U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Sino-U.S. Rapprochement in the Early 1970s: A Study of Secrecy in Bureaucratic Politics By Yukinori Komine Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Lancaster University Department of Politics and International Relations June 2005 ProQuest Number: 11003566 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest ProQuest 11003566 Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 For my parents, Koki and Mieko Komine, and my brother, Yukihiko Komine Declaration This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Lancaster University. I confirm that the views expressed in this thesis are solely my own except where otherwise indicated and that no part of the entire thesis has ever been submitted to higher degree of any other academic institution. Signed: Yukinori Komine Date: January 13, 2005 Acknowledgements During the research for and writing of this thesis from October 1997 to January 2005, I have benefited from assistance and generosity of a number of people in Britain, America, and Japan. I would like to express my appreciation to the former and present members of the Department of Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University. I am indebted to Professor Ian Bellany, Mr. Gordon Hands, Dr. Gerd Nonneman, Dr. Alan Warburton, and Dr. Peter Wilkin for their comments on my research plans and draft chapters. I am indebted to the former Directors of Research Studies at the Department of Politics and International Relations, Lancaster University, Professor Michael Dillon and Professor Ian Bellany, and the current Director Professor Mark Duffield. For granting me teaching assistantship, my special thanks go to the former Heads of the Department, Mr. Gordon Hands and Dr. Peter Wilkin, and the current Head of the Department, Professor David Denver. I am grateful for the Departmental Secretaries, Mrs. Clare Coxhill, Mrs. Trish Demery, and Mrs. Susan Riches, and the Departmental Officer Mrs. Maureen Worthington for their assistance and encouragement. I would like to record my gratitude to Ms. Eve Edmonds, Miss Ann McAleer, and Miss Becky Richards for proof-reading the manuscripts of my thesis and for offering me invaluable suggestions. I would like to express my appreciation to Dr. Paul Stares, Director of Research and Studies Program, the United States Institute of Peace, who provided me a crucial opportunity of consultation which materialized a series of interviews with former U.S. officials. I am indebted to Dr. Gareth Davies, St Anne’s College, Oxford University, who has given me a number of advices for fieldwork in Oxford and Washington D.C. I owe a special debt of gratitude to the following academic experts and former U.S. officials for their cooperation for interviews and correspondences: Professor Rosemary Foot, Dr. Evelyn Goh, Dr. Morton Halperin, Mr. Charles Kennedy, Ambassador Winton Lord, Mr. Peter Rodman, Professor David Shambaugh, Ambassador Richard Solomon, Professor Nancy Bemkopf Tucker, and Professor Allen Whiting. I would like to express my thanks to the support of a number of archivists and librarians in the following institutes: the National Archives, Archives II, Maryland; the Manuscript Division, the Library of Congress, Washington D.C.; the Special Collection Division, the Lauinger Library, Georgetown University, Washington D.C.; and The Rothermere American Institute, Vere Harmsworth Library, Oxford University, Oxford; the inter-library loans, Lancaster University Library. I have benefited from the support and encouragement given by my friends and colleagues. My thanks go to: Cem Birsay, John Boyle, Jim Bowey, Estevao Cabral, Tom Colombino, Stewart Fraser, Ozge Girit, Juan Hall, Radhika Kanchana, Philipe Larcher, A1 Lawson, Luis Lobo-Guerrero, Lillian Lopez, Vince Miller, Rob Moore, Beth Rempe, Athanasia Rodaki, Tracy Sartin, Graham Smith, Lee Smith, John Wiser, Ghulam Yar. Finally, a special word of thanks must be reserved for my parents, Koki and Mieko Komine, and my brother, Yukihiko Komine, for their support over the last nine years in America, Britain, China, and Japan. Yukinori Komine Lancaster June 27, 2005 Table of Contents Page Abstract vii Acronyms ix A Note on Transliteration of Chinese Terms xi A Note on References and Footnotes xi Introduction 1 1. The location of this study 1 2. Literature review 6 3. Sources 