Number 14 — July 2007 RESEARCH NOTES T H E W A S H I N GTO N In S T I T U T E F O R N E A R E A S T P O L I C Y July 2007 Turkish Elections: Winners and Fault Lines By Soner Cagaptay and H. Akin Unver n July 22, 2007, Turkey faces early parlia- Turkey faces at least three ballots in four months: early mentary elections. The polls were called elections on July 22, a referendum on October 21, and O after the political debacle in April and presidential elections after that. Moreover, a fourth May when the ruling Justice and Development Party election may be required for a new parliament if the (AKP) moved to legislatively elect AKP member one elected on July 22 is unable to elect a new president and foreign minister Abdullah Gul to the presidency. within the thirty-day deadline. Will Turkey’s turmoil At that time, rallies by millions of people, interven- come to an end on July 22? Who will win in the elec- tion by the Constitutional Court, and a military tions, and will the country find political stability then? declaration blocked the AKP from achieving its At the moment, predicting the election results goal. When the parliament failed to elect a president, based on Turkish opinion polls is an arduous task. The as stipulated in the Turkish constitution, it dissolved polls suggest widely differing outcomes. For instance, itself so that a fresh parliament could be formed to some surveys say that the ruling AKP, a party with elect the president. Since then, Turkish politics have an Islamist pedigree, might win over 40 percent of been in limbo. the vote, while others put the AKP vote at about 25 For starters, outgoing president Ahmet Necdet percent, on par with the opposition left-national- Sezer continues to act as president. The parliament ist Republican People’s Party (CHP). One way of to be elected on July 22 will have only thirty days avoiding the uncertainty of the broader polls would to elect a new president by a two-thirds majority, be to conduct a detailed analysis of the likely elec- which, depending on the election results, may not tion results across Turkey’s regions, aggregating those be possible. If no president is elected, dissolution of findings to estimate the overall outcome. This meth- the parliament and new elections are required. Even odology should also provide hints about the likely if the parliament formed after July 22 elects a new government in Turkey after July 22 as well as the president, a recent AKP constitutional amendment postelection political environment. stipulates that the president be elected through direct popular vote. The Constitutional Court has 1. Some election scenarios can be viewed at “Seçim Senaryoları” sent this amendment—a popular proposition in any (Election scenarios), Sabah (Istanbul), July 19, 2007 (available democracy—to a referendum on October 21, when online at onwww.sabah.com.tr/2007/06/19/haber,CF8993616B 7D457FAFD0C9AE6C2039B6.html); Ertuğ Yaşar, “İlk Seçim it is likely to pass. Senaryoları” (First election scenarios), in the Turkish business This development promises great political uncer- newspaper Referans (Istanbul), May 9, 2007 (available online at www.referansgazetesi.com/haber.aspx?HBR_KOD=67305&YZR_ tainty: Turkey will be electing its president while both KOD=86&ForArsiv=1); and “Patronların Anketinden Çıkan Seçim Sonuçları” (Election results from the bosses’ poll), Milliyet changing the way it elects a president and holding (Istanbul), June 19, 2007 (available online at www.milliyet.com. general elections for a new government. Accordingly, tr/2007/06/19/son/soneko13.asp). Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute. H. Akin Unver is a research assistant in the Turkish Research Program. The authors would like to thank Zack Snyder for his assistance with this paper. RESEA RCH NOTES #14 Electoral Thresholds for a New AKP on July 22? The answers to both these questions can Government be predicted from a detailed regional analysis of the In the outgoing Turkish parliament, only the AKP likely election results. For the sake of this analysis, and the CHP are represented. The CHP is the only Turkey can be seen as composed of six regions. opposition party in the parliament because a 10 per- cent minimum electoral threshold barred the other Anatolian Heartland fragmented secular parties from parliament follow- This region is in the country’s interior, extending from ing the November 2002 elections. What is more, the Sivas and Kayseri in the east to Kutahya and Isparta threshold allocated the seats that would have gone in the west, with two panhandles jutting north to the to the smaller parties mostly to the AKP, giving the Black Sea, the first along the Sakarya River valley party a legislative supermajority after having actually (Sakarya, Duzce, and