APRIL 2019 Slow and Steady Improving U.S.-Arab Cooperation to Counter Irregular Warfare Ilan Goldenberg, Nicholas A. Heras and Kaleigh Thomas About the Authors Acknowledgments ILAN GOLDENBERG is a Senior Fellow The authors would like to thank Brian Katz, Elisa Catalano and Director of the Middle East Security Ewers, Ted Karasik, and Loren DeJonge Schulman for their Program at the Center for a New American review of this report and their helpful comments. They would Security (CNAS). He previously served also like to acknowledge Melody Cook and Maura McCarthy at the State Department as a chief of for their assistance with the production of this report. staff for the small team supporting then– Secretary of State John Kerry’s initiative to conduct permanent-status negotiations between Israelis About the Middle East Security Program and Palestinians. He was formerly a senior professional staff The Middle East Security Program conducts cutting-edge member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where research on the most pressing issues in this turbulent region. he focused on the Middle East. Prior to that, he served as a The program focuses on the sources of instability in the special advisor on the Middle East and then as the Iran team region, maintaining key U.S. strategic partnerships, and chief in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. generating solutions that help policymakers respond to both fast-moving events and long-term trends. The Middle East NICHOLAS A. HERAS is a Fellow in the Security Program draws on a team with deep government Middle East Security Program at CNAS. He and nongovernment experience in regional studies, U.S. is also a Senior Analyst at the Jamestown foreign policy, and international security. It analyzes trends Foundation, where he provides analysis and generates practical and implementable policy solutions of complex conflicts and security issues that defend and advance U.S. interests. in the greater Middle East and North Africa and Sahara-Sahel regions. A former National Security Education Program David L. Boren Fellow, he has extensive in-field research experience in all regions of Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan, with significant experience in Turkey’s border regions with Syria and Iraq. Before CNAS, Heras was a research associate at the National Defense University, where he worked on a project that comprehensively analyzed the impact of the Syrian and Iraqi conflict on the Middle East. KALEIGH THOMAS is a Research Associate in the Middle East Security Program at CNAS. Previously, she was a program coordinator for both the Middle East Security and Energy, Economics, and Security programs at CNAS. She earned her M.A. in International Peace and Conflict Resolution from American University, and her B.S. in Business Administration with majors in International Business and Marketing from the University of South Carolina. Cover Photo U.S. Marines deployed in support of Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve pose with Iraqi service members in Iraq, Nov. 27, 2017. (Marine Corps photo by Capt. Christian Lopez) SLOW AND STEADY Improving U.S.-Arab Cooperation to Counter Irregular Warfare 01 Executive Summary 03 A Note on Methodology 04 Chapter 1: A Sustainable “By, With, and Through” Strategy for the Middle East 13 Chapter 2: The Challenges and Experiences of Working with Arab Partners 21 Chapter 3: A Joint U.S.-Arab Strategy for Countering Irregular Warfare Threats in the Middle East 27 Conclusion MIDDLE EAST SECURITY | APRIL 2019 Slow and Steady: Improving U.S.-Arab Cooperation to Counter Irregular Warfare Executive Summary cooperatively countering the challenges posed by irreg- ular warfare – especially those posed by Iran’s support Since 9/11 the United States has struggled with how to for proxies in the region and Salafi-jihadist extremists.1 respond to the challenges posed by ungoverned spaces But initiatives designed to improve the capabilities of in the Middle East, from which terrorist attacks and Arab militaries and regional cooperation among them destabilizing mass refugee flows emanate. The collapse have consistently failed. They do not trust one another. of state authority in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya has They also lack many of the necessary capabilities to created security vacuums that extremist groups such as counter irregular warfare individually or separately, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al Qaeda they focus their security investments too heavily on pur- have used to develop local presence, to organize, and chasing expensive weaponry designed for conventional eventually to conduct attacks both inside these countries threats. Further, there is mutual frustration between as well as in Europe and the United States. Meanwhile, the United States and many of its Arab partners. They the refugee flows that have resulted from these conflicts fear that the United States is leaving the region. And the have put tremendous pressure on neighboring countries United States is uncomfortable with some of the strate- and also caused a massive wave of refugees into Europe. gies the Arab states pursue, the most recent example of The question facing the United States and other Western which is in Yemen, that come with a high civilian cost. allies is how to deal with these challenges without Given these challenges, a multinational force to address getting sucked into complex and costly civil wars that the the threats posed by terrorism – for example the Islamic United States has little ability to end on its own. Military Counter Terrorism Coalition proposed by Saudi Arabia in 2015 – is unlikely to be effective. Even a com- The question facing the United prehensive agreement such as the Middle East Strategic States and other Western Alliance (MESA), proposed by the current administra- allies is how to deal with tion, is not a viable option. Instead, this study proposes an incremental approach challenges in the Middle East that over time allows the United States and its Arab without getting sucked into partners to come to multiple common understandings on complex and costly civil wars. the irregular warfare challenges in the Middle East and to flexibly develop common tools that can be used Full-scale American-led counterinsurgency, sta- to address them. bilization campaigns, or other resource-intensive This can be achieved through the creation of two nation-shaping interventions attempted in Afghanistan layers of cooperation. At the policy and strategic and Iraq have proven to be unsustainable models given level, the United States should work with the relevant the high costs, indecisive outcomes, and lack of political Middle Eastern partners to create less formal, tailored support at home. However, completely withdrawing U.S. working groups for various irregular warfare challenges. forces and counting purely on intelligence collection to These groups should focus on: (1) producing common monitor threats and local partners to address them has threat assessments; (2) developing joint strategies and been ineffective, as this approach leaves the United States campaign plans in response to these threats; (3) agreeing vulnerable to attacks. The most successful effort the on a division of labor; (4) discussing ethical approaches United States has launched to deal with these challenges to managing irregular warfare consistent with the laws of in recent years has been the counter-ISIS campaign in war; and (5) developing a common intelligence picture. Iraq and Syria, where it has succeeded in protecting Not all of the United States’ Arab partners need to be U.S. interests at a reasonable cost by working “By, With, involved in every working group. Membership should and Through” local actors. In this model the United be based on the threat prioritization of each country and States generally: (1) uses a comparatively small number limited to those that can realistically work closely with the of troops to train, equip, advise, assist, or accompany United States as well as with each other on these problems. local forces with legitimacy on the ground; (2) provides The first two working groups should address Iran’s Islamic airpower and some enablers and logistics; (3) uses its Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force and Salafi- limited military investment as leverage for a broader dip- jihadist groups. In time, additional working groups, using lomatic effort; or (4) invests in building local governance this approach, can be added to address other challenges, and providing aid on the ground. such as those in North Africa and the Sahel. This model could be improved if America’s At the operational level, U.S. efforts should focus on Middle Eastern partners also became more adept at individually working with these countries and helping 1 @CNASDC Though the program the Though the program the authors recommend in authors recommend in this this report is designed to put more responsibility on these partners, it must be clear from the start that it report is designed to put more will involve a meaningful and sustained American responsibility on U.S. Arab commitment. This must include consistent high-level partners, it must be clear from engagement from the civilian leadership at the Pentagon, the start that it will involve State Department, and Intelligence Community; long- term commitment of a discrete number of American a meaningful and sustained trainers and special operators to the mission; a sustained American commitment. air and naval presence in the region, though one that may be smaller than in recent years; and continued commit- them improve their special operations forces. What has ments by the U.S. government to support aid programs failed in the past is trying to wholly remake these mili- that can improve governance and stability in ungoverned taries in the U.S. image.2 There has been more success spaces in the Middle East. in training and supporting elite forces such as the Iraqi U.S.