University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln Open-Access* Master's Theses from the University Libraries at University of Nebraska-Lincoln of Nebraska-Lincoln 10-1953 The ndonesiI an Dispute in the Security Council Robert L. Munkres University of Nebraska-Lincoln Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/opentheses Part of the Political Science Commons Munkres, Robert L., "The ndoneI sian Dispute in the Security Council" (1953). Open-Access* Master's Theses from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. 50. http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/opentheses/50 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Libraries at University of Nebraska-Lincoln at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Open-Access* Master's Theses from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 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NALL: AI!D ADDP.ESS DATE THE INDONESIAN DISPUTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL DJ Robert L, Munkres A THESIS Presented to the Faculty ot The Graduate College in the UniversitJ ot Nebraska In Partial Fulfillment or Requirements For the Degree of Master of Arts Department or Political Scien~e Under the Supervision ot Dr~ Norman L. Hill Lincoln, Nebraska October, 195~ TABLE OF CONTENTS Chaptei- I BACKGROUND • • • • • • • • • • • • • • l II THE REVOLUTION UP TO THE LINGGADJATI AGREEMENT • •• • • 24 III LINGGADJATI TO RENVILLE • • • • • • • 47 IV RENVILLE TO THE SECOND POLICE ACTION. • • • • • •• • •• • • • • 98 v INDEPENDENCE • • • • • • • • • • • • • 147 VI CONCLUSIONS • • • • • • • • • • • • • 207 BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • • • • • • • • • • 220 CHAPTER I .. DACKGROtJND The gr0up ot islands formerl1 known as Nether• lands India .forms a part ~r·the ·Malaran Archipelago and, geographically speaking, links Australia with Asia and the Pacific with the Indian Ocean. While this terr1torr consists primarily or t1ve large islands, the entire archipelago is dotted with numerous·1slands or var71ng sizes. Under Dutch administration Netherlands India was divided into the tollowing geographical d1v1a1ons1 Java and Madura, Sumo.tra.Reglon, Dutch Borneo, Celebes Region, end Moluccas, New Guinea, and Sunda IslandsJ the total area 'or this terr! tory is over 700 ~ 000 square miles •1 When the Portuguese reached India in 1498, they · found that the chief l!Brket for spices was Malacca, located in the. Malayan peninsula. Consequentlr, in the interests o.f increasing their trade, the Portuguese took over the citJ after attacking 1t twice with a small al9m1'.2 13. s. Furn1vall, Netherlands India, A Study!?..!. Plural Econom:r, P• 1. For a diacuaslon or the relative Importance of the factors or geographical location and natural resources 1n Indonesian history, aee A. E. Sokol, "Communica• tion and Production 1n Indonesian H1sto17," 1!:!.!: Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 7, August, 19481.PP• 339-353. 2a. II. M. Vlekke~ The Storl or the Dutch East Indies, P• 56. Chapter IV or 11.r. ffikkela bookii devote"dt"O a discussion or the part which religion plared in the t1gllt1ng between the Catholic Portuguese and the Mohammedan natives. 1 2 Shortl1 a.fter this conquest, the Portuguese traders discovered that ap1ces in Malacca cost t1ve to aeven times as much as the spices bought in the islands Where they grew. On the basia or this knowledge the1 quite naturall1 desired to establish direct relations with the Spice Islands (Moluccas) 1n order to b1•paas the middlemen., This did not prave to be dittioult as the local rulers were quite willing to give the Portuguese such a foothold in return tor aid in carrying on the almost constnnt warfare or the ialands.3 In 1522 the Portuguese were granted the right to · build a fort 1n the Spice Ialands and were also granted a monopoly or cloves. Wherever Portuguese traders went, m1as1onaries followedJ consequentl1, when the Portuguese moved into the Spice Islands, Chr1at1an1ty began to spread through the territoryJ Islam, however, aproad muoh taster. During the earlier part or the 17th centur1 thia was an 1ncreas1ngl1 important cause of friction. The trouble came to a head when, 1n 1570, the Sultan or Ternate was assassinated and the evidence strongly indicated that the Portuguese Governor had instigated the·act. In a matter ot da1s the ttoluccas were virtually in unanimous revolt against the Portuguese. 