Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society http://journals.cambridge.org/JRA Additional services for Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society: Email alerts: Click here Subscriptions: Click here Commercial reprints: Click here Terms of use : Click here Nader Shah and Persian Naval Expansion in the Persian Gulf, 1700–1747 MICHAEL AXWORTHY Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society / Volume 21 / Issue 01 / January 2011, pp 31 ­ 39 DOI: 10.1017/S1356186310000362, Published online: 20 January 2011 Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1356186310000362 How to cite this article: MICHAEL AXWORTHY (2011). Nader Shah and Persian Naval Expansion in the Persian Gulf, 1700–1747. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 21, pp 31­39 doi:10.1017/S1356186310000362 Request Permissions : Click here Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/JRA, IP address: 144.173.152.78 on 16 May 2013 Nader Shah and Persian Naval Expansion in the Persian Gulf, 1700–1747 MICHAEL AXWORTHY Abstract The purpose of this article is to relate a remarkable episode involving Nader Shah’s navy and to connect it directly to the wider aims and projects of his regime (notably his ambitions in India), and the central events of his reign. In this way his Persian Gulf policy may emerge not as the oddity it might at first appear, but rather as a consistent element in a coherent larger whole. The story of Nader Shah’s naval programme in the Persian Gulf, and of the expansion of Persian power to dominate the Gulf region during his reign, is likely to be unknown even to many who specialise in this region. This is partly due to the relative obscurity of this period and of the history of Nader Shah himself.1 But the story has been explored, by Lawrence Lockhart, in an article published in 1936,2 and in his biography of Nader Shah of 1938.3 And Willem Floor brought the state of knowledge up to date, adding a wealth of new material from the records of the Dutch East India Company, in an article published in 1987.4 The purpose of this piece is not to repeat in detail what appears in those earlier accounts, though it is necessary to give an outline of the main events. The purpose is rather to relate the remarkable episode of Nader’s navy more directly to the wider aims and projects of his regime (notably his ambitions in India), and the central events of his reign. In this way his Persian Gulf policy may emerge not as the oddity it might at first appear, but rather as a consistent element in a coherent larger whole. It is necessary first of all to give a brief account of how Nader Shah came to power in Persia. In the first two decades of the eighteenth century there was a gradual erosion of 1Of the contemporary chronicles of Nader’s life, the most important is that of his official historian, Mirza Mohammad Mahdi Astarabadi - his Tarikh-e Jahangusha-ye Naderi (JN); translated into French by Sir William Jones as the Histoire de Nader Chah, (London, 1770); original Persian text (ed.) Abdollah Anvar, (Anjoman Asar va Mafakher-e Farhangi)(Tehran,1377/1998). 2‘The Navy of Nadir Shah’ in Proceedings of the Iran Society Vol. 1 Part 1,pp3–18, (London, 1936). 3Laurence Lockhart, Nadir Shah (London, 1938). 4Willem Floor, ‘The Iranian Navy in the Gulf during the Eighteenth Century’ in Iranian Studies, 20, 1987.Like Willem Floor’s other publications translating and summarising evidence from the records of the Dutch East India Company, this article conveys a wealth of new primary source material. I am grateful to Willem for commenting on this article before submission (which produced a number of amendments): he and I have discussed the Military Revolution thesis at length without (so far) reaching full agreement. JRAS, Series 3, 21, 1 (2011), pp. 31–39 C The Royal Asiatic Society 2011 doi:10.1017/S1356186310000362 32 Michael Axworthy the authority and prestige of the Safavid monarchy, particularly in the outlying provinces of the empire. The most serious event in this process was the revolt of the Ghilzai Afghans of Kandahar in 1709, followed by that of the Abdalis of Herat later; but there were serious revolts in Kurdistan, the Caucasus and Khorasan also. Part of this pattern was the expansion of raiding against Safavid territory on the Persian Gulf coast from Muscat. Bandar-e Kong was sacked in 1714, and ibn Saif II of Muscat sent a major force against Bahrain in 1715. This was beaten off, but the Muscat fleet returned in 1717 and captured the island. They went on to take Larak and Qeshm, and besieged the fort at Hormuz. The troubles of the Persians were exacerbated by their lack of ships. The Safavid state had no naval vessels of