Nietzsche’s Critique of Morality A Resource for AS-Level and A-Level Philosophy This booklet is desiGned to help AS-level and A-level Philosophy teachers and students to develop This work is licensed under the the independent cri4cal arGumentaon required to earn the hiGhest marks. Creave Commons A2ribu4on-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license, visit h2p://creavecommons.orG/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/. The essays and exercises are desiGned to support work in two units of the curriculum: – Why Should I Be Moral? – Set text: Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil The work can be freely copied and distributed without prior permission, so lonG as it is not altered or used for commercial purposes. We also request that it is not made available throuGh any website The booklet is edited by Jonathan Webber and features work by philosophers at Cardiff University. apart from our own: h2p://bit.ly/cardiffphilosophyalevel Contents References The Disvalue of Morality The primary text discussed in this book is Friedrich Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil. Simon Robertson 3 Quotaons are taken from the Oxford World’s Classics edi4on translated by Marion Faber, as specified in the AQA A-level Philosophy syllabus. References are Given by sec4on Does Nietzsche Think Values Are Merely Expressions of Personal Preference? number (not page number) prefaced by ‘BGE’. Alessandra Tanesini 5 Is Nietzsche Fair To Kant? Occasional reference is made to other works of Nietzsche’s. These are: Jonathan Webber 7 GM On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic, translated by DouGlas Smith. Oxford University Press, Oxford World’s Classics, 1998. Puzzle 1 Can Nietzsche Coherently Reject Chris4anity? 9 GS The Gay Science: With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, translated by Josefine Nauckhoff. CambridGe University Press, 2001. Puzzle 2 TI Twilight of the Idols. In The Portable Nietzsche, edited and translated by Walter A. Can Nietzsche Coherently Reject Morality? 9 Kaufmann. New York: VikinG Press, 1982. Can Nietzsche Accept UndemandinG Moral Theories? WP The Will to Power, translated by Walter A. Kaufmann and ReGinald J. HollinGdale. Simon Robertson 10 Vintage Books, 1968. References to these works are also by sec4on number (not page number). Free Will, the Creaon of Values, and the Well-Ordered Soul Alessandra Tanesini 12 Self-Determinaon and Moral Constraint The arGuments in this booklet summarise oriGinal research. Publicaon details for the full academic statements of the oriGinal arGuments are as follows: Jonathan Webber 14 Simon Robertson, ‘A Nietzschean Crique of Obligaon-Centred Moral Theory’, Puzzle 3 InternaLonal Journal of Philosophical Studies 2011. Has Kant Already Met Nietzsche’s ChallenGe? 16 Alessandra Tanesini, ‘Nietzsche on the Diachronic Will and the Problem of Morality’, European Journal of Philosophy 2013. Puzzle 4 How Is Morality Related To Self-Interest? 16 Jonathan Webber, ‘A Law Unto Oneself’, Philosophical Quarterly 2012. Nietzscheʼs Critique of Morality – an AS-Level and A-Level resource from Cardiff University – freely available under Creative Commons licence from http://bit.ly/cardiffphilosophyalevel"p. 2 The Disvalue of Morality Who are Nietzsche’s Higher Types? Simon Robertson Fully-fledGed hiGher types are those who realize the hiGhest forms of human flourishinG and excellence. But what do these involve? Let’s take each in turn Nietzsche is an ardent cri4c of tradi4onal morality. He cri4cises it on many levels. At the most fundamental level, he aacks two claims that morality makes about its own status. A flourishinG plant is one that realizes its poten4al to be a healthy specimen of the type of One is the claim that it is an objec4vely jus4fied standpoint deliverinG objec4ve truths plant it is. It realizes this poten4al by doinG or GenG what is Good for it. Likewise, about what everyone ouGht to do (BGE 186-203). The other is its idea that we are all accordinG to Nietzsche, a flourishinG human is someone who realizes their poten4al to be responsible for what we do because we have free will (BGE 19, 21). He thinks that these a healthy human by doinG what is Good for them. This involves at least two thinGs: ‘self- claims about objec4vity and free will are false. However, he also says this: ‘We do not understandinG’ and ‘becominG who one is’. object to a judGment just because it is false … The ques4on is rather to what extent the judGment furthers life …’ (BGE 4). Self-understandinG is crucial because different people are very different: different thinGs are Good for different people and how a Given person miGht flourish depends on the This suGGests that what really drives Nietzsche’s cri4que is an evaluave agenda: he thinks par4culari4es of that person. In order to know what to do to