Kevin M. Woods, Williamson Murray, and Thomas Holaday with Mounir Elkhamri INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON, D.C. 2009 The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. This pub- lication is cleared for public release; distribution unlimited. Except for the maps on pages 47, 51, 52, and 68, portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints or reviews. This work was conducted under contract DASW01-04-C-003, Task ET-8-2579 for the National Intelligence Council. 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Contents Foreword . ix Preface. xi Introduction . xiii Summary and Analysis . 1 General Comments . 1 The Arab-Israeli Wars and the Rise of the Ba’ath Party . 2 Between the 1973 War and the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) . 3 The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) . 5 Thoughts on the Iran-Iraq “Cold-War” in the 1990s . 17 Comments on Saddam Hussein as Political and Military Leader . 17 iii The Interviews. 19 Discussion One . 19 Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973 • Military Transition under Ba’athist Rule Discussion Two . 26 Iraqi Military and Political Transition through the 1970s • Prologue to Iran- Iraq War • Transition of Iranian Leadership and Military • Decision to Invade • Saddam’s Aspirations • Earliest Phase of the War • Political and Professional Soldiers • Disorganized Command and Control of Iranian Operations Discussion Three . 34 Early Use of Air Power • SIGINT [Signals Intelligence] • Winter 1980–1981 Iraqi Command Changes • Saddam’s Response to Failure and Executions • 1980–1982 Losses and Army Expansions • Developments of Iranian and Iraqi Forces Discussion Four . 40 Saddam’s Psychology and Personality Development • January 1981 Armor Battle • Iranian Human Wave Tactics and Iraqi Minefields • Khomeini’s Spiri- tual Influence • Battles of Abadan and Khorramshahr • Loss of Special Forces • End of Initial Iraqi Offensives in May 1981 Discussion Five . 49 1981–1982 Turbulence in Tehran • Iranian Infiltration Tactics • 1982 Attacks around Basra • 1984–1988 Marsh Infiltrations and Iraqi Engineering Efforts • International Support to Iran • Chemical Weapons Usage • Iranian Re- sponse to Weapons of Mass Destruction • Postwar Preparations with WMD • 1982–1983 Reorganization and Recruiting for Republican Guard • Psycho- logical Support of Saddam to Troops • Postwar Republican Guard Reorgani- zation Discussion Six . 62 Summer 1983 Iranian Offensive into Haj Umran • Northern Mountain Opera- tions and Kurdish Support • A 1,000-kilometer Front • Threats to the Dams and Baghdad • Unpredictable Iranian Strategy and Tactics • February 1984 Iraqi 6th Armored Division Losses • Iranian Marsh Operations • Intelligence Development and Satellite Support in March 1985 iv Discussion Seven . 70 1986 Al-Fao Campaign and Baghdad’s Misinterpretation of Iranian Strategy • Traitors in the Iraqi Leadership • Prisoners of War • Operation Dawn • Iraqi Casualty Competition and the “Bedouin Mentality” Discussion Eight. 77 Republican Guard Expansion and the Response to Al-Fao • Hussein Kamel • General Hamdani’s Command Obstacles • 1987 Iranian Attack on Basra and Casualty Inflation • Shalamjah: The Somme of the Iran-Iraq War • Hamdani’s Venture through the Front and the Battlefield Conditions Discussion Nine . 83 July 1987 Republican Guard Command Changes • Battlefield Missiles • Hal- abjah • Factors of Post-1987 Shift in “Correlation of Forces” toward Iraq— Planning Effort for Al-Fao Offensive • Use of Helicopters • Front of 1988 • July 1988 Iraqi Incursion through to Ahvaz and the Mujahideen-e-Khalq Discussion Ten . 90 Foundations of the Iraqi Military and Saddam’s Detrimental Influence • Ham- dani’s Effort to Improve Iraqi Military Culture • Questioning Military Orders and Planning • Lessons Learned from the Iran-Iraq War • Fight to Follow the War and Saddam’s Perception of Victory and Warfare Discussion Eleven . 95 Stories of War Heroes, 1973 to Operation Iraqi Freedom • Saddam’s Misunder- standing of Warfare • Hamdani’s Recognition of U.S. Strategy in 2003 • Under- standing One’s Enemy Discussion Twelve . 