Amy Yuan Zhuang China: stock market in crisis mood Nordea Research, 07 July 2015 The Chinese A shares have had their biggest 15-day plunge in 20 years. In this period, total loss is equivalent to the whole UK economy in 2014. The crash was likely triggered by an IPO wave and institutional investor withdrawal and intensified by leverage and margin calls. The crash will likely have limited impacts on the Chinese and global economy, unless it triggers a burst of the credit bubble. The last 15 days have not been easy for stock investors in China. After gaining about 125% in eight months, the Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares, mainly held by domestic investors due to regulations, reached the peak in mid-June. Since then they have fallen 30%. We need to go back to mid-1990s to see a larger 15-day loss. Total loss measured in value is about USD 3tn, same as the UK’s economy in 2014. nexus.nordea.com/research Which factors stood behind the stock market crash? Most market followers have agreed that there were several reasons behind the stock market crash. The A share market has always been liquidity-driven rather than value-driven, in part because those with excess cash had limited investment choices. Thus, the crash was more likely due to liquidity changes rather than concerns about Chinese growth. One of the triggers was likely the IPO wave earlier this year. In the first four months this year, a total of 98 IPOs were approved. Usually, IPOs in China help cooling the secondary market, because the strong investor appetite in new shares lock up huge amounts for a short period and divert funds from existing shares. For example, the 30 nexus.nordea.com/research approved IPOs in April were estimated to tie up nearly USD 600bn in subscription funds over the first two weeks in April. Another trigger was the gradual withdrawal of the institutional investors. From April the institutional investors started to reduce their holding of Chinese equities because of the growing fear of a stock market bubble. This change itself would have limited impacts on the stock prices because institutional investors account for less than 20% of the daily trading volumes. The most important trigger was the relatively large margin balance, which gained popularity among retail investors since last year. Retail investors account for about 80% of the daily trading volumes. The margin balance in the Shanghai Stock Exchange jumped six times from USD 40bn in June last year to USD 240bn in June this year, almost 4% of total market capitalisation. So the IPO wave and the institutional investor withdrawal may have started the stock market decline, but the drop was certainly intensified by the use of leverage, because investors that could not provide additional collateral were forced to sell. Finally, concern about the slowing growth in China and unsolved situation in Greece likely only played a minor role in the bearish sentiment on Chinese stocks. What has Beijing done? nexus.nordea.com/research Many investors have been counting on helps from Beijing. The central authorities have initiated a number of measures to reverse the plunging stock market, including a simultaneous cut of the policy rates and the reserve requirement ratio. In addition, requirements for margin calls were eased so that many investors were no longer forced to sell. In the weekend Beijing asked the state-owned brokers to buy stocks for at least USD 20bn and not to sell before the Shanghai Composite index is back above index level 4500, 20% higher than the current level. State-owned investment companies and pension funds have also been pressured to increase their long positions. According to rumours, short selling will soon be completely banned. The latest step is to suspend trading on individual stock basis. According to Thomson Reuters, more than 700 companies have issued requests to suspend trading or extend trading halts since 12 June. The expectation is that Beijing will step up stimulus if the latest measures prove to be insufficient. More intervention from Beijing will be seen as a setback in financial deregulation that has been a top priority the last year. However, with the stock market in crisis mood, nothing is more important than to preserve financial stability. nexus.nordea.com/research What are the implications on Chinese and global growth? The stock market crash has no direct impact on the global economy and markets, even though the market (the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges combined) is the second largest in the world. This is because capital controls have limited the foreign investors’ exposure in this market. At the moment, the only way to invest in Chinese A shares is to be approved as a qualified foreign institutional investor (QFII) or via the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect programme. No more than 2% of the total market capitalisation is owned by non-residents. Effects on the Chinese economy will be much more notable but a hard landing from only the stock market crash seems not likely. This is because of the low stock market participation rate. A survey from 2012 (no recent survey available) showed that only 8.9% of households had any stock investment. Another study showed that only 5% of household total assets are held in stocks. Plunging stock prices are bad news to consumption but the total wealth effect will likely be limited. If the stock market crash triggers a burst of the credit bubble, then it would be a completely different and direr situation. Many companies have invested in stocks in recent months (including the companies’ holding of their own shares) and the overall corporate profitability has improved nexus.nordea.com/research thanks to the soaring stock prices. However, the current market movements would hit the companies, particularly the heavy manufacturing firms that already struggle with shrinking profits and soaring debts. It is difficult to gauge the extent of the corporate stock investment and whether these investors already have left the market before the crash. Nonetheless, the companies’ stock investment is the primary link between the stock bubble and credit bubble and clearly a large risk factor for the Chinese economy. nexus.nordea.com/research Disclaimer and legal disclosures Disclaimer Origin of the publication or report This publication or report is produced by: Nordea Bank AB (publ), Nordea Bank Danmark A/S, Nordea Bank Finland Plc (including its branches in various jurisdictions) and Nordea Bank Norge ASA (together the “Group Companies” or “Nordea Group”) acting collectively through their unit Nordea Markets. The Group Companies are supervised by the banking and/or securities regulators in each relevant jurisdiction. Banking activities may be carried out internationally by different branches, subsidiaries and affiliates of the Nordea Group according to local regulatory requirements. 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