The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. (IFPA), now in its thirty-second year, develops innovative strategies for new security challenges. IFPA conducts studies, workshops, and conferences on national security and foreign policy issues and produces innovative reports, briefings, and publications. IFPA’s products and services help government policy makers, military and industry leaders, and the broader public policy communities make informed decisions in a complex and dynamic global environment. With core staff as well as offices in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C., the Institute maintains a global network of research advisors and consultants. Radical Islamist Ideologies and the Long War Implications for U.S. Strategic Planning and U.S. Central Command's Operations Principal Investigator: Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis January 2007 For further information on this report contact: Or you may contact: Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis Dr. Charles M. Perry Executive Vice-President Vice-President The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. 1725 DeSales Street, NW 675 Massachusetts Avenue Suite 402 10th Floor Washington, DC 20036 Cambridge, MA 02139-3309 Telephone: (202) 463–7942 Telephone: (617) 492-2116 Fax: (202) 785–2785 Fax: (617) 492-8242 Table of Contents I. Introduction: The “Long War” 1 Towards a New Caliphate 8 The Wahhabi Influence and al-Qaeda’s Ideological Roots 9 II. Core Themes of the Islamist Ideology and Opportunities to Leverage Divisions Among Muslim Populations 13 Principal Themes of al-Qaeda’s Ideology 13 Abu Ghraib—A Self-Inflicted Wound 18 Oil, Development and Globalization Themes 19 Ideology of Martyrdom 20 Contending Sunni-Shia Interpretations of Islam 21 III. The New Face of Warfare: Asymmetric Strategies, Irregular Tactics, and Insurgency Operations 25 Suicide Attacks as a Component of Irregular Warfare 26 A Culture of Violence and the Promotion of Chaos 30 A New Strategic Challenge: Containing, Deterring, and Quite Possibly, Having to Engage/ Defeat Iranian Forces or Proxy Organizations 32 IV. Strategic and Operational Implications for the United States: Essential Elements of a New National Strategy 36 Strategic Communications and “Hearts and Minds” 36 Leveraging U.S. “Soft Power” to Supplement Kinetic Operations to Erode the Extremists’ Appeal 38 Countering Radical Extremist Efforts to Acquire and Use WMD 41 Placing the Rest of the Interagency (beyond DoD) on a War Footing 43 Creating a New Paradigm for “Actionable” Intelligence 44 Coalition Partners are an Essential Component of U.S. CT Efforts 45 Homeland Security and Force Protection Considerations 47 V. Recommendations for the Way Ahead 48 Table of Graphics 1. A New Caliphate 3 2. Radical Islamists’ Commitment to the “Long War” 4 3. Islamist Strategic Framework for the Long War 6 4. Differences Between Sunni and Shia Branches of Islam 22 5. The Growth of Suicide Terrorism 1991-2005 24 6. Islamist Groups’ Ideologies and Goals 27 7. al-Qaeda’s Global Reach 31 8. DOS CT’s Extremist Conveyor Belt 38 9. A Temporal and Virtual Threat 43 10. Contending U.S. and Islamist Strategies for the Long War 47 Radical Islamist Ideologies and the Long War i Executive Summary The United States is engaged in a struggle against violent extremists who use a selective in- terpretation of Islam and Muslim grievances as a cover for their pursuit of political power and global influence. For most Americans, the events of recent years, including the attacks of September 11, 2001, were horrific, but, with the passage of time, largely unrelated to the ebb and flow of their daily lives. The radical extremists are counting on Americans to let their guard down, and to succumb to political pressures to withdraw U.S. forces precipitously from Iraq in the face of mounting U.S. casualties, while turning a blind eye to the proliferation of al-Qaeda cells in Europe, Asia, the wider Middle East, Africa, and even in North and South America. Geographically, Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan and Somalia, have become the central theaters of operation for the new jihadists, but this is a global struggle for “hearts and minds,” one that is being waged over the Internet and directly within Western countries, exploiting the disaffection of Muslim youth and the failure of Western nations to integrate successfully immi- grant Muslim communities into the fabric of their societies. It is also an internal struggle within Islam, pitting those who espouse a particular orthodoxy against those who seek a reformation of Islam. In many respects, this Long War1 can be portrayed as a struggle between modernity and tradi- tion, between Western cultures and values and Islam’s rejection of individual rights over the