G THE B IN EN V C R H E S A N 8 8 D 8 B 1 AR SINCE Monday, November 20, 2006 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE When Parent and Subsidiary Are Public Overlapping responsibilities require coordination. BY JEFFREY W. RUBIN NUMBER of U.S. publicly traded companies are “controlled companies.” A controlled company is Aan entity of which more than 50 percent of the voting A power is held by an individual, a group or another com- pany (the parent). 1 Although in most situations the parent of a controlled company is an individual or a non-public entity, in some instances controlled companies are, or may ART BY NEWSCOM become, controlled by a public parent. A multi-tiered corpo- rate structure where one or more subsidiaries of a public parent is also a public company presents a complicated series of governance issues, at both the parent and subsidiary levels. This article will review certain of these considerations, and will focus in particular on the obligations imposed by securities law requirements and securities exchange rules. Corporate structures involving the control by the parent’s ability to approve the articles directors consisting of a majority of independent of a public subsidiary by a public parent may of incorporation and bylaws of the subsidiary, directors, 7 and an audit, compensation and arise through a variety of means, including to elect directors to the subsidiary’s board of nominating committee comprised exclusively carve-outs, in which a parent or its controlled directors, and to vote on other matters submitted of independent directors. 8 subsidiary sells a minority equity interest in to a vote (or consent) of shareholders. Even Because the imposition of certain of these the subsidiary by means of a public offering, though the parent may have a significant governance requirements could prevent a and acquisitions in which a public company interest in the management and operations of parent from being able to manage its controlled acquires, directly or indirectly, a majority interest the subsidiary, the directors of the subsidiary owe subsidiaries, the principal securities exchanges in another public company that remains public their fiduciary obligations to all the subsidiary’s have permitted “controlled companies” to immediately following the acquisition. Although shareholders, and not merely to the parent. 3 elect to be exempt from the requirement that the potential for conflicts in the discharge of a majority of the board consist of independent fiduciary duties exists in any controlled company Unique Governance Issues directors, and from the nominating committee structure, certain issues are more pronounced and compensation committee requirements.9 when both the parent and one or more of its The governance reforms of the past few years, Notwithstanding the controlled company subsidiaries are public. 2 especially those implemented pursuant to the exemptions, in certain situations the corporate Even though a parent and its subsidiaries Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 4 (SOX) and by the concept of entity integrity becomes a bit blurred may have numerous intercompany business principal national securities exchanges, reflected against the backdrop of a public company’s relationships, under state corporate law a the view that corporate fraud and abuse can be governance obligations. None of these situations parent’s control of its subsidiary is manifested reduced by, among other things, enhancing the presents an insurmountable obstacle to governing role of directors independent from management. 5 a public company in compliance with state Jeffrey W. Rubin is a partner with Hogan As a result of these changes, a listed company 6 corporate law, federal securities law, and stock & Hartson’s New York office. is, in general, required to have a board of exchange requirements, but these situations do NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL MONDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 2006 require some sensitivity to the issues involved. (c) Audit committee investigations of take certain other actions. In many situations, Indeed, an appropriate response to these issues allegations of financial impropriety and the an attorney within the scope of the rules may by both the parent and the controlled subsidiary consequences of any such investigations. be appearing and practicing on behalf of both would be to identify the areas of overlap and to Both audit committees may share the parent and the subsidiary. encourage communication and coordination responsibility for such matters involving The attorney’s obligation in the event the between the parent and the subsidiary to avoid the subsidiary. attorney has information that would constitute unanticipated issues. Although some of these (d) The receipt, retention, and treatment evidence of a material violation applicable to issues are conceptual, an understanding of their of complaints received by each listed issuer both the parent and subsidiary would appear scope may assist in anticipating, responding to regarding accounting, internal accounting to require the attorney to communicate such and resolving any real world issues. controls, or auditing matters, and the information in the manner prescribed at both Among the areas where overlap of confidential and anonymous submission the parent and the subsidiary levels, and to follow responsibilities exists in a public parent-public by employees of the listed issuer of concerns up based on the responses at each such level. In subsidiary relationship are audit committees, regarding questionable accounting or addition, at each of the parent and the subsidiary attorney reporting-up requirements, executive auditing matters. Both auditing committees levels, the receipt of a report from an attorney compensation and SEC disclosure. may have responsibility for such matters.11 would require the recipient to investigate and In these situations, each of the audit respond to the report. There is nothing in the Audit Committees committees will need to satisfy itself that it has rules that would prevent an investigation and appropriately discharged its responsibilities. response to be effected on a coordinated basis, Pursuant to Rule 10A-3(b)(2) under assuming both entities agree with the substance the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the of the response. Exchange Act), the audit committee of each xxxxxxxx xxxx listed issuer “must be directly responsible for In each situation where Executive Compensation the appointment, compensation, retention a public company and oversight of the work of any public As discussed above, under securities exchange accounting firm engaged (including resolution controls a public subsidiary, listing rules, the compensation committee of of disagreements between management and there exists a need a listed company (or in some instances the the auditor regarding financial reporting) for for the board and independent directors) is required to approve the purpose of preparing or issuing an audit management of each the compensation of the chief executive officer report or performing other audit, review or company to understand the and to review the compensation of the other attest services for the listed issuer, and each executive officers. Although under the controlled such registered public accounting firm must roles and responsibilities company exception, a controlled subsidiary is not report directly to the audit committee.” In the of the board required to have a compensation committee, any case of a listed parent and listed subsidiary, two and management of determinations by a subsidiary to compensate audit committees would exist, each comprised the other. a person who is an executive officer of the solely of independent directors, 10 and each xxx xxxxxxxx parent (whether or not such person is also an vested with its own set of responsibilities. In executive officer of the subsidiary), may conflict this instance, coordination between the two with the designated responsibility of the parent audit committees would be appropriate in Because matters affecting one entity may company’s compensation committee.13 order to avoid problems or inefficiencies in also affect the other, it would be prudent In addition, a determination by the subsidiary a number of areas: for the entities to agree to a protocol for to compensate (in any respect) a director of the (a) The selection of auditors. The selection the disclosure to the audit committee of the parent or a relative of the director, or to do of auditors by the parent or the subsidiary parent of matters brought to the attention of business with an entity in which the director could affect the selection by the other, the subsidiary, and for the disclosure to the has a substantial interest, may affect the status especially if the subsidiary represents a audit committee of the subsidiary of matters of the director as an independent director of material portion of the parent’s assets brought to the attention of the parent that the parent. Accordingly, it would be prudent or operations. may involve or relate to the subsidiary. for a subsidiary to refrain from compensating, or entering into a business relationship with, (b) The resolution of disagreements between any director or executive officer of the parent the auditors and management regarding Attorney ‘Reporting Up’ without first considering the implications of such financial reporting. Pursuant to Rule Another example of overlapping a transaction to the parent. 10A-3 under the Exchange Act, the audit responsibility is the obligation, under the committees of the subsidiary and the parent SEC’s attorney conduct rules, 12 for an attorney SEC Disclosure may each be involved in the resolution of appearing and practicing before the SEC to disputes involving the subsidiary. report evidence of material violations and to There are significant benefits to the NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL MONDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 2006 coordination of public disclosure by a public be sensitive to this overlap of responsibilities. nominating committee of a controlled company would not parent and public subsidiary. Some of these, such have a meaningful role if a parent could, by its vote, elect the members of the board of the controlled company.