No Place to Hide: Gang, State, and Clandestine Violence in El Salvador International Human Rights Clinic Human Rights Program Harvard Law School February 2007 IHRC International Human Rights Clinic Human Rights Program Harvard Law School No Place to Hide: Gang, State, and Clandestine Violence in El Salvador The International Human Rights Clinic Human Rights Program, Harvard Law School February 2007 NO PLACE TO HIDE: GANG, STATE, AND CLANDESTINE VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR vii. Table of Contents Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations vi Acknowledgments iv Executive Summary iii Introduction i I. Background: The History of Violence in El Salvador 1 A. A Brief Overview of the Salvadoran Civil War 2 B. The Aftermath of the War: A Culture of Impunity and an Ineffective Judicial System 7 II. The Gang Phenomenon in El Salvador 20 A. The Emergence of Youth Gangs 20 B. How Gangs Function Today 24 C. Organized Crime 34 III. State Responses to Crime/Gang Phenomenon 37 A. Direct State Responses to Violence 37 B. Secondary State Responses to the Gang Phenomenon: Impunity 60 C. Relationship between Political Polarization and Violence in El Salvador 68 IV. Human Rights Violations Grouped by Type of Victim 76 A. People Who Oppose Gangs 76 B. Targeting of Actual and Imputed Gang Members 84 C. Persons deported from the United States 95 vi. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations ARENA Alianza Republicana Nacionalista or Nationalist Republican Alliance banda an organized criminal network BPJ Bloque Popular Juvenil or Popular Youth Bloc CEPES Centro de Estudios Penales de El Salvador or El Salvador Center for Penal Studies clika a local sub-group within a gang CRISPAZ Christians for Peace in El Salvador FESPAD Fundación de Estudios para la Aplicación del Derecho or Foundation for the Study of the Application of the Law FMLN Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional or Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front IDHUCA Instituto de los Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Centroamericana “José Simeón Cañas” or Human Rights Institute of “José Simeón Cañas” Central American University IML Instituto de Medicina Legal or National Institute of Forensic Medicine IUDOP Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública or University Institute for Public Opinion Research (of “José Simeón Cañas” Central American University) LAM Ley Anti-Maras or Anti-Gangs Act of 2003 LAM 2 Ley para el Combate de las Actividades Delincuenciales de Grupos o Asociaciones Ilícitas Especiales or Act to Combat Delinquent Activities of Certain Illicit Groups or Associations of 2004 Mano Dura stringent anti-gang policy initiated by Salvadoran government beginning in 2003, involving large-scale arrests of gang members mara a gang ONUSAL United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador ORDEN Organización Democrática Nacionalista or Nationalist Democratic Organization PAHO Pan-American Health Organization PNC Policía Nacional Civil or National Civil Police renta money collected by gang members from local businesses, public transportation drivers, households, etc., as part of an organized extortion system Súper Mano Dura renewed anti-gang plan that purported to incorporate elements of prevention and social reinsertion, but which NO PLACE TO HIDE: GANG, STATE, AND CLANDESTINE VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR v. in practice retained the repressive characteristics of its predecessor, the Mano Dura plan Tutela Legal the human rights office of the Archbishop of San Salvador UCA Universidad Centroamericana “José Simeón Cañas” or “José Simeón Cañas” Central American University USAID United States Agency for International Development WOLA Washington Office on Latin America iv. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC Acknowledgments This report was researched and written by students enrolled in the International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) of the Human Rights Pro- gram at Harvard Law School under the direction of Clinical Professor and Human Rights Program Executive Director James Cavallaro. The student authors are Stephanie Brewer, Mark Jensen, Timothy Mayhle, Spring Miller, María Luisa Romero, and Molly Thomas-Jensen. Members of the Har- vard Law School Student Advocates for Human Rights, and IHRC clinical students Yanyan Lam and Francesca Gesualdi, provided significant research and editing assistance. In addition to drafting sections of the report, Spring Miller edited the chapter submissions of other students and coordinated the integration of the text. James Cavallaro reviewed several drafts and edited the final version of this report. The International Human Rights Clinic thanks the many individu- als in El Salvador who provided us with information in the course of our research. We are particularly grateful to