greater welfare of society, although it is not as simple as that. While it is not necessarily the clash of civilizations of which much has been written, the new jihadists certainly are seeking to make it one, by attracting moderate Muslim support for actions designed to bring the United States and its coalition allies to their knees, defeated in Iraq and Afghanistan, expelled from the Persian Gulf, and witness to the destruction of Israel. As such, the political, strategic, and operational challenges facing the United States in the global struggle against radical jihadists are twofold: on the one hand, Washington and its coalition partners must contain and, if pos- sible, defeat the terrorists on the “battlefield” (both on the virtual battlefield of the Internet and on the ground in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and other hotspots where they operate), but, on the other hand, they must also develop and communicate a credible message to the broader Muslim community that can help to de-legitimize the jihadists’ arguments and diminish their appeal. What is needed, in other words, is a better blend of hard and soft power to isolate, disrupt, and, when/where possible, destroy extremist networks, and to create lasting divides between the jihadist and non-jihadist Islamic communities. Various phrases have been used to convey the nature of the struggle in which we are currently engaged. President Bush has favored the phrase “Global War on Terror,” or GWOT, while the U.S. military tends to emphasize the “Long War,” to underscore the generational nature of this battle and the profound importance of its outcome for our way of life. Academics, on the other hand, tend to use the formulation of a “Struggle Against Violent Extremism,” or SAVE. For the purposes of this assessment, we recognize that none of these phrases fully captures the totality of this challenge, but for the purposes of brevity we have chosen to use the military’s formulation in some instances, and SAVE in others. Radical Islamist Ideologies and the Long War Radical Islamist Ideologies and the Long War ii To succeed, the United States and its allies will also need to develop new strategic approaches, adaptive operational concepts, and more cost-effective methods of coalition and Interagency coordination. As was the Cold War, the Long War promises to be a generational struggle (or longer), requiring patience and vision, and drawing on all the tools of national power, not just the military. However, unlike the Cold War period, the struggle against radical Islamist extremists has yet to coalesce around a single, coherent, organizing framework, such as that embodied by the containment concept. Because the jihadist “threat” is not widely understood (in the way that the Soviet challenge was), Western responses have tended to be sporadic and often disconnected. Moreover, because this is for the West as much a struggle for “hearts and minds” as it is an effort to defeat radical extremists militarily, campaigns in the Long War need to be carefully tailored to local conditions, though still set within a common broader global strategy in which advancements in political liberalization and economic development are likely to be as important (if nonetheless dependent upon) improvements in security. De-legitimizing the Islamist ideology and defeating the global jihadist threat is, of course, a multifaceted challenge. Without question, it will require, as alluded to above, a much more focused, intensive, and culturally-sensitive strategic communications strategy, with a sizable Information Operations(IO) component. Ideally, this would be organized and run by a new office on par with that of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and charged with coordinating all relevant Interagency efforts. But it will entail as well the design and development of new technologies and procedures for identifying and defeating asymmetric threats (including those that may employ WMD), and a broader capability to mitigate the consequences if such threats are actually implemented. As the jihadists embrace and exploit classical insurgency strategies, and adapt their urban warfare tactics so as to put the onus on U.S. and/or coalition forces for the generation of civilian casualties and collateral damage, it is also essential that counterinsurgency (COIN) operations assume a greater proportion of U.S./coalition operational planning. Waging and winning a counterinsurgency, however, requires an overarching political strategy that guides specific mission taskings for U.S. and coalition partner forces, as well as for COIN- related teams from other USG agencies and their allied/partner country counterparts. Absent such a comprehensive, Interagency, and coalition-minded framework, military operations alone are