© COPYRIGHT by Neerada Jacob 2012 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED For my family UNDERSTANDING NUCLEAR RESTRAINT: WHAT ROLE DO SANCTIONS PLAY? A STUDY OF IRAQ, TAIWAN, LIBYA, AND IRAN BY Neerada Jacob ABSTRACT The dissertation seeks to understand the role of sanctions in the scaling back of nuclear weapons programs. It analyzes the nuclear programs of four countries (Iraq, Taiwan, Libya, and Iran) based on a classification of nuclear restraint as Slow, Stop, and Rollback. The research finds that sanctions have, at times, played a significant intermediary role in ending nuclear weapons programs. The central argument is that the impact of sanctions can be understood in terms of limiting resources, or by affecting the motives for the nuclear program. Such a categorization of the sanctions impact contributes to the literature by delineating two broad ways by which alone sanctions can change a country’s policy. The dissertation also contributes to the literature on nuclear proliferation by developing the concept of nuclear restraint in terms of three sub-categories (Slow, Stop, and Rollback). ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This dissertation owes much to the dedication of my committee members, Prof. Sharon Weiner, Prof. Steve Silvia, and Prof. George Quester. All of them have had high enthusiasm for the project, and ample patience as I worked through various arguments. I am grateful for their examples as scholars and respectable human beings, examples that I hope I can emulate. Their commitment to their work, to their students, and to being good people is something we could have more of in academia. Their scholarship also displays a rare open-mindedness to understand the social world for what it is, rather than dividing it into separate subject areas. I am particularly thankful to my Chair, Prof. Sharon K. Weiner, whose insightful comments are reflected throughout the dissertation. She has been a true mentor, reflecting a rare and rather impossible combination of being deeply critical while highly supportive. The dissertation is truly the better for her penetrating commentary. In particular, she often pushed me beyond my tendency to throw up my arms and say, “everything matters!” Prof. Silvia also never shied away from criticizing my work, while at the same time being encouraging. His knowledge of the comparative politics literature has enriched my dissertation. I thank Prof. George Quester for his contribution to the field of international security and the chance to work with him. The long trips to the College Park campus of the University of Maryland were more than worth it for the illuminating insights he generated. I sincerely thank the individuals who kindly spent time with me discussing their experiences with nuclear programs in various countries. Needless to say, these interviews have been extremely valuable. I would like to thank all those who have taught or mentored me in the past, and my friends and colleagues at various institutions in India and the United States. Perhaps unknown to them, they have shaped who I am both intellectually and as a person. Special thanks go to Dr. iii Surjit Mansingh, whose support I have had on both continents, and to Dr. Phil Williams at the University of Pittsburgh. I am grateful for the funding support I have received from the School of International Service, American University. I am also grateful to two key institutions that have supported my work – the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), and the Belfer Center for International Studies. I thank Dr. Chantal de Oudraat and Dr. Elizabeth Cohl at USIP for their enthusiasm and support. For scholarly exchanges and insightful comments, I thank Dr. Martin Malin, Dr. Steven Miller, and Dr. Matthew Bunn of the Belfer Center. Colleagues who enriched my experience at Belfer as well as made various contributions to my thinking include Mahsa Rouhi and Sungyeol Choi. I thank my friends Yeonmin Choi, Yesim Sungu, Dylan Craig and other cohort-mates at American University, and my friends from Jawaharlal Nehru University. You have truly enriched the dissertation experience. Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to my family, who has encouraged me through this process. Despite the pressures of having a dissertating wife/mother/daughter/sister, they never let me extinguish my passion for understanding the puzzle of nuclear rollback. Thanks to all of you, my dissertation has been truly an enjoyable experience, as I kept asking, why? why? iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................. iii LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... 5 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS .......................................................................................................... 7 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 8 Puzzle of Nuclear Restraint .................................................................................... 8 Economic Sanctions ................................................................................................ 9 Central Argument.................................................................................................. 10 Contribution of the Dissertation............................................................................ 12 Dissertation Outline .............................................................................................. 13 CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................................... 14 Nuclear Proliferation ............................................................................................. 15 Resource Factors ....................................................................................... 17 (II) Motivational Factors ........................................................................... 23 Conclusion: Literature on Nuclear Nonproliferation ................................ 48 Economic Sanctions .............................................................................................. 50 Definition of Sanctions ............................................................................. 51 “Success” and “Failure” with Sanctions ................................................... 53 Sanctions Literature .................................................................................. 55 Conclusion: Literature on Economic Sanctions ........................................ 92 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 93 CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH DESIGN ............................................................................... 95 Research Question ................................................................................................ 95 Hypothesis................................................................................................. 99 Method: Structured, Focused Comparison of Cases ........................................... 100 Case Selection ..................................................................................................... 101 Case Analysis ...................................................................................................... 107 Process Tracing ....................................................................................... 107 Counterfactual Analysis .......................................................................... 108 Sources ................................................................................................................ 110 1 CHAPTER 4 IRAQ........................................................................................................ 111 The Nuclear Program .......................................................................................... 112 Weapons Program ................................................................................... 118 Restraint I (Slow) 1979-1981.............................................................................. 123 Restraint I: Motivational or Resource Driven? ....................................... 126 Sanctions and Restraint 1 ........................................................................ 129 Nuclear Pursuit 1982-1990 ................................................................................. 136 Sanctions and Pursuit 1982-1990............................................................ 138 Restraint in the 1990s.......................................................................................... 140 Continued Nuclear Pursuit August 1990-January 1991.......................... 143 Restraint 2 (Rollback) January-February 1991 ................................................... 145 Restraint 2: Motivational or Resource Driven? ...................................... 147 Sanctions and Restraint 2 ........................................................................ 147 Restraint 3 – (Slow and Stop) March-April 1991 ............................................... 151 Restraint 3: Motivational or Resource Driven? ...................................... 153 Sanctions and Restraint 3 ........................................................................ 156 Restraint 4 – (Rollback) May 1991-1998 ..........................................................