GW-8 The Air Land Battle June 28, 2016 Page 606 Chapter Eight: The AirLand Battle Like many aspects of Desert Storm, it is difficult to generalize about the lessons of the AirLand battle. As has been discussed in Chapters Two and Three, the Coalition land offensive was shaped by US military doctrine that had evolved strikingly since the Vietnam War. This doctrine placed a new emphasis on maneuver, deception, striking at the enemy's strategic center, remaining within the enemy's decision cycle, multiple simultaneous thrusts, decisive use of force through flanking movements, night and power weather warfare, sustained high tempos of continuous operation, and integrating the application of firepower into the concept of maneuver. Many aspects of the new US AirLand battle doctrine were put into practice during the land war. The Coalition battle plans called for "initiative," "agility," "depth," and "synchronization," and all four were achieved. The key tactics in the AirLand battle were to avoid battles of attrition, attack the enemy's vulnerabilities, keep the battlefield fluid, force the enemy to move in the desired direction, maintain continuous operations, optimize all capabilities, and maximize night/limited visibility operations: All these tactics were actually employed in combat, and all were effective. The key sustainment goals were anticipation, integration, responsiveness, and improvisation: These goals too were met. Yet, this success in maneuver and in maintaining high tempos of operation was only achieved after a massive air war of attrition. The UN Coalition was also able to exploit advances in tactics, training, and technology that the US and its allies had developed for fighting in Europe in a AirLand battle against an Iraqi enemy that was tied to static defense concepts. Where US plans for Europe called for NATO to "fight outnumbered and win" against a Warsaw Pact threat with superior numbers and many advanced military capabilities, the Coalition had a decisive advantage of Iraq in virtually every area of military capability. Further, the Coalition had many advantages in human factors. This is sometimes forgotten in the emphasis on new tactics and technology, but the leading land forces -- British, French, and US -- were exceptional professional forces which had had the time to achieve high readiness levels. They fought Iraqi forces which were largely conscript forces with poor training and leadership. If the air war represented a major step forward in achieving air supremacy, and the use of offensive air power, the AirLand battle was a demonstration of the value of many changes in the art of operations. It is one of the ironies of war, however, that it is easier to learn specific lessons from a long slow process of failure than from a quick and decisive success. The land portion of the Gulf War was so quick and decisive that Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. GW-8 The Air Land Battle June 28, 2016 Page 607 analysts often have to settle for victory as a substitute for data, and the cumulative level of Coalition superiority was so high that it is often difficult to determine the relative contribution that any given advantage made. Comparative Land Strength And Capabilities. The details of the individual land forces on each side have already been discussed in Chapter Three. At the same time, it is important to understand several aspects of these forces that have special importance to an analysis of lessons from the AirLand battle. These factors include Coalition strength and order of battle at the time the land war began, the size and state of Iraqi land forces, and the resulting force ratios. The Coalition Ground Forces The force ratios between the Coalition and Iraq changed fundamentally during November, December, and January, as a result of the decision to send a second US corps to the Gulf discussed in Chapter Two. The US VII Corps began to deploy from Germany immediately after President Bush announced by decision to reinforce on November 8, 1990.1 The US Army's 1st Division was deployed from the US, along with the 2nd Marine Division, 3rd Marine Air Wing, and support forces. Much of this build-up took place between December 5, 1990 and January, 1991. The US Army increased its heavy brigades by approximately 145% during this period, from 7 to 17. The VII Corps had 1,200 tanks and 1,046 M-2/M-3s (including 54 M-1s and 42 M-2/M-3s operationally ready afloat (ORF). The XVIII Corps had only 738 tanks and 647 M-2/M-3s (including 26 M-1s and 36 M-2/M-3s in ORF).2 The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) increased by 75% from 4 regiments to 7, and the number of amphibious brigades afloat doubled from 1 to 2. British, French, and