Concurrences REVUE DES DROITS DE LA CONCURRENCE | COMPETITION LAW REVIEW The new US antitrust administration On-Topic l Concurrences N° 1-2021 www.concurrences.com Alden F. Abbott Jacqueline Grise Noah Pinegar General Counsel Partner Associate Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Cooley, Washington, DC Litigation Department, Paul Washington, DC Hastings, Washington, DC Ryan M. Kantor Robin Adelstein Antitrust Partner Christopher L. Sagers Global Head of Antitrust Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, James A. Thomas Professor and Competition Washington, DC of Law Norton Rose Fulbright, New York Former Assistant Chief Cleveland State University and Washington, DC Healthcare and Consumer Products Section Richard S. Taffet Megan Browdie Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Partner Partner Antitrust Division, Washington, DC Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Cooley, Washington, DC New York Donald C. Klawiter Michael A. Carrier Principal Willard K. Tom Distinguished Professor Klawiter PLLC, Washington, DC Antitrust Partner Rutgers Law School, Camden Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, John Kwoka Washington, DC Peter C. Carstensen Neal F. Finnegan Distinguished Former General Counsel Fred W. & Vi Miller Chair Professor of Economics Federal Trade Commission (FTC), in Law Emeritus Northeastern University, Boston Washington, DC University of Wisconsin Law School Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr Eliot Turner Harry First Adjunct Professor Partner Charles L. Denison Antonin Scalia Law School, George Norton Rose Fulbright, Professor of Law Mason University, Arlington Houston and Washington, DC New York University School of Law Howard Morse Douglas Tween Bert Foer Partner Partner and Head of U.S. Founder and Former President Cooley, Washington, DC Government Enforcement American Antitrust Institute (AAI), and Cartel practice Washington, DC Bo Pearl Linklaters, New York and Partner Washington, DC Eleanor M. Fox Litigation Department, Paul Walter J. Derenberg Professor Hastings, Century City Tommaso Valletti of Trade Regulation Professor of Economics New York University School of Law Imperial College London Michael L. Weiner Partner Steptoe & Johnson, New York On-Topic The new US antitrust administration This special set of articles focuses on antitrust law and enforcement Ce dossier se concentre sur l’antitrust et ses possibles développements in the aftermath of the American Presidential Elections. It questions the changes à la suite des élections présidentielles américaines. Il s’interroge and challenges expected in 2021 under the new Biden administration, sur les changements et défis attendus pour 2021 sous la nouvelle and its impacts with respect to antitrust legislation and competition policy administration Biden, et leurs impacts sur la législation et la politique in the USA. de la concurrence aux États-Unis. Competition policy challenges for Competition policy under the new Biden administration antitrust a new U.S. administration: Is the administration Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr past prologue? Bert Foer Adjunct Professor Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University, Arlington Abbott Founder and Former President General Counsel Federal Trade Commission (FTC), American Antitrust Institute (AAI), Washington, DC Washington, DC Will the Biden presidency forge Antitrust enforcement a digital transatlantic alliance What’s old is new again in a Biden administration on antitrust? Robin Adelstein Ryan M. Kantor Gabriella Muscolo Global Head of Antitrust and Competition Norton Antitrust Partner Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Commissioner Italian Competition Authority, Rome Rose Fulbright, New York and Washington, DC Washington, DC Alessandro Massolo Former Assistant Chief Healthcare and Consumer Eliot Turner Economic Adviser Italian Competition Authority, Products Section Partner Norton Rose Fulbright, Houston and Rome Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division, Washington, DC Washington, DC How the antitrust landscape may Biden/Harris expected to double Richard S. Taffet Art. Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits Art. Intellectuelle and DRM protection. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Antitrust Partner Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, New change in 2021: Compliance risks down on antitrust enforcement: York in a Democratic Washington No “Trump card” in the deck Willard K. Tom Bo Pearl Megan Browdie Antitrust Partner Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Partner Litigation Department, Paul Hastings, Partner Cooley, Washington, DC Washington, DC Century City Former General Counsel Federal Trade Commission Jacqueline Grise (FTC), Washington, DC Noah Pinegar Partner Cooley, Washington, DC Associate Litigation Department, Paul Hastings, Washington, DC Howard Morse Biden antitrust: “Building” antitrust Partner Cooley, Washington, DC enforcement “back better” American antitrust and the near Pharmaceutical antitrust: Donald C. Klawiter term: Consistency, one imagines, and What the Biden administration can do Principal Klawiter PLLC, Washington, DC some reasons why Michael A. Carrier Unscrambling the eggs: Merger Christopher L. Sagers Distinguished Professor Rutgers Law School, Camden James A. Thomas Professor of Law control in the new administration Cleveland State University The “ought” and “is likely” John Kwoka of Biden antitrust Neal F. Finnegan Distinguished Professor of Back to normal? Cartel enforcement Economics Northeastern University, Boston under the Biden administration Peter C. Carstensen Tommaso Valletti University Douglas Tween Fred W. & Vi Miller Chair in Law Emeritus Professor of Economics Imperial College London of Wisconsin Law School Partner and Head of U.S. Government Enforcement and Cartel practice Regulating digital platforms: Linklaters, New York and Washington, DC The next four years: antitrust Interoperability and data portability enforcement on an upward trajectory James Langenfeld Biden antitrust: At a crossroads Lisl Dunlop Senior Managing Director Ankura Consulting Group, Partner Axinn, New York Michael L. Weiner Washington, DC Partner Chris Ring Steptoe & Johnson, New York Biden antitrust: The middle way Senior Director Ankura Consulting Group, Harry First Washington, DC Charles L. Denison Professor of Law New York Samuel Clark University Associate Ankura Consulting Group, Washington, Eleanor M. Fox DC délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende (art. utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, d'auteur par les conventions internationales intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute du droit en vigueur et le Code de la propriété au titre Ce document est protégé by copyright laws and internationalNon-authorised use of this document pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected copyright treaties. personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article techniques de protection L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment € 300 000 fine ( Walter J. Derenberg Professor of Trade Regulation New York University Concurrences N° 1-2021 I On-Topic I The new US antitrust administration 1 Competition policy challenges for a new U.S. administration: Is the past prologue? Alden F. Abbott* [email protected] General Counsel Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Washington, DC I. Background: enforcement effectiveness—numbered 46 under Bush, 29 under Obama, and 28 under Trump. Aggregating across measures, one finds 154 merger enforcement The recent past actions under Bush (about 19 a year), 166 under 1. The new Joseph Biden administration (JBA) will have Obama (just over 20 a year), and 85 under Trump the opportunity, if it so chooses, to apply American anti- (just over 21 a year). In short, FTC merger enforce- trust and competition policy in a manner that promotes ment rates were quite consistent across the last three economic efficiency, consumer welfare, and economic administrations, with the FTC having its best aggre- growth. Antitrust policy formulation, of course, is not gate numbers under President Trump. made in a vacuum—the past is prologue. The JBA will find in the pipeline a large number of investigations, 4. Second, non-merger antitrust enforcement. During ongoing enforcement actions, and policy initiatives that the second term of the Obama administration (2013– will have to be considered as new antitrust priorities are 2016), the FTC took 24 non-merger enforcement actions devised. (including 18 consents accepted for comment, 3 injunc- tions authorized, 2 administrative complaints, and 1 Art. Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits Art. Intellectuelle and DRM protection. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété L 122-5 Code de la Propriété 2. Consistent with the “past is prologue” theme, let action for an order violation), whereas the Trump admi- us examine U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) nistration (2017–2020) took 17 (including 6 consents enforcement statistics in recent administrations.1 accepted for comment, 8 injunctions authorized, and 3 administrative complaints). Those numbers are not 3. First, consider merger challenges. FTC merger widely dissimilar, particularly when one considers that consent decrees accepted for comment included the Trump administration litigated administratively and 84 under G. W. Bush (hereinafter “Bush”) (2001– in federal court multiple resource-intensive cases. 2009), 113 under Obama (2009–2017), and 41 under Trump (2017–2021). FTC merger-specific Part III 5. Apart from its vigorous merger and