Volume XXX Number 1 September 2005 Mexico as a Living Tapestry The 1985 Disaster in Retrospect — an invited comment Yes, 20 years have passed since the twin earthquakes Disaster research is criticized at times for its lack of of September 19 (Richter magnitude 8.1) and September historical perspective, for its tendency to focus on the 20 (Richter magnitude 7.3) struck Mexico, hitting Mexico events and their immediate impacts rather than on the evo- City particularly hard, and for many of us who responded lution of the entire society. Metaphorically, if we think of to the 1985 events, the memories are still fresh. More societies as weaving daily tapestries, a disaster is a gash poignantly, it is difficult to find a Mexico City resident or a sharply discordant thread suddenly introduced into alive at the time, especially in the downtown zones, who the pattern. Disaster research tends to focus on the gash cannot tell you precisely where he or she was at the time and its close effects. A 20-year perspective on a disaster, of impact, particularly during the first earthquake. The however, literally forces us to see how a society re- event is a true flashbulb memory for Mexicans, much as pairs/reweaves itself and moves on. In many cases, the the Kennedy assassination remains for many in the United tapestry takes off in a dramatically different direction, States. with new colors and designs. Such was the case in Mexico The ripple effects of a society that self-organized search after 1985. and rescue, assisted the suddenly homeless, and made demands on, not requests to, their government literally Geotechnical Lessons never stopped. These self-organization effects were then multiplied by preexisting neighborhood and popular or- It would be unfair and partial, however, to go directly ganizations that supported, assisted, and coordinated with to that societal evolution level without acknowledging the new groups. And so, the 1985 catastrophe revealed an several of the major but more technical lessons learned emerging social and political space outside of government from the 1985 event. The first was not so much a new control that allowed a blossoming of Mexican civil society lesson as a paradigmatic reminder of the importance of that continues to this day. understanding the seismic resistance of buildings in terms More specifically, the 1985 event demonstrated that of soil-foundation-structure interaction. Indeed, it is often the authoritarian PRI-State system, which had been seen forgotten by nonspecialists that the epicenters of the two as both strong and pervasive (it was often called “the Per- earthquakes were approximately 400 kilometers southwest fect Dictatorship”), was a shell of its former self. In full of Mexico City, in the offshore Michoacán Gap, yet the retrospect, we understand now that the regime had lost its most spectacular damage occurred in the capital—much of moral legitimacy, especially in Mexico City, with its mas- which sits on an old lakebed that greatly magnified and sacre of student demonstrators in 1968, and it had lost temporally extended the shaking. much of its economic legitimacy with its early 1980s mis- Second, the 1985 event confirmed the importance of handling of national finances (particularly the so-called oil microzonation because structural failure was so highly boom, which went bust). The economic mismanagement, variable. That is, some zones of Mexico City, particularly traditionally assigned to the loan-crazed José López the older city center, suffered conspicuously more than Portillo administration (1976-1982), saddled Mexico with others. Indeed, while everyone in Mexico City at the time an enormous foreign debt, a kind of only dimly visible knew that they had experienced an earthquake, many were financial cancer that slowly began sapping the strength of unaware that it was a catastrophe with national implica- the entire nation, but especially the PRI-State system. tions until they heard or saw coverage from the city’s cen- The 1985 earthquakes, however, revealed the regime tral zones. In addition, it escaped no one’s notice that as surprisingly impotent, which was reinforced by the fairly new government-contracted buildings were much denial-ridden and ineffective emergency response of the more prone to damage and collapse than they should have Miguel de la Madrid administration (1982-1988). This been. The resulting corruption charges reverberated ineffectiveness then morphed into a reactive rather than a through Mexico City for years. proactive recovery effort. Again in retrospect, while the Third, the event demonstrated the importance of non- response to the 1985 catastrophe was Mexican society’s structural aspects of seismic safety. While most attention finest hour, it was the PRI-State system’s worst. rightly