Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Legacy to Cognitive Psychology: Concepts as Participatory by Susan Byrne, B.A. Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Presented to: The Department of Philosophy National University of Ireland, Maynooth 30th October, 2012 Head of Department of Philosophy: Dr Michael Dunne Supervisor: Dr Michael Dunne Co-Supervisor: Dr (des.) Simon Nolan Co-Supervisor: Dr Fiona Lyddy (Department of Psychology) C O N T E N T S Acknowledgements iv Introduction 1 CHAPTER I SITUATING WITTGENSTEIN’S THOUGHT IN RELATION TO COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 7 1.1 Status quaestionis 11 1.2 Definition of Terms: Concept, Category, Context, Environment, Mentalism and Cognitivism 22 1.2.1 Concept and Category 22 1.2.2 Context and Environment 27 1.2.3 Mentalism 27 1.2.4 Cognitivism 29 1.3 Methodology 31 1.4 Scope and Limitations 32 CHAPTER II AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 37 2.1 The Nature of Language 38 2.2 Gottlob Frege 43 2.3 Ludwig Wittgenstein 52 CHAPTER III WITTGENSTEIN’S CENTRAL CONCEPTS: LANGUAGE-GAMES AND FAMILY RESEMBLANCE 66 3.1 Language-Games 69 3.2 Family Resemblance 76 3.3 Language: Meaning is Use 80 CHAPTER IV A POTENTIAL PROBLEM FOR PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY: WITTGENSTEIN AND BEHAVIOURISM 89 4.1 Private Language 91 4.2 Behaviourism 100 4.3 Philosophical Behaviourism: Analytical or Logical 107 4.4 Skinner and Wittgenstein 111 4.5 Some Preliminary Conclusions 120 CHAPTER V THE COGNITIVE APPROACH TO 123 CONCEPTS 5.1 The Philosophical Roots of Psychology 125 5.2 The Origins of Psychology 128 ii 5.3 Paradigms in Psychology 130 5.4 The Nature of Concepts 133 5.5 The Defining Attribute View or the Definitional View 139 5.6 The Prototype View 145 5.7 The Exemplar View 151 5.8 The Knowledge Approach or Theory View of Concepts 153 5.9 Other Considerations: Exemplar Strategy, Hypothesis Testing Strategy, and Memory 156 5.9.1 Exemplar Strategy 156 5.9.2 Hypothesis Testing Strategy 157 5.9.3 Memory 158 5.10 The Cognitive Revolution 164 CHAPTER VI EMBODIED COGNITION AND SITUATED CONCEPTS: A WITTGENSTEINIAN THEME 171 6.1 The Historical Anchors for Embodied Cognition 176 6.2 Embodied Cognition 179 6.2.1 Cognition is Situated 182 6.2.2 Cognition is Time Pressured 184 6.2.3 We Off-Load Cognitive Work onto the Environment 185 6.2.4 The Environment is Part of the Cognitive System 186 6.2.5 Cognition is For Action 189 6.2.6 Off-Line Cognition is Body Based 192 6.3 Situated Cognition 195 6.4 Situated Concepts and Embodied Cognition: A Wittgensteinian Theme 198 6.5 Empirical Domains for the Embodied 206 Cognition Approach 6.6 Conclusions 209 CHAPTER VII THE LANGUAGE-GAME: CONCEPTS AS PARTICIPATORY 213 7.1 The Language-Game as Theory of Language 216 7.2 Concepts as Participatory 226 7.3 The Language-Game where Concepts are 230 Participatory 7.4 Concepts as Participatory and Family 246 Resemblance Conclusion 251 Bibliography 262 iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This study would not have been possible without the help and encouragement of many people. I would like to express my sense of gratitude to the late Professor Thomas A. F. Kelly for his interest in and enthusiasm for this research project. Without his support and generosity of spirit I would not have commenced this study. I am also grateful to the late Professor John J. Cleary MRIA for our many discussions on philosophy and for his advice and gentle steering when clear direction was needed. I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr Michael Dunne, for his encouragement and assistance in the completion of this work, and to my co- supervisor, Dr (des.) Simon Nolan, who has been very helpful in sharing his insights into the philosophy of Wittgenstein. I thank him for the extensive conversations about Wittgenstein and for his consistent support and enthusiasm for this project. Sincere thanks are also due to my second co-supervisor, Dr Fiona Lyddy, for her generous support, dedication and guidance since commencing this research. I am grateful to her for keeping me motivated and anchored throughout my time at Maynooth and for providing a wonderful learning experience. I would also like to acknowledge the assistance of members of the Philosophy Department who have always been supportive. In particular I would like to thank Ann Gleeson, Administrative Officer of the Department, iv and Dr Mette Lebech for her kindness and advice. Also I am indebted to my post-graduate friends and colleagues, both past and present, who were always willing to help and advise, in particular Dr Denise Ryan, Dr Haydn Gurmin and Dr Yinya Liu. Thank you also to my friends and colleagues at the Dun Laoghaire Community Training Centre for your encouragement and consistent interest in this project. In particular I wish to express my sincere appreciation to my Manager, Gerry O’Shea, for his understanding and unequivocal support. To my friends who supported me — especially