4 By 1580 the Portuguese were in desperate straits as a result of the alliance ot native princes against them when the Portuguese received help from an unexpected 1ource1 in 3Furn1val1, ..2l?. ill• , pp • 15-16 • 4vlekke, .22• ~., P• 62. that rear Philip II or Spain had made· good h1a claim to the throne or Portugal.· With the aid or the Spanish and new bases in th9 Ph111pp1nea (which were closer than Malacca), the combined Portuguese-Spanish forces maintained a precarious hold in the Moluccas. However,· the· power or.Portugal was broken· and, toward the end or the century, 1t seemed that the·entire tropical Far East would tall to the Mohammedans.5 The Dutch arrived in the Indiea in 1596. Though the7 had never wanted to come East, the ?letherlanders were forced to do a o b1 the same event that had enabled the Portuguese to' maintain their weak hold 1n the Ind1~a--the aucceas1on ot Philip II or Spain to the throne or Portugal. Prior to 1580 the Dutch spice trade had been pr1mar11J with Portugal. King Philip, a bitter enemy or Dutch independence, closed the harbors 'or Pol'tugal to his rebellious Dutch subjects. Thia torced Dutch traders to go to the source o~ the spice 'trade or else give up a lucrative trade wh1oh had become a necesaacy moans or livelihood fo'l9 the Holland merchants. · The Dutch ventures into the Eastern trade were not backed by private organizations, but rather by the State and civic corporations. Experience aoon demonstrated the . necessity or a common policy ot trade and selling it trade was to remain protitable.6 ·· Tho deaaJ.y end unrestricted competition between the Dutch traders quickly torced prices up in the East and drove 5Fl:...~1vall, O;?• ~., pp .16-17. 6Ibid., PP• 20-24. them down on the home market. · Thia situation, combined with the ~act that the Dutch Republic was not able to protect trade in distant waters, led the States General to incorporate the East Indian traders into the United East Indian Compan7 in 1502. The new corporation was given divers rights or monopoly and.sovere1gnt7. Thia monopoly operated to the exclusion ot all other Nethorlandors 1n the areas east or the Cape or Good Hope and west ot the Straits ot MagellanJ the powers ot sovere1gnt7 included the power to I?Bke alliances and contract~ with the various princes and potentates in the delimited area., :The Dutch Republic retained "onl7 a·right or contro1,n7 The Compan7 did.not want to acqu1re·terr1tor7 at the outset. of the venture 1X> the Eaat.. Its aim was to preserve the Spice Islanda aa a private trading ground. However, auch a policy, though allegedly only comm~rcial, inevitably led to a polic7 of territorial expansion •. This change grew out ot:the d1acover7 b7 th8 Company that it was impossible to trade sucoesstully unless the area was also governed.a As a result of this change in polio7. the Compan7, through agreements and a111enoea with native rulers,.acquired an indirect control or dominance over largo areas in the llalay Arch1pel1go. By 1750 the Company had largely, but not completely, shifted trom a co:mnercial to a territorial end ,Pol1t1cal bas1a. Steadily declining profits, poor financial ?A. Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies, ..!!! Govern• ment, Problems,!!!.!! Polit!"Ci'; P• 5l.---- 8Fuz.n1 vall, .21?. .ill• , p. 25 • 5 administration at home, penurious treatment or its personnel 1n the East, and tho breakdown or the connneroial monopoly .. combined, however,to cause the collapse of the Company. toward the end ot the 18th centu:rr. In 1798 the charter of the Comp8.?11' was null1t1ed,to take etteot on l January 1800. On the latt~r date the Dutch Government took over both the Company's aaseta and 1ts 11ab111t1ea.9 During the Napoleonic Wars the British took over the Dutch Colonial possessions:1n the Far East. The English maintained that they did not come as enemies, but rather to prevent the power ot France trom becoming dominant 1n that area,· By the Treaty of Amiens ot 1802 all or these possessions except Cerlon were restored to the Netherlands. Renewal of hostilities placed the Dutch colonies at the disposal ot the English once again. In 1810 France annexed the NetherlandsJ consequentl7, when the English arrived in Java in August, 1811, they took the island trom the French " rather than trom the Dutoh.10 Java was placed under Raffles as Lieutenant Governor • . Rattles instituted a system of taxation based upon the Eastern concept that all property belonged to the ruler and that the tenants kad to pay land rent. This rent was tixed at two• t1tths or the harvest and the ruler •s share o ould be paid 1n either moner or produota. Rattlos instituted other reforms 'dealing with administrative structure, the police force, and 9A.