The problems facing the modern democratic state at war: a trinitarian analysis of government, armed forces and people. Bart Schuurman Van Lieflandlaan 54 K01 3571AD Utrecht The Netherlands 0031 – 6 – 15600893 [email protected] Student number: 0328642 Master of Arts thesis Master: International Relations in Historical Perspective University of Utrecht Supervisor: Dr. Isabelle Duyvesteyn March 2009 ‘You didn't know it, you didn't think it could be done, in the final end he won the war after losin' every battle.’ 1 - Bob Dylan 1 Bob Dylan, ‘Idiot wind’, Blood on the tracks (Columbia Records 2003). 2 Contents Preface 4 Introduction 5 Clausewitz 21 Literature review: government 29 Overestimation of the effectiveness of the military instrument for political goals 29 Casualty phobia 38 The influence of the media and public opinion 46 Globalization and the decline of state power 52 Bureaucratic politics 57 The nature of democracy 58 Summary and evaluation 63 Literature review: armed forces 66 The ‘new wars’ debate 66 Lessons of the past 76 Strategy and grand strategy: a mismatch? 78 Strategy and grand strategy 1: hearts and minds 83 Strategy and grand strategy 2: minimal force 89 Strategy and grand strategy 3: political primacy revisited 97 Strategy and grand strategy 4: an over – reliance on technology 99 Strategy and grand strategy 5: intelligence, external assistance and CIMIC 106 Military culture 112 Casualty phobia and force protection 116 Summary and evaluation 118 Literature review: people 123 Political culture 123 Conclusion 128 Bibliography 144 3 Preface In warfare, as in any contest of strength, it seems only logical that the strong will defeat the weak. However, recent Western military history paints a very different picture. Despite vast military superiority, Western forces were strikingly unable to achieve meaningful victories against weaker opponents during the Cold War. While it may be argued that the threat of nuclear war with the Soviet Union kept Western states from utilizing their full military potential, the post Cold War period has not seen an improvement. The ongoing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the fact that Western states are still unable to effectively use their military superiority to attain the desired political aims. This thesis aims to discover what political, military and societal factors can explain these paradoxical outcomes. It hypothesizes that a lack of understanding regarding fundamental aspects of war’s nature has been one of the prime reasons for a lack of Western military victories against weaker opponents. While the volume of research concerned with this topic inevitably means that this work cannot claim to offer conclusive explanations or straightforward solutions, it is hoped that readers will gain new insights, or expand existing ones, that will allow them to approach the subject of modern warfare from a revealing perspective. Although this thesis has been written between September and December 2008, the inspiration that has led to this topic has been gradually developing during courses followed at the University of Utrecht since 2004. The university lecturer and terrorism researcher Dr. Isabelle Duyvesteyn has been an important source of that inspiration and a hearty word of thanks is due to her on that account, and especially for her supervision and invaluable assistance with the research upon which this work is built. Finally, the author would also like to express his gratitude for James Sutton’s extensive proofreading and valuable commentary on many of the arguments presented here. 4 Introduction In the more than sixty years since the end of the Second World War, the democratic states of Western Europe and North America have reached unprecedented levels of wealth and technological advancement. For most of these states’ citizens, war has become an ever more remote prospect since the defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, yet their world has not been devoid of confrontation. The decades long Cold War with the Soviet Union forced Western states to develop nuclear and conventional forces capable of dissuading a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Unable, or unwilling, to match the unequaled numerical might of the Soviet military, the Western states initially focused their hopes on the nuclear deterrent. Yet the West’s monopoly on atomic weapons was broken as early as 1949 by the first successful Soviet nuclear test.2 As the American policy of keeping the Soviet Union at bay with the threat of nuclear destruction appeared increasingly suicidal, alternatives had to be sought. Turning to the development of capabilities that could survive a nuclear surprise attack to retaliate in kind, the emphasis shifted to deterring nuclear attacks by guaranteeing their reciprocity. 3 Deterrence, however, was not a constant. As both sides developed weapons of ever increasing power and the means to assure their delivery no matter what, deterrent capabilities had to be constantly reappraised and updated. The ensuing arms race made full use of the advent of electronics and computerization. This benefited Western states most, whose economies and research communities were better suited to gain maximum advantage from these developments. 