.D. Jackson, 1953 .......................................... 77 Figure 6. “The Negro in American Life” .................................................................................... 87 Figure 7. Eisenhower at the Voice of America headquarters in New York City ........................ 95 vii List of Abbreviations CENIS MIT Center for International Studies CENTO Central Treaty Organization CIA Central Intelligence Agency CIAA Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs COI Coordinator of Information COMINFORM Communist Information Bureau COMINTERN Communist International CPI Committee on Public Information DCI Director of Central Intelligence FIS Foreign Information Service IIA International Information Administration JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCFE National Committee for a Free Europe NSA National Security Act (1947) NSC National Security Council OCB Operations Coordinating Board OCD Office of Civil Defense OEX Office of Educational Exchange OFF Office of Facts and Figures OFI Office of Information OGR Office of Government Reports OIE Office of Information and Exchange OPC Office of Policy Coordination OSS Office of Strategic Services OWI Office of War Information PPS Policy Planning Staff (State Department) PSB Psychological Strategy Board PWB Psychological Warfare Branch PWD Psychological Warfare Division RFE Radio Free Europe RL Radio Liberty SANACC ad hoc subcommittee of the State—Army—Navy—Air Force Coordinating Committee SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization SHAEF Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force USIA United States Information Agency USIS United States Information Service VOA Voice of America viii Acknowledgements I would like to thank the Department of History at the University of Victoria for providing me with the opportunity and financial wherewithal to undertake this project. Thanks especially to my graduate advisor, Dr. Perry Biddiscombe, and Heather Waterlander for all their time and advice. I consider myself fortunate to have completed my studies in a department full of such interesting, charismatic, and genuinely supportive professors. I would like to acknowledge a few professors in particular who have had a tremendous and positive impact on me: Dr. Martin Bunton, for your enthusiasm and support as you guided me through my undergraduate “Long Thesis.” Dr. Greg Blue, thanks for your patience and encouragement, and for making historiography as painless as a non-theoretical historian like me could have hoped. That said, ‘Foucault’ remains the worst ‘F’ word I can think of! Dr. Rachel Cleves, I wish I could say I had some idea of the role of gender in U.S. history prior to our seminar together, but I think we can both honestly say that I had no idea. I appreciate your honest and direct approach in opening my eyes to an important aspect of a field I have spent so much time studying. For their financial support, I would like to thank the Faculty of Graduate Studies at the University of Victoria. I am grateful for the kind assistance I received from Christopher Abraham, Kevin Bailey, Catherine Cain, and Chalsea Millner at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library & Museum in Abilene, Kansas. Thanks to my fellow graduate students or, as Tylor would say, my colleagues. Our lunch hour chats, though brief, offered a welcome and much-needed respite from the solitude of McPherson. I wish you all the very best in the future. Special thanks to my crew and friends at Chetwynd NIFAC. I’m lucky to have had such great times fighting fires and _______ with you ix every summer for the past three years. Every spring I look forward to getting far away from the history books: “Once more unto the fiery breach, dear friends, once more!” I wish to express my sincerest