PRIME MINISTER AND CORE EXECUTIVE IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY: PROCESS, OUTCOME AND QUALITY OF DECISION By STEPHEN BENEDICT DYSON A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY Department of Political Science DECEMBER 2004 ii To the Faculty of Washington State University: The members of the Committee appointed to examine the dissertation of STEPHEN BENEDICT DYSON find it satisfactory and recommend that it be accepted. _____________________________ Chair _____________________________ _____________________________ iii ACKNOWLEDGMENT I have been fortunate to receive a great deal of support during the process of completing this project. Social Science Automation graciously provided a one-year academic license for the ‘Profiler Plus’ textual analysis computer program. My doctoral committee of Andrew Appleton, Lance LeLoup, and Tom Preston (Chair) were a constant source of advice and encouragement. Each brought a different perspective to the project and I always enjoyed discussing the work with them separately and collectively. My mother and father were supportive personally, intellectually and inevitably given the perilous nature of graduate school, financially. My fiancée Brianna Lawrence was a great companion and source of love. iv PRIME MINISTER AND CORE EXECUTIVE IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY: PROCESS, OUTCOME AND QUALITY OF DECISION Abstract by Stephen Benedict Dyson, Ph.D. Washington State University December 2004 Chair: Thomas Preston While much attention has focused upon the impact of institutional features of governments and individual characteristics of their leaders as separate determinants of foreign policy decisions, relatively little work has combined the two approaches. This is somewhat surprising given the danger of reductionism in studying institutions absent explanations of individual agency, and conversely, of studying important individuals without consideration of the institutional context within which they act. In this study, I investigate the impact of institutional factors and Prime Ministerial leadership characteristics on the process, outcome, and quality of decision making in British foreign policy. To measure individual characteristics, the universe of Prime Minister responses to foreign policy questions in the House of Commons from 1945-2004 were collected and analyzed by means of computer assisted content analysis. Institutional factors were operationalized through an application of the “core executive” framework developed for the study of British central government. The resulting conceptual model was tested through content analysis of primary source decision making documents concerning the crises involving Korea (1950), Suez (1956), and the Falklands (1982). v Complementary qualitative and quantitative methods were used. The dissertation makes a theoretical and empirical contribution to studies of British and comparative foreign policy, British and comparative executives, elite political psychology, and international relations. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………….. iv LIST OF TABLES……………………………………………………………… viii LIST OF FIGURES………………………………………………………….…. ix CHAPTER 1. INSTITUTIONS, INDIVIDUALS, AND FOREIGN POLICY…………… 1 Institutions: The Foreign Policy Core Executive………………….…… 3 Individuals: Characteristics of the Prime Minister……………….……. 13 Process, Outcome, and Quality of Decision Making………………….. 17 Conclusion and Plan of Study…………………………………………. 20 2. RESEARCH DESIGN FOR A MULTI-METHOD INQUIRY…………… 26 Case Selection…………………………………………………………. 27 Data Sources…………………………………………………………… 29 Qualitative Investigation………………………………………………. 30 Quantitative Investigation……………………………………………... 32 Hypotheses…………………………………………………………….. 41 3. RECOVERING INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS OF BRITISH PRIME MINISTERS FROM RESPONSES TO PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS… 45 The Importance of Leaders………………………………………………… 46 Leadership Trait Analysis………………………………………………….. 49 Data………………………………………………………………………… 52 Results……………………………………………………………………... 54 Conclusions………………………………………………………………... 59 4. THE KOREAN CRISIS……………………………………………………….. 62 Analytical Narrative of the Crisis………………………………………….. 66 Explaining the Key Decisions……………………………………………... 88 Quantitative Analysis……………………………………………………… 91 Conclusion………………………………………………………………… 99 5. THE SUEZ CRISIS…………………………………………………………… 106 Analytical Narrative of the Crisis…………………………………………. 110 Explaining the Key Decisions…………………………………………….. 158 Quantitative Analysis……………………………………………………… 163 Conclusion………………………………………………………………… 170 6. THE FALKLANDS CRISIS………………………………………………….. 180 vii Analytical Narrative of the Crisis………………………………………… 185 Explaining the Key Decisions……………………………………………. 