ja Fall 2011_Layout 1 8/16/11 12:56 PM Page 84 Counterpoint Halachic Decision Making in First-Rank Posekim: A Debate Between Rabbis Hillel Goldberg and Michael Broyde Rabbi Hillel Goldberg “...im rak nir’eh lanu lehatir.” The essential Moshe cherry-picked the decision he found word is nir’eh. reasonable because it could be defended as n exchange between Rabbis Aharon Wiener translated the context of that well as another decision that could emerge ALichtenstein and Aharon Feldman in phrase, and the phrase itself, this way: “ . from the sources. the pages of Jewish Action (“Dear Reb but in cases of great need . we are cer- Rabbi Broyde says this is “a common Aharon,” summer 2010) prompted a letter tainly obligated to rule [leniently] only if it situation in Jewish law.” by Rabbi Michael Broyde, which prompted appears to us to be permitted [emphasis However, while nir’eh does denote “it a letter by Yosef Wiener, which now added], and it is forbidden for us to be appears,” it frequently connotes something prompts a letter from me. among the humble . .” very different, certainly in the writings of I wish to comment on one point in the Rabbi Broyde objects to this translation, many first-rank posekim. exchange between Rabbi Broyde and and he is right to do so, insofar as im rak In my acquaintance with the Chazon Wiener, namely, the approach of Rav does not mean only if. It means if only, or, as Ish, for example, when this posek intro- Moshe Feinstein to halachic decision-mak- Rabbi Broyde prefers, if merely. However, duces one of his comments with “it ap- ing (pesak halachah) as reflected in a criti- Rabbi Broyde’s rendering of the entirety of pears,” what this connotes is that a mere cal methodological statement in one of Rav Rav Moshe’s words remains problematic. mortal, about to make a pronouncement on Moshe’s responsa. Rabbi Broyde translates: the Divine Law—a being of flesh and blood The stakes here are broad: not only the “ . but in cases of great need . we are who will someday expire, about to act in fundamental method of Rav Moshe Fein- certainly obligated to rule [leniently], even light of the tremendous weight of genera- stein, but of other first-rank posekim, too. if we merely deem it plausible to be lenient tions of halachic masters and claiming to The issue is the definition of intellectual [my emphasis], and it is forbidden for us to reflect the will of God Himself—will couch honesty within halalchic decision-making. be among the humble . .” his halachic conclusions modestly. He will The difference of opinion between We arrive at the essence of the issue in say only, “nir’eh, it appears.” Rabbi Broyde and Wiener shows that, in the interpretation of Rav Moshe: Is leniency That is vis-a-vis halachic history. essence, the correct interpretation of even the right way to go if “it appears to us” to be But in the Chazon Ish’s determination one single word in a sophisticated rabbinic permitted—if our best halachic reasoning to ascertain the Divine intent in the given responsum can make a critical difference. leads us to a lenient conclusion—or if we case, he is not hedging when he uses nir’eh. Rabbi Broyde cites a short phrase of merely “deem” a leniency “plausible”? The halachic rulings of that formidable Rav Moshe Feinstein, and, in essence, Writes Rabbi Broyde: “Rav Moshe giant are often introduced by “nir’eh”—an builds a theory of halachic decision-making meant that in cases of urgent need, ‘a posek expression of modesty before the tradition, on one word in that phrase. Rabbi Broyde can adopt an understanding of the halachah coexisting with a ferocious determination writes that his critic, Wiener, “misunder- that he genuinely thinks is reasonable, even to have his halachic ruling seen as nothing stood” him. if he himself recognizes that other under- less than compelled by the sources. I don’t think so. I think Wiener did un- standings of the Talmudic sources can be Likewise, in my acquaintance with the derstand Rabbi Broyde, did have the correct just as correct . .’” comments of the Vilna Gaon on the reading of Rav Moshe, and that it was Rabbi Is that what Rabbi Feinstein actually Shulchan Aruch, when this extraordinary Broyde who misunderstood Rav Moshe. I said? The essence comes down to that one posek introduces a source with “it appears say this notwithstanding Wiener’s confu- single word: nir’eh. to me” (nir’eh li), what this connotes is a sion of im rak and rak im, which Rabbi Nir’eh indeed denotes “it appears.” That hammering conviction, not a mere plausi- Broyde correctly pointed out (see below). is, “I am not dogmatic on the question.” bility. The issue is