Dr Kathleen Deasy, Aisling Newton, Monika Doheny and Yvonne Scully —I thank you dearly. A special ‘thank you’ to my husband, Damian, and my son, Alexander, for their love, patience and support without which this study would not have been possible. Finally, I would like to thank my parents to whom this study is dedicated. Thank you to my Mum who instilled the value of education in me, and to my Dad who showed me what hard work, determination and ambition were really about. v INTRODUCTION ‘James: “Our vocabulary is inadequate.” Then why don’t we introduce a new one?’1 Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) is regarded as one of the most influential and eminent philosophers of the twentieth century. In both his early and later work, he is a key figure in the development of analytical philosophy: he wants us to see that natural language use is pivotal to understanding the nature of the mind.2 However, his later work, specifically with regard to the Philosophical Investigations (1953) [henceforth referred to as the Investigations], where concepts are a participating part of the context, makes him a key figure in contemporary cognitive psychology. While Wittgenstein’s interest in psychology began between 1934-1936 when he lectured on private experience and sense data,3 his contributions to the field of psychology continued up until his death in 1951. Unknown to Wittgenstein at the time, his remarks on philosophical psychology would have an enormous influence on both the psychology and philosophy disciplines. 1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations [1953], trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe, 3rd edn, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), #610. ‘James’ here refers to William James (1842–1910). Psychology’s inception can be seen in the early stages of American psychology, commencing with James. As part of his seminal work, he proposed that there should be less emphasis on the structure of consciousness and more emphasis instead on the character of consciousness and its relation to the environment. Here we can see a Wittgensteinian theme in terms of the prominent role that the ‘context’ or the ‘environment’ play. In 1890 James published Principles of Psychology in the United States. (Also, interestingly, the first two words in Zettel are: ‘William James’.) 2 Meredith Williams, Preface, Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning — Towards a Social Conception of Mind (London: Routledge, 1999). 3 Hans-Johann Glock, A Wittgenstein Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 23. 1 Wittgenstein is a towering figure in history and yet his contribution to the domain of cognitive psychology specifically has, to date, been undervalued and underestimated. This study examines Wittgenstein’s move from viewing language as a calculus to his more natural language view as exemplified in his language-game. While Wittgenstein’s early work in the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus (1921) [henceforth referred to as the Tractatus] is primarily concerned with language and logic, and was influential on the logical positivist movement, his later philosophy shows his view on language, human nature and how behaviour is intrinsically linked to the practice of language and its use. Wittgenstein’s remarks and descriptions in his later work, the Investigations, show concepts in varying ways, such as ‘concept’ qua concept, concepts ‘about’ things in the world, and the more specific concepts that he refers to in the preface of the Investigations. In contrast to Wittgenstein’s description of concepts and the practice of language, the cognitive approach adopted by psychology explains concepts and, therefore their use, in a more developmental and theoretical framework. The term ‘family resemblance’ is used by Wittgenstein to show that there is no defining feature, no one essence, of a concept but rather there is a criss-crossing and over-lapping of features. This term ‘family resemblance’ was later used by cognitive psychology to support an approach in concept development, namely the prototype view. Interestingly, while the cognitive theorist Eleanor Rosch used Wittgenstein’s term family resemblance to 2 develop the prototype view in cognitive psychology, I am using Rosch’s term ‘participatory’ to support my argument that Wittgenstein considered that concepts are participatory in any language-game. While the Investigations also shows Wittgenstein’s rejection of mentalism and cognitive analysis, he does not deny that mental processes and states exist; he considers, rather, that they should play a more prominent role in how we use language. For Wittgenstein, this is not in any developmental way, but in our behaviour. Furthermore, Wittgenstein is aware of the limitations of behaviourism. Wittgenstein’s descriptions and remarks show concepts are not isolated and abstract objects, but ‘participate’ within a context or environment, i.e., a language-game.