100 1990s Military Planning against Iran • Historical Explanation of Iran-Iraq Conflict • Religious and Ethnic Elements • Economic and Regional Aspects (Persian Gulf) • Shatt al-Arab • Ideology, Ba’athism, and Khomeini • Present Conflict and Iranian and al Qaeda Influence Discussion Thirteen . 108 Planning for an Iranian Adversary • Iranian Structure • 2003 and Iranian Strategy • Ayatollah as Executive • Iranian Military Development and Capa- bilities • Missiles • Iranian Threat to Iraq and Infiltration • Internal Agents • v Iraqi Counterinfiltration • Iranian Militias • Iraqi Military Developments since 1991 • Cooptation of Tribes Discussion Fourteen. 119 Role of Religion in Iran-Iraq Conflict • Hypothetical Iraqi Offensive Against Iran and Phases of Preparations • Iranian Influence in Iraq • Arabistan • Bal- uchs and Kurds • Air and Missile Strikes and Military-Industrial Complex • Younger Iranian Generation • Smart Weapons and Satellites • Terrain • Op- erational Objectives • Iranian Lessons Learned • Iranian Missile Deterrent Discussion Fifteen. 127 Armor Operations • Bravery and the Warrior Mentality • Saddam’s Misunder- standing of Military Technology • Integration of Helicopter and Tank Capa- bilities • Lessons Learned on Artillery, Iraq, and Iran • Changes in Iranian Command and Control • Iranian Tactical and Operational Developments Discussion Sixteen. 133 Recommendations for U.S. Actions in Iraq from May 2007 Endnotes . 137 Bibliography . 143 Index to Themes in the Discussions . 144 vi Figures Figure 1. Franz Halder, former chief of the General Staff of the German Army in World War II . xiii Figure 2. General Ra’ad Hamdani (left), former Iraqi Republican Guard Corps commander, explains details of the 1986 Iranian capture of Al-Fao to members of the Project 1946 research team . xiv Figure 3. The initial Iraqi invasion of Iran, September 1980 . 29 Figure 4. The southern sector of the war (region of Khorramshahr) . 47 Figure 5. Southern war sector. 51 Figure 6. General Hamdani’s sketch of Iranian infiltration tactics, 1982. 52 Figure 7. Iranian Dawn offensives—northern sector, 1983–1986 . 63 Figure 8. Iranian Dawn offensives—central and southern sectors, 1983–1986 . 64 Figure 9. Bubyan and Shatt al-Arab. 68 Figure 10. Map of the Kut-Sulaimaniyah border with General Hamdani’s markings . .117 vii Foreword When lessons learned from the major combat operations phase of Opera- tion Iraqi Freedom were briefed to the Nation’s top leaders, the question was asked: “How did events leading to the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime look from the Iraqi perspective?” That question was posed to the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses, triggering the Iraqi Perspectives Project (IPP), a research effort sponsored by the U.S. Joint Forces Command that has delivered sev- eral volumes of analysis and supporting materials, with more in production. The IPP is reminiscent of an effort begun in 1946, when a team of U.S. Army historians and intelligence officers established a relationship with former members of the German General Staff to develop an understanding of familiar events from an unfamiliar point of view. This volume marks the extension of that same methodology under a different sponsor, the National Intelligence Council, to en- compass a broader spectrum of Middle Eastern military history from the perspective of Lieutenant General Ra’ad Hamdani, who during Operation Iraqi Freedom com- manded Saddam Hussein’s II Republican Guard Corps. Interviewed over a number of days by project leader Kevin Woods and historian Williamson “Wick” Murray, General Hamdani shared his knowledge about a wide range of subjects, with particu- lar emphasis on his experiences in Iraq’s long war against Iran. The project,s objective was to produce a series of personal, organizational, and campaign histories of contemporary Iraq. This volume is the first in that series, provided with the hope that it will improve our understanding of Middle Eastern military thought, the new Iraqi military, neighboring countries, and the dynamics of a region of the world that is vital to U.S. interests. Karl Lowe, Director Joint Advanced Warfighting Division Institute for Defense Analyses ix Preface his paper was prepared under the task order