flourish, you have Got to morality is overall a bad thinG and that it ‘cons4tute[s] the danGer of all danGers’ because understand what makes you you. So you need an accurate assessment of your own nature it is not life-enhancinG, but rather thwarts the possibility of achievinG the most advanced and character. Note that one of Nietzsche’s worries about morality is that it overlooks the forms of life, ‘the highest power and splendour of the human type’ (GM.Preface.6). Those fact that different thinGs can be Good for different people: ‘Any altruis4c moral code that capable of realizinG such an advanced life are Nietzsche’s ‘free spirits’ or ‘hiGher types’. takes itself uncondi4onally and addresses itself to everyone is … inci4nG to sins of Thus, Nietzsche says that ‘to demand one morality for all is precisely to encroach upon the omission … and par4cularly temp4nG and harmful to those who are Greater, rarer, hiGher sort of human beinGs’ (BGE 228). Elsewhere, he says that to ‘men of Great privileGed’ (BGE 221). Nietzsche thinks that ‘it is immoral to say, “What’s Good for the creavity, the really Great men accordinG to my understandinG ... nothinG stands more Goose is Good for the Gander”’ (BGE 221) because ‘what is riGht for the one miGht certainly maliGnantly in the way of their rise and evolu4on … than what in Europe is today called not be riGht for the other’ (BGE 228). simply “morality”’ (WP 957). Self-understandinG involves understandinG not only who you already are, but also what So, Nietzsche’s drivinG cri4cism of morality is not that it rests on false claims. He rejects you can make of yourself. And makinG somethinG of yourself involves doing things – for morality because it is disvaluable – that is to say, a bad thinG. He thinks it is bad because instance, achievinG the Goals you set yourself. For Nietzsche, then, to flourish you must set he thinks it prevents those capable of livinG the hiGhest kind of life from doinG so. All of your own Goals – Goals that express who you are (as revealed throuGh self-understandinG) this raises a number of important ques4ons for understandinG and assessinG Nietzsche’s and that reflect what you can realis4cally make of yourself. A very creave person should crique. In this essay, I consider two of these ques4ons. Who are these hiGher types? And set Goals that express creavity, and it is throuGh this creavity that the creave person what are the Good thinGs that morality supposedly thwarts? will realize their poten4al and hence flourish. Nietzsche!s Critique of Morality – an AS-Level and A-Level resource from Cardiff University – freely available under Creative Commons licence from http://bit.ly/cardiffphilosophyalevel"p. 3 No4ce that you can express who you are even thouGh the results of your efforts are But how does morality come to dominate the evaluave landscape in ways that relavely mediocre. A creave person miGht set ar4s4c Goals, yet end up creanG only (supposedly) thwart hiGher types from realizinG the excellences they are capable of? The mediocre artworks. Even if this person lives the most flourishinG life that they are capable key to Nietzsche’s thouGht is that, despite the death of God, morality s4ll presents itself as of, this would not be an example of the hiGhest forms of human flourishinG or excellence. an objecvely jusLfied and hence authoritaLve standpoint. Here is a way to ar4culate For Nietzsche, this mediocre ar4st would not be a fully-fledGed hiGher type. A fully-fledged Nietzsche’s challenGe: hiGher type is someone who also achieves ‘external’ or ‘externally recoGnisable’ excellences. So what miGht these be? 1. Morality demands that you comply with its norms, values, ideals, and du4es, irrespec4ve of whether doinG so conflicts with what is Good for you personally. Nietzsche says conspicuously li2le about this. But there may be a Good reason for that: there simply cannot be a manual or recipe for achievinG the hiGhest excellences, since such 2. Morality takes itself to apply to all people equally, so you cannot escape morality when excellences are the result of creave ac4vity directed towards novel Goals. Consider again it conflicts with what is Good for you personally. an analoGy with artworks: we cannot supply a list of specific rules sayinG ‘do this to produce a Great artwork’, for not only does Great art oten break established rules, even 3. Therefore, morality requires even the hiGher types comply with its demands – when it does not do so it is always creave and novel. So, a hiGher type is someone who reGardless of whether doinG so is conducive to expressinG who they are. achieves the hiGhest excellence, which expresses their own nature and cannot be specified in advance by anyone else, and who thereby realizes their poten4al to be excellent in that 4. ComplyinG with morality can prevent you from realizinG the hiGhest excellences.