Karabakh Ilgar NIFTALIYEV PhD in History 1988: Final stage of the deportation of Azerbaijanis from Armenia Article 1 hinking about the prospect of change in the international image of the USSR, which did not allow it to Soviet Union in 1985, the architects of reform did use mass violence to crack down on unrest. Permission to Tnot suspect how much importance the national use troops and make mass arrests of national movement question will have in the history of perestroika. Gorbachev’s activists had to be more thoroughly justified. Naturally, policies in many respects provided an impetus for this facilitated the development of national movements. ethno-national processes, the direction of which was The December 1986 events in Alma-Ata were a pre-set by earlier contradictions. These contradictions harbinger of the coming storm. They can be considered had historical roots and stemmed from both ethnic and the first Gorbachev provocation in the field of “national other social and political factors. Contradictions resulted and ethnic conflicts”. Moscow then decried the Kazakhs in national movements that developed based on two and Kyrgyz for “their tendency toward national isolation classical models - the Baltic and Caucasus models. The and the mood of national conceit” and “nationalist first option was characterized by the growing tendency individual manifestations”. Later such accusations would of the Baltic republics toward autonomy from the Union be made against Azerbaijanis. Following the events in center until independence, which would change the Kazakhstan, the Institute of Ethnography of the USSR external borders of the country. The second option was established a Center for the Study of Interethnic Issues characterized by the versatility of conflicts (Union center and Interethnic Relations. In autumn 1987, it prepared - republic - autonomy) and an attempt to change internal for the CPSU a special note on the national question, in Soviet borders. If the first option was characterized by which it named 19 “hot spots” in the country. Among relatively non-violent actions, in the second case, non- them was also the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous violent actions gradually escalated into violent clashes Region (1). with significant casualties in the opposing forces.I n The decision to establish an Armenian autonomy the ethno-national conflicts of the perestroika period, in Nagorno-Karabakh in the Azerbaijan SSR in 1923 there were two main forces: 1. Emotional mass people’s was a compromise formula and put an end to the element led by radical fringe elements and the national bloody clashes of previous years between Armenia intelligentsia; 2. Republican nomenklatura that came and Azerbaijan. But, as subsequent events showed, in under pressure from mass demonstrations, but was strategic terms the formation of a territorial autonomy ready to use it to their advantage if need be. The situation for the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh within became unprecedented because conflicts, once started, the Azerbaijan SSR despite the existence of a separate continued to develop. The protracted nature of conflicts Armenian republic invariably preserved the threat of gradually radicalized the masses. Perestroika changed the separatism and the potential for conflict between the political climate in the country and set a higher bar for the two peoples. The existence of two identical ethnic 44 www.irs-az.com 3(18), AUTUMN 2014 Armenian national entities within one state, i.e. the Soviet Union, near each other, was similar to a delayed- action mine, which definitely had to explode. In Soviet historical retrospect, one can highlight several most acute phases of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh in the post-Stalin period. The first phase belongs to the period of the “Khrushchev thaw” and was associated with the decisions of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU Central Committee to address the serious consequences of Stalin’s personality cult, which put the idea of​​ territorial claims to neighboring republics and Turkey on the agenda in Armenia. The second phase of the exacerbation of the situation relates to the 1965 events in Armenia connected with the anniversary of the so-called “Armenian genocide”, which allegedly took place in the Ottoman Empire during World War I. From 1965 when the Soviet authorities sanctioned the official cultivation of anti-Turkish (including anti-Azerbaijani) sentiment in the Armenian SSR, for which the communist leadership organized events to commemorate “the victims of genocide”, the seeds of hatred toward Azerbaijanis fell on already fertilized soil. From that time, the moral Moscow denied housing, jobs and food to these and psychological expulsion of Azerbaijanis who lived Azerbaijani refugees from Armenia in their historical lands within Soviet Armenia became more intense. Until the 1980s, except for isolated cases began to flare up almost after MikhailG orbachev came of growing tension mainly initiated from Armenia and to power in the USSR leadership. Moreover, the