SIPRI THE IMPACT OF Policy Paper ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ON STRATEGIC STABILITY AND NUCLEAR RISK Volume II East Asian Perspectives edited by lora saalman October 2019 STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public. The Governing Board is not responsible for the views expressed in the publications of the Institute. GOVERNING BOARD Ambassador Jan Eliasson, Chair (Sweden) Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar (Indonesia) Dr Vladimir Baranovsky (Russia) Espen Barth Eide (Norway) Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France) Dr Radha Kumar (India) Dr Patricia Lewis (Ireland/United Kingdom) Dr Jessica Tuchman Mathews (United States) DIRECTOR Dan Smith (United Kingdom) Signalistgatan 9 SE-169 72 Solna, Sweden Telephone: + 46 8 655 9700 Email: [email protected] Internet: www.sipri.org The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk Volume II East Asian Perspectives edited by lora saalman October 2019 Contents Preface vii Acknowledgements viii Abbreviations ix Executive Summary xi Introduction 1 1. Introduction 3 Box 1.1. Key definitions 4 Part I. The technologies and dynamics of artificial intelligence 11 and nuclear risk 2. Artificial intelligence and its impact on weaponization and 13 arms control I. Strategic weapons 13 II. Cyberspace 16 III. Lethal autonomous weapon systems 17 IV. Conclusions 17 3. The role of artificial intelligence in cyber-deterrence 20 I. The impact of machine learning 20 II. Conditions for cyber-deterrence 21 III. Problems for cyber-deterrence 22 IV. Conclusions 23 4. Integration of neural networks into hypersonic glide vehicles 24 I. Expanding collaboration and innovation 24 II. Reshaping deterrence with neural networks and hypersonic glide 27 III. Conclusions 28 5. Applications of machine learning in North Korea and South Korea 29 I. South Korea 29 II. North Korea 31 6. Military developments in artificial intelligence and their impact 33 on the Korean peninsula I. South Korea 33 II. North Korea 35 III. The impact on the Korean peninsula 37 IV. Conclusions 38 7. Artificial intelligence and military advances in Russia 39 I. Russian defence policies and economic foundations for AI 39 II. Military applications of AI 40 III. Conclusions 42 8. Exploring artificial intelligence and unmanned platforms in China 43 I. Assumptions underpinning research on AI and autonomy 43 II. Military applications of AI and autonomy 45 III. Conclusions 47 Part II. The future of arms control and strategic stability with 49 artificial intelligence 9. The impact of military artificial intelligence on warfare 51 I. Costs and thresholds 51 II. Laws, norms and ethics 52 III. Conclusions 53 10. The shaping of strategic stability by artificial intelligence 54 I. National AI strategies 54 II. From nuclear strategic stability to complex strategic stability 56 III. The feasibility of AI having an impact on strategic stability 58 IV. The ways in which AI could shape the future path of strategic stability 63 V. Conclusions 75 Table 10.1. The empowerment effect of AI on nuclear weapons 64 Table 10.2. The enhancement effect of AI on conventional military forces 66 Table 10.3. The comprehensive penetrative effect of AI on strategic stability 70 Table 10.4. The behavioural risk effect of AI that leads to conflict escalation 72 Table 10.5. The psychological anxiety effect of AI 74 11. Regulatory frameworks for military artificial intelligence 78 I. Military threats from AI 78 II. Military applications of AI 78 III. Possible regulatory approaches 81 IV. The role of strategic stability 82 V. Conclusions 84 12. The environmental impact of nuclear-powered autonomous weapons 86 I. Development of nuclear-powered autonomous weapons 86 II. Radioactive contamination from explosion of propulsion reactors 88 III. Conclusions 89 13. East Asian security dynamics as shaped by machine learning 91 and autonomy I. Applications of AI in nuclear forces 91 II. The impact on nuclear deterrence and arms control in East Asia 92 III. Conclusions 94 14. Arms control and developments in machine learning and autonomy 95 I. A brief history of arms control 95 II. Arms control of autonomous weapon systems 97 III. Conclusions 100 Figure 14.1. Spectrum of autonomous weapon systems in relation to 98 nuclear forces Conclusions 101 15. The impact of artificial intelligence on nuclear asymmetry and 103 signalling in East Asia I. Risks and dynamics of machine learning and autonomy 103 II. Confidence building and the military use of AI 106 III. Addressing gaps in AI assumptions and capabilities 107 About the authors 109 Preface The post-cold war global strategic landscape is currently in an extended