FO RTIFICATIONS‘ 'REPARED B' THE W AR COLLEGE DIVISIO N GENERAL STAFF CORPS AS A SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF A PROPER MILITAR' 'OLIC' FOR THE UNITED STATES W OD 4896-4 ARM' W AR CO LLEGE :W ASHINGTO N VE E 1 9 15 NO MB R , W ASHINGTON GO VERNMEN T PRINTING OFFICE 1916 DE'ARTM E NT W AR , 1 m li N 5 3 . Docu e t 0 . e o ta Ofiice of the Chi f f S fi . S ' N O ' S I S . NT O D T . R U C IO N I I . 1 . nfluence of or s and or fie es as s n ui s e rom n ren e areas I f t f ti d citi , di ti g h d f i t ch d , u on o era ons on an p p ti l d . F rtifi ations of Li e e o c g . Fortifications of Namur and along the French frontier Antwerp 'rzemysl and the Russian fortifi cations The fortified city of the ' Influen e of sea oas or ifi a ons w ar u ar re eren o 2 . c c t f t c ti ith p tic l f c e t the attack by allied fleet on Dardanelles fortifi cations D escription of the Dardanelles i n an s Fortificat o s of the Dard elle . a 'ower of the uns ( ) g . 6 ara er of the a er es ( ) Ch ct b tt i . R eduction of the forts at the entranc e O perations against the forts at the narrows Final attack ofMarch 18 Efficiency of seacoast fortifications R equisites for succ essful d efense Ne cess ity for mobile troops . m D r n s a ons mo roo s Summar of a e to ake a a e e or fi e . 3 . y tt pt t d ll f ti c ti by bil t p ni a a I ti l del y . Strength of forc es ’ s an Allie pl . n s so n ni nsu a Landi g at uth e d of pe l . A ian- w Z a an or s Landing by the ustral Ne e l d c p . Diversion by the French Attempts to advance Landing at Suvla Bay and subsequent operations Necessity for heavy mobile guns ns The value of m obile troops i n c oas t d efe e . 5 1 3 (3) 6 6 7 3 7 0 FO RTIFICATIO NS. I . IN TR O D U C TIO N . In a memorandum from the Chief of Staff dated November 15 1 915 r a , directions were given for the p eparation of brochure upon “ ” F o rtifications the subject of , with sole reference to the present E a i urope n war , giving especial attention to the follow ng points a i as n ( ) What influence forts and fort fied cities , disti guished from intrenched areas , have exerted on the operations on land . ( 6 ) Influence of seacoast fortifications with particular reference to the attack of the allied fleet against the fortifications of the Dar danelles . Give in detail the total armament , with calibers of arms of e r ss the fl et as well as of the land fo ts , and the lo es in personnel and ' ufl r material s e ed by both fleets and forts . ( c) A brief summar y of the attempt to take these forts by the operation of the mobile troops ; the number of mobile troops , as near a as can be determined , used to date , both in the ttack and in the defense , with total losses . This has been done as far as practicable with the data now avail : able , and the results are noted in the following paragraphs D R F ED AS D 1 . INFLUENCE O F FORTS AN FO TI I CITIES, ISTIN RE HED AREA ' 'ERA N N GUISHED FROM INT NC S , U O N O TIO S O LAND. o r E E FORTIFICATIONS LI G . E in At the outbreak of the present uropean war the Germans , 4 their march through Belgium , were , on the evening of August , 1914 , closing in on Liege , which lies astride the Meuse River near the eastern boundary of Belgium . The fortifications of Liege had Bri lmen been constructed by a t, a Belgian officer, who also designed the fortifications of Namur and Antwerp . They were completed in 1 892 r a , and consisted of a circle of fo ts commanding the main p r p o aches to the city and about 4 miles therefrom . There were six main forts of the pentagonal type and six smaller , triangular in shape ; the greatest distance between forts was yards , and the r E r r 80 average less than ya ds . ach fo t had a ga rison of about 6 - r - men and an armament of two inch guns, fou inch guns , two 8 - -fir e inch mortars , and three or four quick guns , the total number 4 of guns in the 12 forts being about 00. It was intended to construct 6 between the forts lines of trenches and redoubts for infantry and gun pits for artillery , but this had not been done . e The fort itself consisted of a low mound of concret or masonry , roofed with concrete and covered with earth ; a deep ditch sur u e rounded the mo nd , the top of the latt r barely showing above the margin of the ditch . The top was pierced with circular pits , in r u which cupolas o gun turrets moved p and down . Within the ‘ w r there e e e . mound quarters , machinery , stor s , etc When the Germans appeared the Belgian mobilization was still in s progre s , and it is probable that the garrison , instead of being r as was intended , was only The Germans, numbe ing about ' concentrated the attack on the four for ts at the southeast 4— sector and opened up with field guns on the night of August 5 . 5th 6th One of the forts was silenced by this fire on the , and on the the Germans br ought up their 84 -inch howitzers and probably some - 11 u . inch mortars , outranging the Belgian g ns Shells are said to 2 h ave gone through 1 feet of concrete . The accurate firing of the Germans showed that the forts could not long withstand , and in the afternoon of the 6th the Belgian field force was withdr awn from the r city and all the fo ts abandoned except the northern ones . The Ger r r 13th the mans left the emaining fo ts in peace until the , when 1 1 - r r the 15 inch mo ta s opened on them , and by th all had been cap tur ed . The cupolas had been smashed and shells had penetrated the roofs and exploded the magazines . F A' AN D T E F E H R IER ORTIFICATIONS OF N MUR ALONG H R NC F ONT . r a s 2 om Namu was defended by ring of nine fort , miles fr the r city , with an armament simila to that in the Liege forts . The garr ison of had prepar ed the defense of the intervals by in tr enchments . and wire entanglements, and a vigorous defense was Was . r r intended , as French help expected The Ge mans b ought up 32 r i 42- z mode n siege pieces , ncluding the centimeter howit er , its r 12- r e fi st appearance , and the Austrian inch morta , and plac d them 3 0 n 2 . O miles from the Belgian lines . The attack began August the next day the Belgians had to withdr aw from the advanced trenches owing to their inability to reply to the German fire ; two r fo ts fell ; thr ee others were silenced after an attack of two hours . O n 23d 25th t the Namur was occupied , and on the the las fort had n fallen . O e fort had fir ed only 10 times and was itself struck by r r 2 shells fi ed at the ate of 0 per minute . The speedy fall of ’ Namur came near playing havoc with the allies plans , as with the delay caused by its resistance they had intended to complete the th concentration along e Belgian frontier. 51 3 7 s c La e h Other fortified places , u h as Lille , Laon , F re , and R eims , along the northeastern French boundary fell before the advancing r Ge mans without striking a blow . The advance was on such a broad front that an attempt at defense would have endangered the safety of the garrisons , and it was imperative that the garrisons join the 28 M u field army . By August a ber ge of all the northern strong holds alone held out . The defenses had been brought to a high ffi state of e ciency , the intervals well prepared with an armored train running on a track encircling the main line of defenses . The German 27 infantry invested the place August , but the siege gun s did not go into action until September 3 . The place fell September 8 with a loss of men . W ER' ANT . Antwerp , said to be the second most strongly fortified city of E a 20 12 urope , encircled by girdle of permanent forts and earthen redoubts , was in similar manner quickly reduced by the heavy siege guns .