Bolu provinces) and the second won only one-third of the seats. This picture might along the Yesilirmak River valley (Samsun and Tokat change on July 22. provinces). Sending 113 deputies to parliament, this At the moment, three parties—the AKP, the CHP, rural area with twenty-one provinces and 7,544,330 and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), a right- voters is essentially a conservative-nationalist heart- nationalist party—seem likely to cross the threshold land. This political trend dominates even in the area’s to enter parliament. The populist-nationalist Young large cities, such as Konya and Kayseri. The region Party (GP) and perhaps the center-right True Path votes for conservative parties, as it did for the Islamist Party (DYP)—now renamed the Democrat Party Welfare Party (RP) in 1995. At the same time, however, (DP)—each hold a slim chance of scaling the thresh- the area has strong nationalist reflexes and shies away old and entering parliament as well. The Kurdish- from Islamist parties that confront the much-respected nationalist Democratic Society Party (DTP), which military. Hence, after the 1997 showdown between the is unlikely to surpass the threshold, is running inde- RP and the military, in the 1999 elections, this region pendent candidates and might gain about two dozen moved en masse from the RP to the MHP. In 2002, seats in the 550-seat parliament. (In the Turkish elec- when the AKP was formed by cadres who suggested a tion system, independent candidates do not have to clean break with the RP, the heartland shifted to the cross the national threshold to enter parliament as AKP, enticed by the party’s conservatism. long as they win in their respective provinces.) Will the Anatolian heartland stay with the AKP What are the chances that the AKP will gain a on July 22? Today, continuing terrorist attacks by the legislative majority to form a government after July Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) combined with the 22? Statistically speaking, in a four-party parliament AKP’s resulting inability to deliver security against (with AKP, CHP, MHP, and DTP represented), the the PKK are eroding the AKP’s popularity in this AKP could gain a legislative majority if it receives 35 region. At another time, the AKP would have already to 37 percent of the votes. In a five-party parliament lost votes en masse to the MHP in the Anatolian (with AKP, CHP, MHP, DTP, and GP or DP repre- heartland. Currently, however, the AKP’s politically sented), the AKP would need at least 36 to 38 percent savvy message—that the party’s attempt to elect For- of the votes to gain a majority of the seats. eign Minister Gul to the presidency in April–May 2006 was blocked by secular Turks and their institu- Turkish Regions in the Elections: Issues tions “because Gul is religious,” and that such “injus- and Winners tice can be undone” by supporting the AKP—is hit- Will the AKP cross the crucial 35 to 38 percent ting very close to home among the rural heartland’s threshold, and how many parties will enter parliament 3. Results for all the previous general elections in Turkey are available 2. An interactive screening in Turkish of how votes correspond to the online in Turkish (www.belgenet.net). seats in parliament is available online at Arı movement’s website 4. Author interviews with Turkish politicians, Istanbul (June 12, (www.bilinclioy.com). 2007) and Ankara ( June 19, 2007). 2 www.washingtoninstitute.org www.washingtoninstitute.org ROMANIA Turkish Electoral Regions, 2007 BULGARIA B l a c k S e a GEORGIA Kırklareli Istanbul Bartın Sinop ne Kastamonu E Edir Tekirdag˘ Istanbul Zonguldak EC Samsun Artvin Ardahan E Sea of Kocaeli Karabük R Yalova Düzce Rize G Marmara Ordu Trabzon Sakarya Bolu Çankırı Amasya Giresun ARMENIA Çorum Gümüshane¸ Kars Çanakkale Tokat Bursa Bilecik Bayburt Erzurum Igdı˘ r July Elections Turkish 2007 le a Balıkesir Ankara Agr˘ ı Yozgat Erzincan Eskisehir¸ Kırıkk Sivas Kütahya Kırsehir¸ Bingo˘ l IRAN Tunceli Mus¸ Manisa Van Afyonkarahisar Tuz ¸ Usak¸ sehir Gölü Van Gölü ev Kayseri Elazıg˘ Izmi˙ r N Malatya Bitlis Aksaray s¸ Konya Diyarbakır Aydın Isparta Siirt Denizli Nigde˘ Batman ramanmara Adıyaman Hakkâri h Sı¸ rnak Burdur Ka Mugla˘ Mardin Adana Sanlıurf¸ a G Karaman Osmaniye R Antalya E Gaziantep E ˙ C Gulf of Içel E Antalya Hatay Kilis Anatolian Heartland Middle Turkey Varos Coastal Turkey Southeast SYRI A Euphrates River Valley N M e d i t e r r a n e a n S e a O N A B E IRAQ 0 200 L miles ISRAEL JORDAN 3 ©2007 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy RESEA RCH NOTES #14 conservative voters. Accordingly, the AKP’s rhetoric had a strong showing in coastal Turkey, a moderately on “electing a religious president” (a conservative good outcome at the polls this time.