process of being redrawn. A number of different trends are in play here. Most importantly, the underlying dynamics of world power are shifting with the economic, political and strategic rise of China, the reassertion under President Vladimir Putin of a great power role for Russia, and the disenchantment of the current United States’ administration with, perhaps paradoxically, the international institutions and arrange ments the USA had a big hand in creating. As a result, a binary Russian–US nuclear rivalry, a legacy of the old Russian–US confrontation, is being gradually augmented by regional nuclear rivalries and strategic triangles. As the arms control frame work that the Soviet Union and the USA created at the end of the cold war disintegrates, the commitment of the states with the largest nuclear arsenals to pursue stability through arms control—let alone disarmament—is in doubt to an unprecedented degree. On top of this comes the impact of new technological developments. The world is undergoing a ‘fourth industrial’ revolution, characterized by rapid and converging advances in multiple technologies including artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, quantum technology, nanotechnology, biotechnology and digital fabrication. How these technologies will be utilized remains a question that has not yet been fully answered. It is beyond dispute, however, that nuclear-armed states will seek to leverage these technologies for their national security. The potential impact of these developments on strategic stability and nuclear risk has not yet been systematically documented and analysed. The SIPRI project, ‘Mapping the impact of machine learning and autonomy on strategic stability’, is a first attempt to present a nuanced analysis of what impact the exploitation of AI could have on the global strategic landscape, and whether and how it might undermine international security. This edited volume on East Asian perspectives is the second major publication of this two-year research project. The authors are experts from China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the USA. This volume was preceded by one on Euro-Atlantic perspectives and will be followed by one on South Asian perspectives, as well as a final report. SIPRI commends this study to decision makers in the realms of arms control, defence and foreign affairs, to researchers and students in departments of politics, international relations and computer science, and to members of the general public who have a professional and personal interest in the subject. Dan Smith Director, SIPRI Stockholm, October 2019 Acknowledgements This edited volume is the second in a series generated by a two-year SIPRI research project that addresses two main questions related to the connection between artificial intelligence and nuclear weapons. First is the question of whether and to what extent machine learning and autonomy may become the focus of an arms race among nuclear-armed states. The second question is the impact that this may have on calculations of strategic stability and nuclear risk at the regional and transregional level. The editor would like to express sincere gratitude to the Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY) for its generous support of the project. The editor is also indebted to all the experts who participated in the East Asia workshop that SIPRI and the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) organized on the topic on 6–7 September 2018 and who agreed to contribute to this volume. The essays that follow are, by and large, more developed versions of the presen- tations delivered at the East Asia workshop, taking into account the points made in subsequent discussions. The mix of perspectives achieved at this work shop is reflected in the different styles and substance of the chapters. The views expressed by the various authors are their own and should not be taken to reflect the views of SIPRI, CICIR, CCNY or any organization to which the authors are affiliated. The editor also wishes to thank her SIPRI colleagues Sibylle Bauer, Vincent Boulanin, Petr Topychkanov and Su Fei for their constructive feedback and con- trib utions. Finally, the editor would like to acknowledge the invaluable editorial work of SIPRI’s Editorial Department. Lora Saalman Abbreviations AI Artificial intelligence ATR Automatic target recognition C4ISR Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance CBM Confidence-building measure CCW (Convention on) Certain Conventional Weapons CFE (Treaty on) Conventional Armed Forces in Europe CPGS Conventional Prompt Global Strike DBN Deep belief network DOD Department of Defense (of the