206 Quantitative Analysis…………………………………………………….. 211 Conclusion………………………………………………………………... 219 7. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS………………………………………… 228 Discussion and Conclusions……………………………………………… 250 BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………... 259 APPENDIX A. CODE BOOK WITH VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATIONS…. 268 viii LIST OF TABLES 1. Number of Occasions for Decision by Case…………………………………. 41 2. Hypotheses Linking Institutional and Individual variables to quality of decision making………………………………………….…………………... 42 3. Trait Conceptualization and Coding Rules…………………………………… 51 4. Characteristics of Word Files………………………………………………… 54 5. British Prime Ministers and Reference Group of World Political Leaders….. 55 6. Mean Trait Variable Scores by Prime Minister……………………………… 56 7. One Way ANOVA with Prime Minister as Grouping Variable……………... 57 8. Orthogonal Comparisons of Prime Ministers: t-scores……………………… 59 9. Trait Scores: Clement Attlee………………………………………………… 64 10. The Core Executive Institution in the Korean Crisis………………………… 93 11. Impact of Prime Minister in the Korean Crisis………………………………. 95 12. Quality of Decision Making in the Korean Crisis…………………………… 98 13. Chronology of Korean Crisis………………………………………………… 100 14. Trait Scores: Anthony Eden…………………………………………………. 108 15. The Core Executive Institution in the Suez Crisis…………………………… 164 16. Impact of the Prime Minister in the Suez Crisis……………………………... 166 17. Quality of Decision Making in the Suez Crisis……………………………… 169 18. Chronology of the Suez Crisis……………………………………………….. 171 19. Trait Scores: Margaret Thatcher……………………………………………… 183 20. The Core Executive Institution in the Falklands Crisis………………………. 213 21. Impact of the Prime Minister in the Falklands Crisis………………………… 215 22. Quality of Decision Making in the Falklands Crisis…………………………. 218 23. Chronology of the Falklands Crisis…………………………………………... 220 24. Cross Case Comparison of Variables………………………………………… 229 25. Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Quality of Decision Making Factors (Model 1, Tables A-C)………………………………………………. 239 26. Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Quality of Decision Making Factors (Model 2, Tables A-C)………………………………………………. 242 ix LIST OF FIGURES 1. Prime Minister, Core Executive, and British Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework…………………………………………………………………… 20 2. Egypt Committee……………………………………………………………. 113 3. ODSA: The Falklands 'War Cabinet'………………………………………… 194 1 CHAPTER ONE: INSTITUTIONS, INDIVIDUALS, AND FOREIGN POLICY A divide is often posited between individual and institutional modes of analysis in political science. Individualists attribute great importance to the personal characteristics and motivations of prominent actors within the political process. Institutionalists, by contrast, argue that configurations of formal political organizations and informal norms shape and structure interests, behavior and outcomes. This divide has been prevalent in most sub-fields of the discipline, and has certainly been influential in shaping studies of decision making in the British central government. Individualist perspectives informed the long-running and ultimately inconclusive debate concerning the relative distribution of power between Prime Minister and Cabinet, and in particular the question of whether apparent increases in Prime Ministerial power had transformed the British central government into a pseudo-Presidential system1. Many of these arguments were centered on the personality and performance of specific Prime Ministers. The “rediscovery of institutions” which swept political science from the mid 1980s onward refocused the debate from the influence of individuals and onto their relative insignificance when set against organizational structures, values and practices which were transmitted from government to government2. The strongest version of this argument suggests that political life can be understood as "a collection of institutions, rules of behavior, norms, roles, physical arrangements, buildings, and archives that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals"3. However, there have been prominent arguments which suggest taking 2 simultaneously an individual micro perspective and an institutional macro perspective approach to the study of executives and decision making4. Many individualists now recognize the significance of institutional factors, and argue that these should be incorporated explicitly into conceptual models. Indeed, Paul 't Hart suggests that a consideration of factors such as institutional norms and structured interactions is critical to a credible account of central government decision making: Social and political psychologists cannot afford to ignore the broader institutional forces that govern