22 3.1. Overview 22 3.2. Published declassified documents 24 3.3. A survey of new archival materials 25 3.4. Oral history collections 31 4. Main research questions 33 5. The structure of this thesis 36 Part I. The Foundations of Foreign Policy Decision-Making 38 Chapter 1. The Nixon-Kissinger Leadership for a New China Initiative 38 1. Richard M. Nixon as the architect of U.S. rapprochement with China 38 1.1. The development of Nixon’ s early view on China 3 8 1.2. Changes and Developments of the China issue during the 1960s 44 1.3. “Asia After Viet Nam” in October 1967 52 1.4. China issue during the 1968 Presidential Election Campaign 56 2. Kissinger’s role in U.S. rapprochement with China 59 2.1. Kissinger as a theorist for new administration’s foreign policy philosophy 59 2.2. Kissinger’s balance of power in theory 61 2.3. Kissinger’s balance of power in practice 64 2.4. Kissinger’s early views on China 67 3. The Nixon-Kissinger Leadership 70 Chapter 2. Foreign Policy Decision Making Machinery for the U.S. Rapprochement with China 74 1. Organization and Procedure for a New NSC System 74 1.1. Problems of the previous NSCs 74 1.2. Goodpaster’s memoranda 78 1.3. Halperin’s memorandum 80 1.4. Objections from the Defense Department and the State Department 82 2. The Structure and Procedure of the New NSC System 85 3. Other Key Players in the New China policy 91 3.1. The NSC staff 91 3.1.1. NSC staff procedures 91 3.1.2. Drafting of policy papers 94 3.1.3. The Kissinger-NSC staff relations 96 3.2. The State Department 101 3.2.1. Secrecy in bureaucratic politics 101 3.2.2. Senior State Department officials 103 3.2.3. Intelligence sources 106 3.2.4. The State Department-NSC staff relations 107 3.2.5. The question of geopolitical perspective 109 Part II. The Evolution of the Opening Policy 114 Chapter 3. The Development of Policy Options from January 1969 to July 1969 114 1. First development 114 1.1. Inaugural address 114 1.2. Nixon’s memorandum to Kissinger and the directive of NSSM 14 116 1.3. The cancellation of the Warsaw Ambassadorial talks in February 1969 118 1.4. The Nixon-De Gaulle talks 122 2. The outbreak of the Sino-Soviet border clashes 125 2.1. The Sino-Soviet border clashes in March 1969 125 2.2. The first official initiatives by the State Department 128 2.3. NSC Review Group Meeting on NSSM 14 in May 1969 131 2.4. The Sino-Soviet border clashes in June and July 1969 136 2.5. NSSM 35: Easing trade and travel restrictions 138 Chapter 4. The Reassessment of the China Policy from July to November 1969 141 1. Nixon’s trip to Asia and Romania in July and August 1969 141 1.1. The Nixon Doctrine 141 1.2. The Nixon-Yahya talks and the opening of the Pakistani channel 145 1.3. The Nixon-Ceausescu talks and the opening of the Romanian channel 150 1.4. Reactions to the Nixon trip 153 2. The escalation of the Sino-Soviet border clashes in August and September 1969 156 2.1. NSC Meeting on NSSM 14: U.S. China Policy in August 1969 156 2.2. The Kissinger-Whiting consultation in August 1969 159 2.3. The Zhou-Kosygin talks in September 1969 162 3. Two lines of policy studies - the NSC and the State Department 166 3.1. Drafting of NSSM 63: Sino-Soviet Differences 166 3.2. State Department’s Policy Studies in October 1969 168 3.3. NSC Review Group Meeting on NSSM 63: Sino-Soviet Differences in November 1969 172 Chapter 5. The Resumption of the Warsaw Ambassadorial Talks from December 1969 to May 1970 175 1. Initial Contact with the Chinese at Warsaw in December 1969 175 1.1. Nixon’s instructions to Stoessel 175 1.2. The December 1969 contacts in Warsaw 178 iv 1.3. The Kissinger-Hilaly backchannel exchanges 182 1.4. The State Department’s Instructions to Ambassador Stoessel 184 2. The 135th Warsaw Ambassadorial Talks in January 1970 186 2.1. The development of the perception gap between the White House and the State Department 186 2.2. The January talks 187 2.3. The Game Plan for the February talks 189 3. The 136th Warsaw Ambassadorial Talks in February 1970 192 4. Attempts for the third Ambassadorial talk 193 4.1. The March proposal 193 4.2. The April proposal 195 5. The Cambodia military operation and the collapse of the Warsaw channel in May 1970 198 Chapter 6. The Development of Backchannel Communications from June 1970 to June 1971 203 1. The exploration of the channels of communication with the Chinese in late 1970 203 1.1.