4 Aptitude for harnessing the potential of new technologies was matched by the strong belief that technological developments would bring corresponding strategic advantages. The conviction that the problems posed by warfare could be solved by new technologies is very much alive today, as shall be discussed in depth. What is important here is that Western states not only acquired high – tech nuclear arsenals but also 2 The United States was the first Western country to develop nuclear weapons, with Great Britain following in 1952 and France in 1960. 3 Michael Howard, War in European history (New York: Oxford University Press 2001), 139. 4 Jeremy Black, An introduction to global military history: 1775 to the present day (London: Routledge 2005), 192 – 193. 5 developed their conventional forces along similar lines. Although the threat of nuclear war meant that military force could only be employed for goals limited enough that neither superpower would risk escalation to the atomic level, a credible non – nuclear deterrent was still needed. By concentrating on high technology, Western states hoped to balance the Soviet numerical advantage in conventional forces through an emphasis on quality. 5 Ultimately, the nuclear and conventional forces developed by the N.A.T.O. countries caused economic rather than material damage by tremendously taxing the Soviet Union’s economy in order to keep up with the arms race. It is very fortunate that the Cold War never escalated to the level of direct armed conflict between the Soviet Union and the N.A.T.O. allies. However, this did not keep Western armed forces from engaging in actual combat in the decades that followed the end of the Second World War. Some of these conflicts were wars of decolonization, such as those fought by the French in Indo – China and Algeria. Others were related to the worldwide struggle between democracy and communism, best exemplified by the long, costly, and ultimately unsuccessful American intervention in Vietnam. 6 The armed conflicts Western states became engaged in during the Cold War differed in origin, location, scope and goals, but shared one central feature: despite Western military superiority, the majority were lost. This is remarkable, yet the point could be made that the ever present threat of any conflict escalating to a nuclear war with the Soviet Union kept Western states from utilizing their full military potential. The demise of the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991 to a large extent removed this threat and the ‘victorious’ Western nations emerged into a decade seemingly full of promise, determined to use their now unrivalled military capabilities. Nevertheless, weak states were still able to defeat their militarily and economically far stronger Western adversaries: a few examples. In 1993, American – led U.N. forces were forced out of Somalia, unable to defeat militias armed with the most basic of weapons. A year later in Rwanda, U.N. troops were 5 Lawrence Freedman, The evolution of nuclear strategy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2003), 93 – 100, 147, 271 – 278; Steven Metz, ‘Strategic asymmetry’, Military Review 81 (2001) 23. 6 W. Klinkert, ‘De ontwikkeling van de moderne oorlogvoering in hoofdlijnen’ in: G. Teitler et al., Militaire strategie (Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt 2002), 408. 6 unable to prevent genocide despite clear advance warnings by U.N. commander Roméo Dallaire. In Europe, extensive aerial campaigns in Bosnia (1995) and later in Kosovo (1999) further revealed the West’s inability to back up humanitarian ideals with decisive action. Deployment of ground forces capable of providing actual security was deemed too dangerous, and so an attempt was made to use airpower to force the Serbian president Milosevic to negotiate. While this was partially successful, it was a factor among others and, more importantly, the N.A.T.O. air campaigns could not stop the escalation of the ethnic violence they were supposed to halt. The most recent examples of the West’s continuing inability to attain meaningful victories against weaker opponents are the ongoing campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. 7 Respectively seven and five years since the attacks on those countries, Western military forces are still engaged in combat on a daily basis. Both campaigns started promisingly as hostile Afghan forces operating in the open were quickly routed and the forces of Saddam Hussein were crushingly defeated in an operation that seemed to exemplify the unparalleled military superiority of the American armed forces. In 2001 and 2003, victory in Afghanistan and Iraq seemed only a matter of time. 8 Yet these battlefield victories did not lead to any meaningful political gains. Large insurgencies in both countries have followed the conventional warfare phase and, as with the unconventional opponents of the past, Western forces still seem unable to effectively deal with them.