Global Journal of HUMAN SOCIAL SCIENCE History & Anthropology Volume 12 Issue 10 Version 1.0 Year 2012 Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal Publisher: Global Journals Inc. (USA) Online ISSN: 2249-460x & Print ISSN: 0975-587X The Socio-Historical Construction of Corruption Examples from Police, Politics and Crime in Argentina By Daniel Míguez University of the State of Buenos Aires Abstract - This paper proposes that corruption results from particular historical and social conditions. Specifically, it sustains that the stability and credibility of a society’s institutional system, the perception of a shared fate by most members of society, the levels of inequality and the perception of fair opportunities for personal progress are all elements that may deter or promote corruption. In order to show the association between these social conditions and corruption we analyse socially and historically the way that state agents such as the police, members of the judiciary and the political system relate to each other and to normal citizens. Although the examples are taken from the argentine context, they constitute a tool to understand, heuristically, why corruption is prominent in many parts of the underdeveloped world. Keywords : Corruption / police / judiciary / crime / civil society / Argentina / inequality / state. GJHSS-D Classification : FOR Code : 160605 JEL Code : D73 The Socio-Historical Construction of Corruption Examples from Police, Politics and Crime in Argentina Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of : © 2012. Daniel Míguez. This is a research/review paper, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution- Noncommercial 3.0 Unported License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/), permitting all non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The Socio-Historical Construction of Corruption Examples from Police, Politics and Crime in Argentina Daniel Míguez Abstract - This paper proposes that corruption results from In order to s 12 how how the social construction of 0 particular historical and social conditions. Specifically, it corruption occurs we will concentrate on one particular 2 sustains that the stability and credibility of a society’s case, which is how corruption takes place in the institutional system, the perception of a shared fate by most ear relationships between state agents (such as the police, Y members of society, the levels of inequality and the perception politicians and the judiciary), and members of criminal of fair opportunities for personal progress are all elements that 1 may deter or promote corruption. In order to show the organizations, but also how members of civil society association between these social conditions and corruption we (‘normal citizens’) become involved in corrupt social analyse socially and historically the way that state agents such relationships. During the last decades Argentina has as the police, members of the judiciary and the political faced enormous corruption problems, especially by system relate to each other and to normal citizens. Although state agents. The corruption perception index the examples are taken from the argentine context, they elaborated by Transparency International shows that in constitute a tool to understand, heuristically, why corruption is 2011 Argentina ranked among the most corrupted prominent in many parts of the underdeveloped world. countries in the world (a problem common to many Keywords : Corruption / police / judiciary / crime / civil other Latin American, African and Eastern Europe society / Argentina / inequality / state. countries).1 This perception is congruent with what has I. Introduction been find by several researches, that state that corruption has become one of the central problems in sually corruption is thought as a ‘personal’ Latin America in general and Argentina in particular matter: an ethical failure of a particular individual (Manzetti and Blake, 1996; Kurt, 1998). Volume XII Issue X Version I ) DDDD that, for his own benefit, does not act according In this paper we will try to show that these levels D U ( to the law or a moral code. Our standpoint in this paper of corruption derive from historical and social differs from this common perception of corruption. In our circumstances. Although we will concentrate in the nce e view, corruption results from particular historical Argentine case, our aim is to use this as an example to ci processes and how specific human and social relations reflect on the historical and cultural processes that al S are configured in these processes. We are, of course, usually underlie systemic forms of corruption. Hence, ci o not referring to isolated cases were acts of corruption initially we will show how corruption is coproduced by S occur very seldom. Instead, we are interested in several types of institutional and civil agents and how systemic forms of corruption. That is, when specific acts this responds to specific social conditions. Then we will uman of corruption are part of complex systems of social explore the historical circumstances that derived in the relationships involving institutional agents, institutional and civil cultures that are associated with f H organizational traditions and cultural formations. In these the emergence of systemic forms of corruption. Finally, al o n contexts, although ‘acts’ of corruption are, of course, we will draw some conclusions on the historical and r u committed by specific social actors, they result from a social conditions that foster systemic corruption. o more complex system of social and cultural forces. al J Specifically, current research shows that the stability and II. The Coproduction of Corruption b lo credibility of a society’s institutional system, the in Argentina G perception of a shared fate by most members of society, the levels of inequality and the perception of fair Waldmann (2003) has shown that, historically, opportunities for personal progress are all elements that the rule of law in Argentina has been conditioned by the either strengthen compliant behaviour or predispose capacity of the state to act according to the law and to people to anomic acts, championing their own personal generate the conditions that would make the argentine interests over the collective good. population interact according to basic legal principles. In this line, Nino (1995) has spoken of the anomic Author : Consejo de Investigaciones Científicas y Ténicas Universidad Nacional del Centro de Buenos Aires Pinto 399 (7000) Tandil, Argentina. E-mail : [email protected] 1 See: http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/ © 2012 Global Journals Inc. (US) The Socio-Historical Construction of Corruption. Examples from Police, Politics and Crime in Argentina character of Argentine society and O’Donnel (2002) of between state agents and actors with different types the ‘(un)rule of law’ in Argentina. From different and degrees of involvement in organized and semi- standpoints, these authors reveal the complex causes organized criminal networks. Hence, partly, corruption that explain the particular ways in which norms intervene comes from powerful institutional actors that in several in the interactions between the state, its agents and the ways and to several extents control the rule of law. But argentine population. Hence, Waldmann (2003) has this has become so naturalized for particular state shown how the Argentine state has historically had a agents (as the police, judges, etc.), and those who are tendency to legislate beyond its means of control. This in conflict with the penal law, that micro forms of gives to encoded laws an ambiguous status, since they corruption are part of the ongoing way in which the exist as formal principles but cannot always be enforced argentine state regulates crime. A few examples will as actual ruling norms. This ambiguous character of the allow us to show some of the more habitual forms taken 2012 law creates a propitious context for ‘corruption’ to by these types of arrangements. r flourish. Since the law is applied contingently, state a) Police, Politicians, Criminals and the Judiciary Yea agents may select when and how to enforce it. Hence, Between 1998 and 2003 I conducted corruption finds a fertile soil, since it results from the ethnographic research, interviewing and interacting with 2 suspension of enforcement. This may be easily young men in conflict with the penal law. During those dissimulated, since it not only happens because of the years I interviewed some 71 young persons between 15 discretionary capacity of state agents, but also from the and 25 years of age, along with another 7 elder persons mere incapacity they sometimes have to impose the over 30 years of age holding extended criminal records. law. In those interviews the police and judicial agents Moreover, the ambiguous status of the law has recurrently appeared as an irreconcilable enemy, but in also propitiated a more active role of the argentine state spite of this the delinquents’ narratives were full of in the violation of the law. As O’Donnel (1984) has anecdotes were several types of negotiations with shown, the anomic character of argentine society is politicians, the police and members of the judicial power related to the recurrent emergence of dictatorships. were described as common practice. Hence, although Where the state not only has been involved in an illegal many times the delinquents’ tales described politicians, and brutal repression for political ends, but also in the police or the judges as despicable, they also common crimes (we will come back to this later). Thus, frequently mentioned for example, how the illegal O’Donnel’s observations reveal that the creation of Volume XII Issue X Version I weapons market was to an important extent in the ) corruption is not the mere production of the state. DD DD hands of members of state agencies, and how they D Although state agents play the ‘leading’ role, the ( often had ‘rented’2 weapons from police officers or multiple ways in which corruption is created in Argentina members of the armed forces.