Kremlin expressed in collecting signatures and addresses of was well-informed about the mood in Armenia and Armenian intellectuals to the Soviet leadership, as well Nagorno-Karabakh and knew what was happening and as at clashes at the domestic level, which took place what was being prepared there, especially since they did between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Nagorno- not hide their intentions and plans, carefully embedding Karabakh, the Soviet authorities managed, keeping their radical separatist demands in the democratic rhetoric hand on the pulse, not to allow information about these of perestroika. This is evidenced by the ideas expressed facts to go beyond the boundaries of the autonomy by Mikhail Gorbachev in his memoirs: “In three years and get on the pages of the Soviet press. During the last (meaning the period from 1985 to 1987 – I.N.) the Central phase of the conflict that began in the second half of the Committee received 500 letters about the situation in 1980s, the Armenian-Azerbaijani territorial conflict broke Nagorno-Karabakh. Perestroika set in motion large out on the pages of the Soviet and republican press for internal forces and opened chronic abscesses. National the first time, thereby getting out of the latent state and feelings and national extremism revived alongside.” (2) becoming a subject of extensive discussion. For the first Thus, Gorbachev was forced to admit that long before time since the 1920s, a demand was put forward not in the bloody stage of the conflict in 1988, Moscow was closed offices or during feasts but openly and officially aware of the complex processes that occurred around to change the administrative-territorial structure of Nagorno-Karabakh associated with the growth of the Soviet state, which was one of the main truths on nationalist extremism among local Armenians. Moscow which the “unbreakable alliance” was based. At the same received this information primarily via special services. time, for the first time the Armenian leadership, along F. D. Bobkov, who was first deputy chairman of the GK B with political support for the separatist movement in at that time, wrote about the looming conflict: “For two Nagorno-Karabakh, took concrete legal steps to merge years we had sounded the alarm about the looming Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan... a brigade was The new phase of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh sent to Armenia, which confirmed that ethnic conflicts www.irs-az.com 45 Karabakh were brewing in the Transcaucasia and it was necessary of the USSR Council of Ministers Heydar Aliyev was to take urgent measures. The issue was brought up for removed from the Politburo. According to the memoirs discussion at the Secretariat of the Central Committee of Assistant Secretary-General I. Boldin, when Aliyev was of the CPSU. However, all the conclusions and proposals forced to retire, Mikhail Gorbachev spoke fondly of him of the brigade were removed from the decisions and and his work at the plenum of the Central Committee, but the issue was smoothed over. Nobody wanted to openly when the transcript was publish, he threw these words admit the existence of conflicts on ethnic grounds and out (5). As determined by Thomas de Waal, the author that social upheavals were brewing in some republics ... of the book “The Black Garden”, Armenian nationalists the CPSU Central Committee thwarted any attempts to had the most direct relation to the resignation of Heydar reveal the truth.” (3) Aliyev. “They planned a campaign to discredit the Thus, the Kremlin believed that another Armenian Azerbaijani patriarch Heydar Aliyev, who, as it seemed, intrigue around the idea of ​​transferring Nagorno- could become a major opponent of the idea of Karabakh’s Karabakh to Armenia would be choked by traditional secession and block the whole process. Karabakh activists methods of preventive influence by local party and even managed to garner the tacit support of the head law enforcement bodies. The party leadership of the of the Communist Party of Armenia, Karen Demirchyan, Azerbaijan SSR was also aware of the events taking who, they say, was very pleased with the end of place around Nagorno-Karabakh, and long before the the political career of his opponent in the top party beginning of the last bloody phase of the conflict, leadership of the USSR. Remembering that, the former they systematically notified Moscow about that. The first secretary of the Communist Party of Armenia K. S. former chairman of the State Security Committee of the Demirchyan said in 1990: ‘We managed to do the most Azerbaijan SSR, Vagif Huseynov, writes about this in his important thing - remove Aliyev before the beginning book, citing the words of the former chairman of the of the (Karabakh) movement. It was very important’ (6). NKAR regional department of the KGB, Colonel G. Sept: Undoubtedly, the presence of an Azerbaijani figure in “Facts about intensifying nationalistic manifestations the top political leadership of the Soviet Union, whoever were regularly reported to the leadership and authorities.