Egyptian land forces also made major increases in force strength during this period.3 As has been discussed in Chapters Two and Three, the missions of various national contingents also changed. The French 6th Light Armored Division was placed under the tactical control of the US XVIII Corps, and was used to secure the Coalition's left flank. At least one source indicates that this move occurred at French request to avoid continued French subordination to the Saudis.4 The equipment of the 6th Light Armored Division did, however, suit the operations of XVIII Corps better than those of JFC-N or JFC-E. The rest of the British 1st Armored Division arrived from Germany, and Sir Peter de la Billiere, the British Commander successfully sought the reassignment of the 7th Armored Brigade and British forces from the US Marine Command to the US VII Corps. In order to give the Marine land force more heavy weapons, and compensate for the reassignment of British forces to the VII Corps, two battalions of the 2nd Marine Regiment Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. GW-8 The Air Land Battle June 28, 2016 Page 608 were detached from the incoming 2nd Marine Division, and assigned to the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, and one battalion was assigned to the 6th Marine Regiment. Most importantly, the US Army Tiger Brigade (1st Brigade, 2nd Armored Division) -- with 118 M-1A1 tanks and 78 M-2/3 Bradley armored fighting vehicles -- was detached from the US Army 2nd Armored Division and place under the tactical control of the US 2nd Marine Division of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF).5 By the time the land offensive began, the US had built-up its forces to a total of 527,000 men and women in all four military services. Its major land forces now included two US Army Corps with seven Army divisions, two armored cavalry regiments, and three combat aviation brigades directly under their command. The US Army now had 1,878 Abrams tanks in maneuver units, of which 116 with M-1s and the rest were M-1A1s or M- 1A1 Heavy Armors. It had an additional 80 in division-level ORFs, 429 in theater war reserves, 609 M-1 and IPM-1 models counted as excess. Counting M-1s on loan to the Marines, this totaled 3,082 M-1 tanks. The Army had 1,616 Bradley M-2/M-3 armored fighting vehicles in maneuver units, not counting 78 in division-level ORFs, 346 in theater war reserve, and 161 counted as excess.6 US land forces also included one Marine Corps expeditionary force (consisting of two US Marine Corps Divisions, their associated air wings, and combat and service support.). The Marine Corps force had 16 M-16 organic M-1A1 tanks, 60 M-1A1 tanks on loan from the Army, M-60A1 tanks, more that 350 Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs), 532 Assault Amphibian Vehicles, and 56 M-551A1 Sheridan armored reconnaissance vehicles on loan from the Army. US land forces had a total of over 2,000 tanks, 2,200 armored fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, and 1,700 helicopters. Allied forces deployed more than 200,000 troops, and 1,200 tanks.7 Britain had contributed 43,500 British troops with 180 tanks, and an armored division, and France had contributed 16,000 troops, attack helicopters, and a light armored division, and combat aircraft. US. British, and French land forces totaled 258,710 soldiers, 11,277 tracked vehicles, 47,449 wheeled vehicles, and 1,619 aircraft.8 Saudi Arabia deployed 118,000 troops, 550 tanks, 179 aircraft, and over 400 artillery weapons. Egypt contributed 40,000 troops, two armored divisions and 250 tanks. Syria contributed 20,000 Syrian troops and two divisions. The Coalition land order of battle at the start of the ground offensive is shown in Table 8.1. It is clear from this table that the Coalition had formed one of the largest and most complex multi-national orders of battle in military history. As has been explained earlier, the main attack forces were concentrated in VII Corps, supported by XVIII Corps to the West. The forces for the main supporting attack were concentrated in the I MEF, with Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. GW-8 The Air Land Battle June 28, 2016 Page 609 support from Joint Forces Command (North) and Joint Forces Command (East). As a result, the main weight of attack was carried out by Western forces and predominantly by the US Army, US Marine Corps, and British 1st Armored Division. The joint force organization of the Coalition order of battle supported this concentration of force, and allowed the US Army Central Command (ARCENT) to set clear missions, boundaries between units, phase lines for the advance, fire support coordination lines, and restricted fire lines.