whether plausibilities in From this, bolstered by Rav Moshe’s intro- So, too, in my acquaintance with Rav halachic sources may be snatched up at ductory im rak (“if only”), out pops Rabbi Moshe, when he writes (I translate literally will, or whether authoritative halachic Broyde’s “even if we merely deem it plausi- now), “ . if only it appears to us to rule le- analysis operates on the basis of what ble.” That is, Rabbi Broyde says that Rav niently,” the connotation is: The full force of Wiener calls “conviction.” Moshe says: Take your pick among the plau- my polymathic halachic knowledge yields a The phrase and the word of Rabbi Fein- sibilities. According to Rabbi Broyde, Rav lenient ruling here because it is compelled by stein that Rabbi Broyde focuses on is this: 84 I JEWISH ACTION Fall 5772/2011 ja Fall 2011_Layout 1 8/16/11 12:56 PM Page 85 the sources. Rav Moshe’s complete conviction in his reading of the sources is on full display in the very teshuvah that Rabbi Broyde cites, in which Rav Moshe himself bridles at the suggestion of his Sukkot in Israel? questioner that the sources do not really say what Rav Moshe says they decisively say. The choiice is easy!! There is a way of indicating that a conclusion is merely “plausible” — for example, im rak heichah timtza—but Rav NEEWW SRRAAEL & Moshe did not write that. He wrote nir’eh, expressing his conno- tatively clear conviction. INTERNAATTIONAL CCAALLING ² This does not mean that Rav Moshe never revisited or altered his rulings, but again, such developments represented his further thought, not his supple readjustment of plausibilities. If Rav Moshe merely made choices among plausibilities, since he could justify it, he would not have become the universally ac- knowledged posek that he became. Rabbi Broyde concludes: “[Rabbi Feinstein’s] vision, breadth, knowledge and wisdom are missed in this time of terrible need.” What was Rav Moshe’s wisdom? His phenomenal knowledge, coupled with his determination to seek the most cogent and com- pelling reading of halachic sources in response to every question put to him—in a word, his conviction. It was this, not some supple selection among plausibilities, that constituted his wisdom. The real issue in assessing different first-rank posekim is not their aspiration to identify the most truthful reading possible within the sources, but their actual findings. Findings, of course, can differ. That is another story—and that is the real story—not a supposedly limitless pliancy, based on a misleading, denotative reading of im rak nir’eh. The odd thing is, Rabbi Broyde seems to acknowledge all this himself in other parts of his original letter to Jewish Action. Rabbi Broyde quotes Rav Moshe, from the very same teshuvah that con- tains the im rak nir’eh quote, as saying that the qualified posek “must rule decisively . to the best of his ability,” based on “diligent investigation” and “a clear understanding and valid proof.” Right: A decisive ruling based on a clear understanding, not a “reasonable” ruling based on a “mere” understanding, is the context of im rak nir’eh lanu lehatir. Rabbi Broyde himself asserts the value of gen- eral rabbinic leadership that is “willing to assert what it thought the halachah really was.” Precisely. Rabbi Hillel Goldberg, PhD, executive editor of the Intermountain Jewish News, in Denver, Colorado, is a contributing editor of Jewish Action. Rabbi Michael J. Broyde abbi Hillel Goldberg’s insight that Jewish law authorities fre- Rquently use the term nir’eh li or nir’eh leaniyat da’ati merely as a term of modesty, but are, in fact, sharing their opinion as to what the halachah undoubtedly is in their view, is certainly correct. Rabbi Feinstein did so hundreds of times in his teshuvot. But that is not the case here. Rabbi Feinstein states: However, one ought not be haughty in one’s instructive rulings– this should be avoided whenever possible, but in cases of great need, and certainly in serious matters regarding the ending of marriages as this case, we are certainly obligated to rule [leniently], even if we merely deem it plausible to be lenient [im rak nir’eh lanu lehatir] and it is forbidden for us to be among the “humble” and [thereby] cause Jewish women to remain unable to marry, or cause fellow Jews to stumble in prohibited activities, or even simply cause a Jew’s finan- cial loss. Let me explain why: There are hundreds of cases in Iggerot Moshe where Rav Moshe invokes the phrase “it appears to me in my humble opinion” (nir’eh leaniyat da’ati) or “it appears to me” (nire’eh li) and if this had been one of them, Rabbi Goldberg would certainly be correct.