‘The Sky’s the Limit’: A Comparative Assessment of the Global Proliferation of Military Airpower in the Early and Late 20th Century By Adam Jungdahl B.A. in History and Political Science, May 2006, Miami University M.A. in Political Science, May 2009, George Washington University A Dissertation submitted to The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy January 31, 2015 Dissertation directed by James H. Lebovic Professor of Political Science and International Affairs The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University certifies that Adam Jungdahl has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy as of October 20th, 2014. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation. ‘The Sky’s the Limit’: A Comparative Assessment of the Global Proliferation of Military Airpower in the Early and Late 20th Century Adam Jungdahl Dissertation Research Committee: James H. Lebovic, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Dissertation Director Christopher J. Deering, Professor of Political Science, Committee Member Alexander B. Downes, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Committee Member ii Acknowledgements In the pursuit of any distant goal there always comes a time when one flirts with self-doubt, agonizes over the obstacles ahead, contemplates the mistakes made and the opportunities lost, and entertains the thought of stepping aside, throwing in the towel, and walking away forever. If not for the support and guidance of my committee, my colleagues, and my family I would have done just that. They saved me from myself. First, I would like to thank Chris Deering and Alex Downes for providing excellent feedback on each chapter and for bearing with me on deadlines and due dates. I’d also like to thank Elizabeth Saunders and Jeremy Kinney for taking the time to read my completed dissertation and providing your invaluable comments. Finally, I’d like to thank my chair Jim Lebovic. Not only did you help guide me through the development, research, and writing phases but your steadfast support and timely intervention pushed this project through to completion. For this I am forever indebted. Second, I’d like to thank all the wonderful colleagues I’ve had the pleasure of learning and working with at the George Washington University and the Department of Defense. Special mention goes to David Banks and John Yaeger. David, our long, rambling conversations on strategy, theory, and method were absolutely crucial in shaping this project. John, your consistent optimism and constant encouragement made this into a reality. I sincerely thank you from the bottom of my heart. Third, and most importantly, I would like to thank my family. To my mother, your unwavering support to everything I do and unshakable confidence sustained me through the darkest days and kept my inspiration alive. Without you this project simply would not be. To my father, up to this point everything that I have worked for, strived to attain, and sacrificed to achieve has been for myself. But this, this most precious accomplishment, this is for you. I hope I’ve made you proud. iii Abstract of Dissertation ‘The Sky’s the Limit’: A Comparative Assessment of the Global Proliferation of Military Airpower in the Early and Late 20th Century The purpose of this dissertation is to compare and assess the national-level determinants of military airpower diffusion in the early and late 20th century. To do so I look at the invention of military airpower, its initial adoption patterns, and the intensity of adoption over time. I find that there are two principal determinants of airpower diffusion. The first, and most consistent, determinant is resources, specifically national levels of military power. States with high levels of military capability, as determined by the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score, are more likely to adopt airpower earlier and with greater intensity. The second determinant, national status, has had a more complex effect on airpower diffusion. In the early 20th century national status, or a desire to adhere to the norm of technological modernity, increased the speed and intensity with which states adopted airpower. In the late 20th century, though, pressure to acquire airpower capabilities for status purposes no longer held. Instead, it appears that states concerned about their relative levels of status became slightly less likely to pursue airpower. I also find that external threats are an important underlying cause for increasing airpower adoption intensity, that population constraints affected airpower adoption in the late 20th century, and that among the very earliest airpower adopters the presence of public advocacy groups in favor of aviation increased the rate of airpower adoption. In both the early and late 20th century the airpower diffusion process was facilitated by diplomatic communication channels which allowed for the rapid dissemination of information on aircraft performance and capabilities. These findings are synthesized into two proposed models of airpower diffusion in the final chapter. These models are intended to guide future research into military innovation diffusion. iv Table of Contents Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………………………………..…iii Abstract of Dissertation…………………………………………………………………………………………..iv Table of Contents…………………………………………………………………………………………………….v List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………………..........................vi List of Tables…………………………………………………………………………………………………….….vii Chapter 1: Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………1 Chapter 2: The Theory of Military Airpower Diffusion………………………………………………19 Chapter 3: Innovation Emergence – The Invention of Airpower………………………………..51 Chapter 4: The Proliferation of Military Airpower in the Early 20th Century.………………99 Chapter 5: The Proliferation of Military Airpower in the Late 20th Century……………….133 Chapter 6: Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………….164 Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………………………………..173 v List of Figures Figure 1…………………………………………………………..…………………………………………………..101 Figure 2……………………………………………………………………..………………………………………..113 Figure 3……………………………………………………….……………………………………………………..114 Figure 4…………..…………………………………………………………………………………………………..115 Figure 5……………………………………………………………….……………………………………………..118 Figure 6…………….………………………………………………………………………………………………..119 Figure 7……………………………………………………………………..……………………………………….125 Figure 8……………………………………………………….……………………………………………………..126 Figure 9…………………………………………………………….………………………………………………..126 Figure 10………………………………………………………….…………………………………………………147 Figure 11…………………………………………………..…………………………………………………………148 Figure 12………………………………………………………………….………………………………………...149 Figure 13……………………………………………….…………………………….…………………………..…150 Figure 14………………………………………………….………………….………………………………………151 Figure 15…………………………………………………………………….……………………………………....152 Figure 16………………………………………………………………………………..……………………………153 Figure 17………………………………………………………………………….………………………………....168 Figure 18…………………………………………………………………………………..………………………..170 vi List of Tables Table 1…………………………………………………………………………………………..………………….....76 Table 2…………………………………………………………………………..…………………………………….81 Table 3………………………………………………………………………………………..………………………110 Table 4…………………………………………………………………………………..……………………………122 Table 5…………………………………………………..……………………………………………………………124 Table 6………………………………………………………..………………………………………………………125 Table 7………………………………………………………………………..………………………………………139 Table 8………………………………………………………………………………………..………………………155 Table 9………………………………………………………………………………………..………………………157 vii Chapter 1: Introduction The purpose of this study is to answer a few simple questions: why do states rely on airpower? What factors determine the degree to which states pursue airpower capabilities and how have these factors changed over time? And lastly, how has the innovation of military airpower diffused across the international system over the course of the 20th century? The genesis for this project began with an article in the Wall Street Journal in late September 2011 outlining a proposal by the Iraqi government to spend $4.2 billion to acquire 18 F-16 fighters from the United States. The official justification for the purchase claimed that these aircraft would strengthen the Iraqi Armed Forces and enhance their ability to “protect Iraq’s sovereignty and security” against national security threats.1 I lingered on this statement. Finally, after a few moments of silence, I wondered aloud, “what threats, exactly, are they defending against?” At the time, the Iraqi government was involved in a life or death struggle against a deadly domestic insurgency that had been raging, at varying levels of intensity, for some seven years. It seemed abundantly clear that the primary challenge to the Iraqi government came not from traditional nation-state actors, but rather from its own population. Specifically, the insurgents’ blatant disregard for the state’s proclaimed monopoly on the use of force was eviscerating the legitimacy of the national government and the political leadership. The severity of the challenge was obvious, and yet, in allocating limited defense resources, the Iraqi Defence Ministry was choosing to devote 1 Adam Entous and Nathan Hodge, “Iraq Buys F-16s, Strengthening its Air Force,” Wall Street Journal (27 September 2011). Accessible at: http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204422404576594900420928050.