focused on collapsed or partially collapsed major Much flowed from the Mexican nation’s 1985 realiza- structures (especially hospitals) that killed hundreds at a tion that the PRI-State system was no longer completely time, many more buildings were dangerous and/or unus- dominant, that as a people they could organize, demand, able for weeks if not months because of internal damage and even act without fear of draconian governmental re- to ceilings, partitions, stairways, plumbing, light fixtures, prisals. Nearly every comprehensive scholarly work on etc. While everyone remembers the spectacular structural Mexico now notes the political and social ramifications of failures, few remember the lost functionality of surviving the 1985 disaster, especially the opening of political buildings that so greatly slowed response and recovery. space, the rise of popular organizations, and the rapid Fourth, and although little has been done to correct maturation of a Mexican civil society. the situation, the 1985 earthquakes underscored the na- The most direct political legacy of the 1985 disaster tional vulnerability of extreme centralization, allowing a was the democratization of Mexico City’s municipal gov- single city to utterly dominate the country socially, eco- ernment. Prior to the earthquakes, politics in Mexico City nomically, and politically. It is truly difficult for outsiders had been very top-down and exclusionary. Mexico City to wrap their minds around the importance of greater residents did not even elect their own mayor. Instead, the Mexico City (with perhaps 30 percent of the national president would reward a PRI loyalist with the powerful population) to Mexico. The best parallel would be to take position of city regent. In addition, the Federal District New York City, Washington, DC, and Chicago and then did not have any elected representation in the Mexican cram them into the highly seismic Los Angeles basin, Congress. The 1985 earthquake disaster began to change along with Los Angeles (and also make that basin a sink- all that. ing lakebed). While Mexico City had seen growing anti-PRI senti- ment since the 1968 student massacre, the post-1985 Mexico as an Evolving Tapestry groundswell in popular mobilization, and self-confidence, Turning now to the earthquakes and Mexico’s societal forced the PRI-State system to respond to demands for tapestry, one of the most stunning new threads was the more openness and citizen participation in government at emergence of a responding and effective civil society, all levels. Indeed, in his 1988 presidential campaign, left- especially given the authoritarian 50-year-old PRI- (Insti- ist Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas reflected popular resentment tutional Revolutionary Party) State system that was as- against the old system and won the capital. He may also sumed to still control most of Mexican public life in 1985. have won the election nationwide, but we still cannot be Natural Hazards Observer September 2005 2 certain of that, despite strong hints in the recent memoirs the presidency Vicente Fox of the center-right National of Miguel de la Madrid. Regardless, the PRI’s Carlos Action Party (PAN). In retrospect, the 1985-2000 period Salinas de Gortari was declared the 1988 winner. To his was remarkable, history-altering, and Mexicans can and credit, despite clear evidence of PRI electoral fraud, should be extremely proud of turning an authoritarian Cárdenas refrained from calling for street demonstrations one-party political system into a functioning democracy— that could have turned Mexico City from a reconstruction peacefully and in less than a decade. zone into a combat zone. Were all of these cumulatively monumental changes Faced with mounting civil society and organizational in Mexico the result of the 1985 disaster? No, of course opposition that the 1985 disaster had accelerated (“loosed” not. Weaving a national tapestry is much too complicated might also be apt), the PRI-State system implemented a to allow such a facile interpretation of a single event. Was series of liberalizing reforms. A 1993 reform law released the 1985 disaster important, even crucial, for everything the Federal Electoral Institute from the fetters of govern- that followed? That answer is definitely yes. Mexico re- ment (and PRI) control, after which Mexican elections paired and rewove itself around the gash and hurt of became increasingly fair and transparent. In the 1997 mid- 1985. term elections, for the first time in modern history, Mex- ico City residents were allowed to elect their own mayor, Richard Stuart Olson choosing . Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. Those same 1997 Department of Political Science elections saw an opposition majority elected to the na- Florida International