Two Mistaken Strategies of Deontology Abstract Two distinctions between parallel strategies commonly used by deontologists and consequentialists to derive or defend their respective views have been almost completely ignored in the literature on both. The first is a difference between the type of moral universalizability test used by each, the second is a difference in testing the rationality of a principle (whether universalized or not). Once explicitly identified, the strategies used by deontologists are easily seen to be defective compared to those their consequentialist counterparts. Paper Two distinctions between parallel strategies commonly used by deontologists and consequentialists to derive or defend their respective views have been almost completely ignored in the literature on both. Once explicitly identified, the strategies used by deontologists are easily seen to be defective compared to those their consequentialist counterparts. The first distinction is between two kinds of universalizability test. Many philosophers mistakenly associate universalizability tests with deontology, and more specifically with Kantian ethics (cf. Jens Timmermann 2005: 254 note 27). Actually consequentialists frequently claim that their norms are uniquely universalizable—cf. Peter Singer (1981: 229-30; 1993: 11-14), Richard Hare (1963; 1981), David Cummiskey (1996), and Phillip Pettit (2000)—often using the language of the golden rule or moral supervenience. Their differing conclusions are partly explained their appeal to two very different types of universalization tests. The deontologists’ universalizability test requires that moral principles be those which a rational agent can will (value, endorse, approve, etc.) all agents following simultaneously, cf. the question “What if 1 everybody did that?” Consequentialists’ universalizability tests instead require that moral principles be those which a rational agent can will that any agent follow, in any situation (including cases where not all other agents are following the same principle); cf. the question “What if somebody did that to you?” We may distinguish these as universal practice (UP) and universal approval (UA) tests, respectively. (Note that a common version of rule consequentialism uses a UP test—and supports some deontological norms as a result.) UA tests are stronger than UP tests, for their test conditions include the ideal worlds of universal conformity which the latter appeal to, as well as many more realistic ones. Hence they are intuitively more plausible and relevant, while UP tests have problems identifying sound principles for non-ideal situations, as when confronting evildoers, or solving coordination problems. The vast logical gulf between these tests can be made invisible through at least two strategies, both of which are commonly used—perhaps quite unconsciously—by defenders of UP tests. The first is to use negative (failing) examples; for since the UA condition includes the UP condition as a limiting case, any principle which fails the latter will also fail the former. But the reverse is not the case, so passing a UP test is a necessary condition of morality, not a sufficient one; sadly the history of Kantian scholarship is strewn with instances of this elementary logical fallacy. The second strategy is to use examples of principles which produce certain harmful effects (in virtue of which we intuitively judge them to be immoral) in linear proportion to the number of agents following them. For instance, if one person litters, hits or kills another agent, lies (while promising or otherwise), or refuses to help another agent in need, some predictable harm ensues; and if a thousand or a billion agents do the same, roughly a thousand or a billion times as much total harm will ensue, making it increasingly likely that any agent taken at 2 random—including, pointedly, any single agent considering acting on such a principle—will suffer from it. If our agent imagined that he could put up with a few other agents acting as he does, given the low likelihood that he will be harmed thereby, a UP test puts that harm in a starker light by showing the magnitude of harm he would suffer if he was guaranteed that all agents were doing the same as he, making escape from the ill-effects of his principle impossible. While stress on the deprivational effects of a universalized practice can highlight the harm caused by even a single instance of it, a huge problem with this approach is that many principles cause harm at non-linear rates. E.g., principles of absolute non-violence or always driving on the left side of the road cause no harm at all when everyone is following them, but lead to utter disaster when some people do but others reject them. Hence these easily pass UP tests, but only pass UA tests if further qualified, requiring different behavior in response to the predatory violence of others, or to a local practice of driving on the right. Both deontologists and consequentialists have routinely confused these two tests, treating them as interchangeable or even identical, even while relying upon one or the other form in their actual derivations of moral norms. A common approach is to begin by describing the requirements of morality as a UA test, then claiming to derive a UP test from this, as if the sufficiency of the former shows the sufficiency of the latter, or as if they were not even distinct. The most infamous, though unrecognized, example of this is Kant’s famous derivation of the formula of universal law (FUL). He begins by describing the sought-for categorical imperative as a principle for an individual will—i.e., governing our judgments or evaluations of behaviors as good or bad according to some universal law [my emphasis in all quotes below]: “[the categorical imperative must be a] principle of volition [or] of the will” (G 4:399- 400) “which alone is to serve the will as its principle” (G 4:402) “[and] which contains no conditions to which it could be limited [beyond] the universality of a law as such.” (G 4:421) 3 But then this immediately becomes a principle whose universalization ranges, not over our acts of will, valuation, or judgments, but over a group of persons in a world: Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law. (G 4:421) Kant’s examples of how to apply this law (G 4:423-424) amply demonstrate that what he means is that it must be possible both for all persons to follow the maxim, and to thereby satisfy the ends thereof, so the universalization ranges, not over an agent’s will that some or any agent follow the maxim, but over the behavior of all agents at once, whose universal compliance the agent must be able to will as a single unitary state of affairs. In other words, after insisting the principle should be limited by no conditions, he limits it severely by saying that it must consider only how an agent would fare if all other agents were following it simultaneously—a bizarre situation we are almost never going to be in. Many Kantians have followed him in this error, either again inadvertently making the UP-UA slide in their own language, or sliding from the claim that passing the UP test is a necessary condition of morality to claiming that it is a sufficient condition, or simply by describing Kant’s test as if it was a UA test, and then naively asserting that this demonstrates the adequacy of his (UP) FUL test.1 1 “[it follows from the requirement that if an agent acts on some principle] then it must be possible for him to will that [everyone do so], that the test of the moral acceptability of your action is whether…you could will that everyone follows such a law [of doing this action].” (Patricia Kitcher 2004: 571) “The maxim of your action…must contain nothing which would prevent that maxim from serving as an unconditioned practical principle: as a universal law for all beings” (Barbara Herman 1990: 170) “To regard one’s reason for acting in a certain way as good is to assume its legitimacy for all rational beings in similar circumstances…[hence] rational agents cannot reject the universalizability test [of the FUL]” (Henry Allison 1990: 205) “[Kant’s formula] 'Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law' [means that] I have, that is, to will it not only for the present situation, in which I occupy the role that I do, but also for all situations resembling this in their universal properties, including those in which I occupy all the other possible roles. (Richard Hare 1997: 153) “[A maxim is authoritative if you can will that any other agent] “no matter how situated” (Andrews Reath 2006: 73) regard it as giving a sufficient reason for action, or “more precisely, [if] you can regard the maxim as 4 G.E. Moore (1903: 161) and C.D. Broad (1916) are among the few authors who have explicitly distinguished between these two kinds of universalizability as a criticism of Kantian ethics. Neither criticism has been either adequately answered by Kantians, or (perhaps even more strangely) taken up at large by other consequentialists. However it has long been the basis of criticism against ideal rule consequentialism (IRC), the theory that we should follow those principles whose universal practice would create at least as much good as the alternative practice of any alternative principles would—this is a UP test which unsurprisingly supports many deontological norms. IRC has been accused of “rule worship” in cases where an individual’s following the principle does harm precisely because not everyone else follows it (J.J.C.