C. Stephen Layman Seattle Pacific University (5-8-15) The Natural Law Theory of Ethics The label “Natural Law Theory” has been used to refer to various philosophical ideas, but for present purposes it refers to theories of ethics having these four features: 1. The moral law is grounded in human nature. 1 Human beings cannot flourish or be genuinely fulfilled unless they heed the moral law and no true system of morality undermines human nature, i.e., prevents human beings from flourishing. Furthermore--as a first (and rough) approximation--an act is right if and because it promotes human flourishing, and a motive or character trait is good if and because it promotes human flourishing. Thus, the moral law is “natural” in the sense that it is grounded in human nature. This does not mean, however, that humans are always or even usually inclined to do what is right; Natural Law (NL) theorists are well aware that becoming a good person takes a lot of effort. Also, since any plausible system of morality requires that individuals make some sacrifices for others, NL theorists must explain how such sacrifices are compatible with human flourishing. 2. The good is prior to the right; that is, principles concerning right action (e.g., “You should not commit murder”) are based on the goods necessary for human flourishing or fulfillment. 2 NL theorists do not all agree on which goods are necessary for human flourishing, but a typical list would include life, health, friendship, creative activity, knowledge, beauty, and pleasure. The most general moral principle is “Seek the good.” But we need more specific rules or laws for a variety of reasons. For example, in a given situation, seeking one good (e.g., pleasure) may be incompatible with seeking another (e.g., knowledge); and in many situations, seeking one person’s good may conflict with seeking the good of another person (e.g., we may not have enough flu vaccine for everyone who needs it). 3. The most important truths about morality are knowable by human beings. 3 Here the NL theory collides with moral skepticism. NL theorists need not claim, however, that every human being knows the most important moral truths. Indeed, severely mentally impaired humans may lack even the ability to know moral truths. And a child raised by morally corrupt adults may have deeply misguided ideas about right and wrong. But most human beings are capable of knowing the most important moral truths. That said, humans need instruction to gain a good working knowledge of moral truth, just as they need instruction to have a good working knowledge of mathematics. 4. The moral law is universal; it applies to all human beings. 4 Thus, the NL theory conflicts with normative relativism, the idea that acts are right (or wrong) simply because they are approved of (or disapproved of) by the society in which they occur. For example, the moral code of some societies permits acts and attitudes that are sexist in nature, but the mere fact that the members of a society generally endorse such a code is no defense of it from the standpoint of NL theory. If the code hinders the flourishing of many people, then NL theory calls that code into 2 question. Similarly, the NL theory conflicts with moral subjectivism, the idea that acts are right (or wrong) simply because they are approved of (or disapproved of) by the agent (i.e., the person who performs the act). No doubt Adolf Hitler approved of the many acts he performed to exterminate Jews and other minorities. But given that his acts were destructive of flourishing for millions of people, from the standpoint of NL theory, Hitler’s self-approval provides no defense of his actions whatsoever. However, while NL theorists hold that the promotion of human flourishing is morally required of everyone, NL theorists do not deny that flourishing is, to some degree, dependent on (and hence relative to) a person’s social or cultural context. This is so because humans can flourish only in communities or societies and because social structures to some extent dictate the terms of fulfillment. For example, in a preliterate society, human fulfillment does not depend on being able to read, but in a society in which gainful employment typically involves reading, a person’s fulfillment does usually depend on his or her being able to read--and thus, hindering a person’s attempts to learn to read becomes a moral issue. In what follows I want to expand on these basic elements of NL theory, identify some of its strengths, and consider some key objections to it. I. God and Ethics Many theists have been NL theorists; noteworthy examples include Augustine, Aquinas, and C. S. Lewis. The NL theory provides a view of the relationship between God and ethics that contrasts sharply with Theological Voluntarism (TV), so let’s briefly consider TV: TV: Something (e.g., an act, motive, or character trait) is right or good if, and simply because, the almighty Creator approves of it; and something is wrong or bad if, and simply because, the almighty Creator disapproves of it. 5 There are many objections to TV. The most famous objection is this: suppose the almighty Creator approves of, say, child abuse or torturing people just for the fun of it. According to TV, such acts would then be right. But it is extremely implausible to suppose that such acts could be right. So, TV is surely false. Defenders of TV might reply, “But God would never approve of child abuse or of torturing people just for fun.” Unfortunately, this reply misses the point. Given TV, if God did approve of such acts, they would be right. God would have done nothing wrong in approving of them. God’s approvals and disappovals are the ultimate standard in ethics. Furthermore, even if God currently disapproves of child abuse, nothing prevents God from approving of it in the future. Ethics is entirely dependent upon God’s will. A second objection runs as follows: When God approves (or disapproves) of some act (character trait, etc.), does God do so for a reason (or reasons)? It is natural to suppose that the answer is “Yes.” But then, contrary to TV, the act (character trait, etc.) is not right (or wrong) simply because God approves of it (or disapproves of it). It is surely the reason (or reasons) that make the act (character trait, etc.) right, good, wrong, or evil, as the case may be. On the other hand, if God’s approvals and disapprovals are not backed by reasons, then they are purely arbitrary; they are, in effect, divine whims. But ethical decisions are the most important, or among the most important, decisions we make. Can ethics really depend in the end on mere 3 whims? God approves of “Loving thy neighbor” but God might just as well have approved of “Hating thy neighbor”—there’s no reason why God approves of love over hate? That’s hard to believe. Here is a third objection: TV asserts or assumes that whatever an almighty Creator wills (or approves) is right. But why should we accept this proposition? Is it supposed to be a necessary truth, like “No circles are squares” or “All husbands are married”? (A necessary truth is one that cannot be false under any possible circumstances.) The problem is that there is no obvious logical connection between “An almighty Creator wills (approves) X” and “X is right.” This is underscored by possible substitutions we might make for X, e.g., racism, sexism, child abuse, adultery, etc. (Keep in mind that there are no limits on what an almighty Creator might will or approve given TV, for there is no moral standard independent of God’s will.) Finally, proponents of TV apparently presuppose that there can be no moral law without a personal lawgiver, i.e., a person in authority who issues a command. They apparently regard “There is no moral law without a personal lawgiver” as a necessary truth. But critics of TV question this claim. Instead, many of them would claim that there are necessary truths about right and wrong, such as, “It is wrong to intentionally inflict intense pain on a person without his or her consent and merely for sadistic pleasure.” From this perspective, an act can be morally wrong even though it has not been forbidden by a personal lawgiver. The claim that some truths about morality are necessary truths is controversial, but very important in this context, so let us stop a moment to examine it more carefully. It is often assumed that truths about morality depend on the existence of human beings, and hence are merely contingent truths (i.e., true but not necessarily true). This line of reasoning might be summed up as follows: “Surely there would be no moral truths if there were no humans. But humans do not exist of necessity. In fact, we know there was a time when there were no humans. And it makes no sense to suggest that there were truths about right and wrong before humans came into existence.” But this line of thinking overlooks the apparent fact that moral truths can be conditional (if-then) in nature. Think about it like this. Suppose we describe an action that we consider to be clearly wrong. We make a list of all the features that make the act wrong, for example: a. The agent inflicts intense pain on another person, b. The agent does so intentionally, c. The agent inflicts the pain knowing full well that doing so is against the will of the victim, d.