BLOCK VS. PARR DEBATING ABORTION: A SUMMARY Anthony Cesario* Abstract The topic of abortion is undoubtedly one of the most controversial issues currently being debated. Several decades ago, philosopher and economist Walter Block developed a solution to the issue based on libertarian principles, called “evictionism.” According to evictionism, which is a principled compromise between the traditional pro-life and pro-choice positions, it would not be illegal for a pregnant woman to evict a fetus at any time for any reason due to the fact that she is the one who owns her womb but it would be illegal for her to kill the fetus unnecessarily once it’s viable. Despite coming up with such a brilliant compromise, very few people have actually heard of Block’s solution to the abortion controversy, and of those who have heard of it, even fewer have actually been convinced by it. As a result, there have been several written debates between Block and his critics about what they perceive to be problems with the compromise he has developed. This paper summarizes one of the main debates that Block has had on the topic. Keywords: evictionism, abortion, pro-life, pro-choice, property rights JEL: K19 BLOCK VS. PARR DEBATING ABORTION One of the main debates that Walter Block had defending evictionism was with libertarian theorist Sean Parr starting back in 2011 and ending in 2013. In total, their debate lasted two rounds (4 papers total -- 2 from Parr and 2 from Block).1 * Loyola University, New Orleans, 310-486-6143, E-mail: [email protected] 1 To read the full debate, see Block, 2011b, 2013; Parr, 2011, 2013. The Review of Social and Economic Issues, v. 2, n. 1, 2019 82 ANTHONY CESARIO PAPER 1 (PARR 2011) The first paper, titled “Departurism And The Libertarian Axiom Of Gentleness,” was published by Parr in 2011 (Parr 2011). He began the paper by summarizing Block’s argument in favor of evictionism. Parr also mentioned that unlike Wisniewski, he recognized that the fetus is the one initiating the aggression but suggested that since it lacks mens rea and is in a nine-month process of leaving the womb, evicting it to its death instead of waiting for it to leave would be unjustified. Next, Parr introduced his alternative to evictionism, which he called “departurism.” Specifically, he stated: The departurist and evictionist views are in agreement that in the event of an unwanted pregnancy, a fetus becomes to its mother what a trespasser is to the owner of the property in question. However, where evictionism holds that it is justifiable for the mother to evict this fetus from her property (that is, to abort it), departurism – on the grounds of the axiom of gentleness – holds that it is not. The departurist position affirms that all unwanted fetuses are morally innocent of their gestation-entailed trespass and that, as such, these fetuses, in their removal from the premises of the property owner, are to be treated in “the least harmful manner possible” (Block, 2011[a], p. 3). Departurism further affirms that such a manner is applicable to any unwanted fetus because the innately certain and temporary duration of its trespass is an attestation that private property rights are being respected (that is, it is an indication that, in the unwanted fetus’ departure from the property owner’s premises [the process of gestation], the act of trespass is in the act of being stopped). There exists every reason, then, for departurism to affirm that the fetus’ continued and completed departure is the gentlest manner possible to affect its removal from the property owner’s premises or, at least, THE REVIEW OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES B LOCK V S . P ARR DEBATING ABORTION. A SUMMARY 83 that such a manner is more gentle than the property owner’s lethal eviction of him (Parr, 2011, p. 4). He then added: When there exists, like there does in an unwanted pregnancy, a situation in which a non-criminal trespasser is ceasing his property-directed aggression (that is, when he is in the act of stopping his trespass), departurism contends that libertarian law ought to require that the owner of the property in question allow for this trespasser to complete the process of his departure from the premises just in case death is the necessary result of his eviction. Because such a case is relevantly similar to the case of a trespass within the womb (and because allowing for such a trespasser to depart in this situation is the gentlest manner possible consistent with stopping the crime) the same course of action ought to be endorsed by libertarian legal theory in either case (Parr, 2011, p. 4). Next, Parr presented his position as a formal argument with two premises and a conclusion: P1). The course of action that libertarian legal theory ought to endorse in S1 is