The Syrian Military Establishment in 2019: Sectarianism, Militias, and Foreign Investment Note of Appreciation Omran Center for Strategic Studies expresses its appreciation to the Carnegie Middle East Center for its partnership and support in this project funded by the European Union and Germany as part of the Syria Peace Process Support Initiative (SPPSI). All the information, ideas, opinions, themes and supplements contained in this book are the express the views of the authors and their research efforts and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the Carnegie Middle East Center or the donors. -4- The Syrian Military Establishment in 2019: Sectarianism, Militias and Foreign Investment Omran Center for Strategic Studies Omran Center for Strategic Studies An independent think tank and policy research center focusing on presenting an objective understanding of Syria and the region to become a reference for public policies impacting the region. Omran began in November 2013 in Istanbul, Turkey. It publishes studies and policy briefs regarding Syrian and regional affairs in the areas of politics, economic development, and local administration. Omran also conducts round-table discussions, seminars, and workshops that promote a more systematic and methodical culture of decision making among future leaders of Syria. Omran’s work support decision making mechanisms, provide practical solutions and policy recommendations to decision makers, identify challenges within the Syrian context, and foresee scenarios and alternative solutions Website: www.OmranStudies.org Email: [email protected] Published in Arabic and English on May, 2019 © All rights reserved to Omran for Strategic Studies Contributors Ayman Al-Dassouky Navvar Şaban Ayman Abu Hashem Maen Tallaa Anwar Majani Table of Contents Introduction ...................................................................................................... 11 What Sectarianism Reveals about the Syrian Army .............................. 16 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 16 A Politicized and Ruralized Army ................................................................... 17 Influence Networks with Limited Privileges ................................................... 20 Erosion of the Old Era ..................................................................................... 24 Fragmentation and Reconfiguration during the Syrian Crisis.......................... 28 Conclusion: Army with a New Look ............................................................... 33 Annex ............................................................................................................... 35 Military Groups and Networks within the Syrian Army: Multiple Loyalties and Militia Mentality .............................................................. 40 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 40 Iranian Networks: Networks of Horizontal Control ........................................ 41 Legitimizing Iranian Network Positioning ...................................................... 43 Iran’s Investments in Militias: Dynamics and Current Status ......................... 45 Russian Corps: Vertical Control as an Entry Point to the Construction Process ......................................................................................................................... 50 Russia’s Ambition to Control the Restructuring Processes ............................. 54 Influence Networks Functioning Under the Cover of Private Security Companies ......................................................................................................................... 58 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 60 Annex: The Most Prominent Combat Groups within the Local Defense Forces ......................................................................................................................... 62 The Role and Fate of Palestinian Militias Loyal to the Syrian Regime ...................................................................................................... 66 First: Intimidation and Containment Policies in the Era of Hafez al-Assad .... 66 Second: Mobilization during the Syrian Revolution ........................................ 67 Formations and Factions Loyal to the Regime before and During the Revolution ......................................................................................................................... 68 Palestinian Formations Created by the Regime During the Revolution .......... 81 -8- Assessment of the Fate of Pro-Regime Palestinian Forces and Militias .......... 88 New Military Corps in the Syrian Army ............................................... 92 Fourth Corps: A Failed First Step .................................................................... 92 Fifth Corps: A Model for Containing Militias ................................................. 95 A ‘Sunni’ Formation in the Making ............................................................... 101 Testing the Regime’s Capacity for Restructuring and Reintegration .......................................................................................... 106 Introduction .................................................................................................... 106 The Question of Capability as Perceived by the Regime ............................... 107 Cautious Decisions and Arrangements .......................................................... 109 Contrasting Decision Drivers ......................................................................... 113 Returning to Original Structures or Forming a Large Gathering of Militias? 115 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 120 Non-Technical Challenges of Restructuring Syria’s Military ........... 122 Introduction .................................................................................................... 122 The Ideological Indoctrination of the Army .................................................. 122 Toward the Regulation of Civil-Military Relations ....................................... 126 An Army Not for All Syrians? ....................................................................... 129 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 132 Military Judicial System in Syria (1950-2019) .................................... 134 Introduction .................................................................................................... 134 First: Military Judicial System Regulations and Jurisdiction ........................ 135 Second: The Military Judicial System and Emergency Provisions ............... 137 Third: Military Field Courts, Times of War, and Internal Unrest .................. 138 Fourth: Analysis of the Structure of the Military Judicial System................. 141 Fifith: The Military Judicial System and its Impact on Syrian Community .. 145 Sixth: Concluding Recommendations ............................................................ 147 -9- -10- Introduction Questions about the fate of Syria’s security and defense sectors continue to be some of the most important questions facing the country today. These questions have only grown in importance since the revolution, both because reforming these sectors was one of the main demands of protestors, and because Syria’s security and defense institutions have undergone profound transformations in their structure and function. Most of these questions remain unanswered, as security agencies consider research in this field as acts “against security and defense.” At the same time, the shortcomings in Syria’s security and defense sectors that must be addressed are both numerous and old, and recent policies and practices have served to exacerbate these issues, transforming them into increasingly intractable dilemmas. The current reality of the Syrian military establishment raises questions about the very nature of its existence and fate, especially given the changes in its social composition, power centers, and key actors. Given these substantial shifts, there is an urgent need for research to redefine Syria’s military establishment and to understand how the changes in its structure will impact the restructuring process that is already underway. So far, this process is being driven by several conflicting agendas, but is entirely lacking any consideration of the crucial national dimension. The role of the army and its impact on local interactions and shifts and on the dynamics of democratic transformation remain central questions facing the process of restructuring the Syrian military establishment. The structural and functional shortcoming and the identity distortions that have taken occurred in the military establishment have led it to constantly intervene in Syrian society and politics in a manner that both serves and fuels the philosophy of the ruling class. As a result of the ideological, organizational, and functional distortion of the security and defense establishments, these institutions have become completely alienated from Syrian society. They lack any sense of neutrality and are instead forces that are politically aligned with the regime. -11- The Syrian Military Establishment in 2019: Sectarianism,