Elite Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes A Study of Norway PHILIP M. BURGESS $6.25 Elite Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes A Study of Norway BY PHILIP M. BURGESS In the past two decades, the application of the combined skills of various disciplines to the study of those forces that exert a decisive influence in the formulation of foreign pol­ icy has brought increased recognition of the role of social-psychological factors in the decision-making process. To date, however, the significance of the "strategic image" held by any nation's governing elite, by which it selectively defines and evaluates the coun­ try's international position as a determinant of its foreign policy, has been almost totally neglected. By concentrating attention specifically on the strategic images held by successive Nor­ wegian leaders in the 1940's, and by tracing the evolution of the security concept that, in 1949, resulted in Norway's decision to renounce its neutrality and to join the North Atlantic Alliance, Mr. Burgess is able to demonstrate conclusively that an under­ standing of the security image held by the Norwegian authoritative elite serves to ex­ plain on what basis the makers of foreign- policy decisions found options confronting them either acceptable or unacceptable. He finds, furthermore, that the failure of the attempt in 1949 to establish a joint Scandi­ navian defense system, in response to shared societal and political goals clearly working in favor of common policies and programs, is directly attributable to a fundamental dis­ parity in the security concepts of the nego­ tiating parties that effectively prevented their concluding a mutually acceptable defense pact. (Continued on back flap) Elite Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes A Study of Norway A Publication of the Mershon Center for Education in National Security Elite Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes A Study of Norway riirn PHILIP M. BURGESS The Ohio State University Press COPYWGHT © BY THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS ALL RIGHTS RESERVED LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGUE CARD NUMBER 67-2445 3 Dedicated to Rene N. Ballard Philip S. Haring John A. Houston Charles O. Lerche, Jr. who served so well for -political science at Knox College Foreword The Mershon Center for Education in National Security represents one of the Ohio State University's commitments to policy analysis and scholarly research on the grav­ est global problems of our time. The Center's conception of national security" recognizes the existence of many national securities and postulates no overriding, all-embracing definition. Not only does each nation have its image of what constitutes se­ curity, but subgroups (including various 'elites" and "publics") within each nation have competing formulations of security ob­ jectives. The Mershon Center devotes a substantial share of its resources to learning more about the processes by which decisions concerning national security are reached. These processes include the mechanisms by which contending images of security are for­ mulated and the procedures through which decision-makers choose from arrays of alternative security goals and alternative programs of action to achieve the selected goals. In many countries at different times, the effectiveness of the policy-making process is itself an issue of public policy. The Center's continuing interest in policy-making processes is not description of the processes but discovery of the ways in which variations in the processes relate to variations in the content or substance of policy, i.e., in the outcomes of the processes of decision. Philip M. Burgess, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Director of the Behavioral Sciences Laboratory, is one of several participants in Mershon's continuing efforts to unravel the elusive relations between process and outcome. In this book, viii • Foreword he investigates the images that Norwegian foreign ministers and other elite decision-makers hold of their nation's interests and objectives. Professor Burgess is not content with a histor­ ical resume of one nation's elite images of security; he extends his analysis to theorizing about the ways in which these images affect the outcomes of foreign and defense processes. Through research such as is reported in this volume, the Mershon Center hopes to demonstrate that studies of policy-making processes are not only of aesthetic interest to academic observers of politics but also that the processes are important factors in shaping the values and out­ comes that are at the core of political decisions in any country at any time. As policy scientists learn more about the ways in which process shapes outcomes, decision-makers and their constituents will be better able to realize national and international security consistent with their images of preferred outcomes. JAMES A. ROBINSON, DIRECTOR Mershon Center for Education in National Security Prefiace This book on Norwegian foreign policy- making focuses on the period 1940 to 1949. During this period a fundamental change occurred in Norway's foreign policy—a change from neutrality and withdrawal from international poli­ tics to active participation in the Atlantic Alliance Treaty. For Norway's experiences, like most other nations', during and after World War II had a profound impact on outlook on interna­ tional politics. And the change in outlook—or rather the percep­ tion of Norway's relations in a larger international system—is a primary concern of Professor Burgess. He has largely confined his study to the perceptions of the "authoritative" elite, i.e., prime ministers, foreign ministers, and defense ministers. When World War II broke out, Norway had enjoyed peace for 125 years—since 1814. This long span of peace was due to not only domestic forces; to a large extent it was the result of external circumstances. With her long and ice-free coast border­ ing the North Atlantic Ocean, Norway held an important strate­ gic position, particularly significant for her powerful neighbor Great Britain. If some hostile great power should seize control of the Norwegian coast, this would mean a serious disadvantage for British sea power. As long as Britain was strong enough to prevent other great powers from gaining a foothold on Norwegian territory, Norway's wish to remain neutral did not conflict with British interests. In this respect the geostrategical situation of Norway was similar to that of other nations bordering the Atlantic Ocean, the x • Preface outstanding case in point being the United States of America. Protected by British sea power, these countries could develop their democratic institutions and national resources relatively undisturbed by international conflicts.1 This external background of Norwegian foreign politics was clearly recognized by Prime Minister Gunnar Knudsen who stated in 1914, "We trust in England." Although his statement was strongly attacked by political opponents, it is not quite clear whether this reaction was due to the bluntness of his declaration, or whether some leaders simply did not recognize the signifi­ cance of strategical factors. Neutrality and withdrawal from international conflicts were the key words of Norwegian foreign politics until World War II. After World War I Norway was an ardent supporter of the League of Nations. Pacifist sentiments were prevalent among a large proportion of the population, and national defense was reduced to a minimum. During the 193O's the defense was not improved significantly, despite growing international tension, and despite the failure of the League to maintain peace. Both militarily and politically the German attack on Norway in April, 1940, came as a surprise. Despite rumors of an imminent German invasion, the government did not make military prepa­ rations. A leading Norwegian commentator on foreign politics at that time has told an anecdote which clearly characterizes the confusion of the situation. On April 9, when German forces invaded Oslo, and he was seeking shelter from the bombing, people came up to him and asked his expert opinion on what was happening. They wanted to know from where did the attacking airplanes come. His answer was: "They must be British, because the German Luftwaffe would not have been able to break through the British blockade of Skagerak and Kattegat." This perception of the military situation, held by an influential expert, would certainly not be expressed in public statements by the authoritative elite. Although a number of political and military leaders might not share the opinions of this commentator, his view apparently constituted an underlying strategical assump­ tion of Norwegian foreign policy. The German attack revealed Preface • xi that modern warfare—in particular the development of long ranged air forces—had changed dramatically the strategical posi­ tion of Norway: the country was no longer sheltered by the British navy. The experience of the German attack and subsequent occupa­ tion led to a rethinking on Norwegian foreign politics. The discussions which were carried out in circles around the exile government in London have been extensively covered in the present volume. The government eventually arrived at the posi­ tion that Norway in the future would have to solve her problem of national security in collaboration with the Western powers. From the very beginning Norway strongly supported the col­ lective security system of the United Nations. However, as the cold war emerged and as it was realized that the United Nations did not give sufficient security, Norwegian