A. P2). S2 is relevantly similar to S1. C). Therefore, the course of action that libertarian legal theory ought to endorse in S2 is A (Parr, 2011, p. 5). In an attempt to make his argument more clear, Parr explained that “S1 represents the situation of a trespasser (a) without mens rea (b) in the process of departing the premises of the owner of the property in question and [the situation] where (c) eviction from said premises would necessitate the death of the trespasser, and S2 represents the situation of a fetus on the premises of the mother” (Parr, 2011, p. 5). Additionally, he noted that “A represent[s] VOLUME 2, NUMBER 1, 2019 84 ANTHONY CESARIO the continued and completed departure of the trespasser” (Parr, 2011, p. 5). After presenting departurism as a formal argument, Parr then expanded further on the first premise in an attempt to show that his argument is not just valid but also sound. First, he asserted that A, which is letting the trespasser continue and complete their departure from the property, is more consistent with libertarian law than evictionism because it is the gentlest manner possible with stopping the crime. To clarify, Parr stated, “allowing for the trespasser in S1 to complete the process of his departure is a course of action in which the aggression will have been stopped and the property owner will not have had to respond to the aggression against his property with lethal or, for that matter, any force whatsoever” (Parr, 2011, p. 5). He also mentioned that if A is “to be considered a positive obligation on the part of the property owner, then it is a strict and particular one that ought to be exempted from the prevailing libertarian restriction against such” (Parr, 2011, p. 6). Basically, Parr is suggesting that if A is, indeed, a positive obligation, then an exception should be made. Moreover, Parr argued that departurism does not require that the libertarian axiom of gentleness “be amended so as to require a time-frame outside of which the aggression cannot be stopped and be thought of as the gentlest manner possible consistent to that end)” (Parr, 2011, p. 6). After describing the first premise in a bit more detail, Parr then anticipated several objections that Block or others may raise against his theory of departurism. The first objection that he anticipated was from those who would dispute the role of gentleness in his theory. Specifically, he argued that when it comes to the “gentlest manner possible” principle, ”it is not the trespasser, but the trespass that must be stopped” (Parr, 2011, p. 6). From here, Parr claimed that in S1, the trespasser is in the act of stopping their trespass, which means THE REVIEW OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES B LOCK V S . P ARR DEBATING ABORTION. A SUMMARY 85 that it would be unjustified to lethally evict them from the premises rather than allowing them to finish the process of removing themselves. Parr also pointed out that it cannot be said that allowing the trespasser to remove themselves is not an act of stopping the trespass on the part of the property owner because human action includes both engaging in an action and refraining from an action. The second objection that he anticipated was from those who would argue that his theory involves positive obligations, which are incompatible with libertarianism. Before addressing the departurist response to such an objection, though, Parr first pointed out that in Block’s own writing about evictionism, he appeared to contradict himself by being in favor of an exemption to there not being any positive obligations when it comes to the claim that a woman would be required to notify an evictionist that she wishes to rid herself of the fetus while at the same time arguing that such a requirement “does not constitute a positive obligation.” (Block, 2011a, p. 2). Next, Parr mentioned that while notifying others of one’s wish to abandon a child “stems from what it means to abandon property,” Block has not shown “how the obligation to notify an evictionist, or the authorities, or whomever, stems from what it means to evict trespassers” (Parr, 2011, p. 8). Consequently, Parr reasoned that the evictionist obligation is, therefore, a positive one, regardless of how narrow and limited it is. Parr then explained that this means the “evictionist must abandon this obligation, or else an exception for it must be made” and that “if an exception is to be made for the evictionist requirement, however, one must also be made for the departurist one because it is no less strict and particular in its application” (Parr, 2011, p. 9). Additionally, he noted that “the only difference between the departurist and evictionist requirements is a theoretical one: the amount of time entailed in the fulfillment of each one” (Parr, 2011, p.