its own. They tried to get ships from the Dutch, Portuguese and English trading companies present at the Persian ports (a recurring theme later on), but the Dutch and English refused. The Persians briefly retook Bahrain in July 1718, using small vessels lent by local Arab tribesmen to ferry across a 6,000-strong expeditionary force, but another fleet from Muscat landed in Bahrain in November and massacred the Persians. The Persian commander had some success later, with the help of Portuguese ships, in removing the Muscat fleet from the waters around Bahrain, and the two sides entered into negotiations concerning the island in 1721. But implementing the agreement they reached was messy and no definitive settlement was ultimately achieved.5 After 1719 the difficulties of the Safavid monarchy deepened and the court in Isfahan had no time to spare for their territories in the Persian Gulf. Growing bolder after their revolt, the Afghans of Kandahar raided Kerman in 1719,andthenin1722 struck at the heart of the Safavid realm, defeated the royal army and after a long and destructive siege occupied the capital, Isfahan itself.6 This catastrophe led to a free-for-all in the provinces. In Nader’s birthplace, Khorasan,7 rival warlords (him among them) manoeuvred and fought to take control. But Nader’s cause was greatly strengthened in 1726, when Tahmasp, the son of the last Safavid Shah, arrived in Khorasan and joined forces with him. Together, under Nader’s leadership, they were able to take Mashhad and in 1729 successfully defeated an Afghan army from Isfahan under the Afghan Shah, Ashraf. After two further battles Nader ejected the Afghans, and restored Tahmasp to his throne in Isfahan. Within a few years Nader had restored the borders of Persia almost to the extent to which they had reached before the Afghan revolt, defeating a variety of enemies, including the Ottoman Turks, along the way. But he did not do it for Tahmasp, who was deposed in 1732. After a period as regent for Tahmasp’s son, Nader deposed him too and made himself Shah in his own right in 1736. The argument in my book, The Sword of Persia, is that Nader achieved this startling reversal of fortune by a ruthless and innovatory policy, which unconsciously paralleled many of the 5Floor 1987,pp.34–37. 6The best detailed overall account in English of the Afghan revolt and the fall of the Safavid monarchy is still Laurence Lockhart’s The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia (Cambridge, 1958) – though important additional source material has become available since that time. 7Nader came from the Turkic Afshar tribe of northern Khorasan. Nader Shah and Persian Naval Expansion in the Persian Gulf, 1700–1747 33 measures of military reformers in Europe in the gunpowder age.8 Marshall G Hodgson9 famously named the Safavid as one of the three Gunpowder Empires of the Islamic world in the sixteenth century, but in an important article10 Rudi Matthee has pointed out the weakness of the Safavid claim to that title, even by the end of the seventeenth century. Despite the use of muskets and cannon by some of the centrally-held troops of the Safavid State, the majority of provincial troops were still armed with lance, sword and bow, as they had been since the time of the pre-Islamic Sassanid monarchy. Most towns were unwalled and few or none had the new kind of powerful fortifications designed to resist artillery that were the norm in Europe, and common in the Ottoman and Moghul territories. Nader changed all that, gradually building up an army that at its height was fully equipped with up-to-date gunpowder weapons. With the ultimate aim of wresting the caliphate and supremacy in Islam from the Ottomans, he expanded the army hugely and insisted on constant, daily training to ensure maximum effectiveness of the new weapons. His regime had a new, totalising character, extracting the last drop of revenue from taxation, and demanding minute accounting from officials. In other words, in a short time most of the elements of at least the first stage of what in Europe has been described as the Military Revolution11 were present. Maximising the effectiveness of the regime’s armed force at sea was an indispensible part of that process. This is the context in which we have to view Nader’s Persian Gulf policy. Nader was a monarch in a different mould. He did not loll back in his capital, sending his officers off to do battle in far-flung provinces. He was constantly on the move, accompanying his troops on all their major campaigns, rarely staying in one place for more than two months at a time, unless forced to do so by the necessity of a lengthy siege.
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