Matthew Eisen, Rosa Anaya, Sherry Stanley and Nelson Escobar, whose assistance in coordinating research dur- ing our March and August 2006 trips to El Salvador was invaluable. We also thank the staff of various Salvadoran non-governmental research, advocacy, and humanitarian organizations who helped us access the in- formation used in this report. In particular, we thank staff of the Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública at the Universidad Centroamericana “José Simeón Cañas” (IUDOP), the Instituto de Derechos Humanos at the Universidad Centroamericana “José Simeón Cañas” (IDHUCA), Christians for Peace in El Salvador (CRISPAZ), Movimiento Juvenil (MOJE), Clínica Octavio Ortiz, Generación XXI, and Homies Unidos. We would like to express our appreciation to the governmental au- thorities who provided important information and insights to us through- out our research process. Special thanks go to Jaime Martínez Ventura of the Office of Juvenile Justice of the Supreme Court, and Dr. Fabio Molina, Research Director of the National Institute of Forensic Medicine. Finally, we are deeply grateful to the victims of and witnesses to violence in El Salvador who spoke with our researchers. The report would not have been possible without the valuable information they shared with us. NO PLACE TO HIDE: GANG, STATE, AND CLANDESTINE VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR iii. Executive Summary No Place to Hide: Gang, State, and Clandestine Violence in El Salvador Fifteen years after the civil war in El Salvador came to an end, violence and insecurity continue to shape the daily lives of many Salvador- ans. This report examines the phenomenon of youth gangs and documents human rights violations associated with gang violence and Salvadoran governmental responses to it. Our examination is situated in the context of an assessment of the current state of the rule of law in El Salvador. The war in El Salvador during the 1980s was one of the bloodi- est and most brutal in a region gripped with civil conflicts throughout that decade. The Salvadoran conflict gained worldwide notoriety for the prevalence of human rights abuses and death squads, that operated with the apparent acquiescence of state authorities, to terrorize civilian populations. Unfortunately, as discussed in Section I of this report, efforts since the war to build functioning democratic institutions in El Salvador have largely failed to overcome the legacies of institutional incapacity and politicization. Current levels of violence are extraordinarily high. El Salvador’s homicide rate is nearly double the average for Latin America, a region with high levels of violence by global standards. Continued political polarization, weak judicial and law enforcement institutions, and the persistence of extra-judi- cial violence seriously undermine citizen security and the rule of law in El Salvador. Violent street gangs have grown rapidly in this fractured and dys- functional socio-political context. The deportation of tens of thousands of Salvadorans from the United States since the late 1990s (a consequence of forced emigration of Salvadoran families during the civil war years and subsequent changes to U.S. immigration laws) helped spur the growth and development of these gangs, a process we describe in Section II. In recent years, and as a result of particularized political conditions and law enforce- ment responses in El Salvador, the dynamics of the gang phenomenon have evolved. The two major rival gangs – the Mara Salvatrucha and the Mara 18, both of which have U.S. roots and a U.S. presence – engage in brutal battles for control of neighborhoods and communities throughout the country. Gangs’ methods of recruitment, and the sanctions they impose on members who demonstrate disloyalty or who attempt to withdraw from active gang life, are increasingly violent. Active and former gang members report that it is increasingly difficult, if not impossible, for young people to ii. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC escape the pressure of gang recruitment or to leave a gang. Gangs fre- quently use extortion to gather funds and solidify territorial control. There is evidence that organized criminal networks are operating with growing sophistication and impunity in El Salvador. The relationship between these organized criminal networks and the upper tiers of gang hierarchies is uncertain, as is the role of state actors in these activities, but the effect on Salvadoran citizens – a deepening sense of impunity and insecurity – is clear. The primary governmental response to the gang phenomenon, which relies heavily on repressive law enforcement-military tactics, mass arrests, and profiling of youth and alleged gang members, has been inef- fective and even counter-productive. Governmental responses to the gang phenomenon are explored in great depth in Section III of this