University of Aberdeen School of Law Centre for Commercial Law Working Paper Series Number 000/20 Page 2 of 109 Seeking Policy Resilience SEEKING POLICY RESILIENCE: POTENTIAL METHODS TO AVOID THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTI-COMMONS WITH APPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW PROF DR ROY ANDREW PARTAIN パルテイン ロイ アンドリュー Chair/Professor of International Law & Sustainability School of Law University of Aberdeen (Scotland, UK) Professor of Law (Visiting) Graduate School of Law and Faculty of Law Kobe University (Japan) 2019 June 18 © Roy Andrew Partain The Anticommons and International Law Page 3 of 109 Table of Contents THE SPEECH 1 A TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................................ 3 2 INTRODUCTION TO ANTICOMMONS ................................................................................................... 6 2.1 WHY I INVESTIGATE ANTICOMMONS ......................................................................................................... 6 2.2 OF ANTICOMMONS AND LAW .................................................................................................................. 7 2.3 THE BASIC ANTICOMMONS MECHANISM .................................................................................................... 8 3 TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS – BORN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW .......................................................... 8 4 ANTICOMMONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW? ......................................................................................... 9 5 WHAT IS KNOWN OF THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS ............................................................ 11 5.1 ARE THERE SOLUTIONS? ........................................................................................................................ 11 5.2 STATE OF CURRENT ANTICOMMONS RESEARCH ......................................................................................... 12 6 PREVENTING THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS ........................................................................ 15 6.1 EXPROPRIATION OF EXCLUSIONARY RIGHTS ............................................................................................... 16 6.2 FACILITATION OF COORDINATION ............................................................................................................ 16 6.3 RESISTING THE ACTS THAT CREATE ANTICOMMONS .................................................................................... 17 6.4 AN UBER-AUTHORITY ........................................................................................................................... 18 6.5 TEAMWORK – THE LESSON FROM FOOTBALL COACHES ................................................................................ 18 7 COMEDY OF ANTICOMMONS ............................................................................................................ 20 8 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS .................................................. 22 THE RESEARCH PAPER 1 `DEFINING AND FINDING THE ANTICOMMONS TRAGEDY .................................................................. 27 1.1 HARDIN: BACKGROUND OF TRAGEDY AND OF COMMONS ............................................................................ 28 1.2 COURNOT’S MODELS AND DUALITY ......................................................................................................... 32 1.3 MICHELMAN ....................................................................................................................................... 34 1.4 HELLER’S CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS ....................................................... 35 1.4.1 Caution on Overinclusion of Commons and Anticommons .................................................... 38 © Roy Andrew Partain Page 4 of 109 Seeking Policy Resilience 1.5 VARIETIES OF DEFINITION, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ...................................................................................... 39 1.5.1 Focus on Mismatched Topology of Rights ............................................................................. 40 1.5.2 Anticommons and Unlimitedness of Exclusionary Rights ...................................................... 42 1.6 SIMULTANEOUS AND SEQUENTIAL ANTICOMMONS ..................................................................................... 42 1.7 PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND THE ANTICOMMONS ......................................................................................... 45 1.8 THE IMPORTANCE OF EXCLUSIONARY RIGHTS IN PROPERTY LAW ................................................................... 46 2 IDENTIFIABLE CHARACTERISTICS OF ANTICOMMONS TRAGEDY ........................................................ 49 2.1 DUALITY OF THE COMMONS AND ANTICOMMONS TRAGEDIES ...................................................................... 49 2.1.1 Buchanan and Yoon’s Models ................................................................................................ 49 2.2 COMPLEMENTARY NATURE OF THE ANTICOMMONS .................................................................................... 52 2.3 MORE ACTORS WORSENS THE INCIDENCE OF TRAGEDY ............................................................................... 53 2.4 PRICE COMPETITION AND BINARY POLICY CHOICES ..................................................................................... 56 2.5 PIGOUVIAN EXTERNALITIES: CORE OF TRAGIC MECHANISM .......................................................................... 57 2.6 COASE, TRANSACTION COSTS, AND THE ANTICOMMONS .............................................................................. 58 2.7 ANTICOMMONS: DIFFERENCES IN QUANTITY AND PRICE COMPETITIONS ......................................................... 62 2.8 REGULATORY ANTICOMMONS ................................................................................................................ 64 2.8.1 Formally Defined.................................................................................................................... 64 2.8.2 Commonplace Nature of Regulatory Anticommons .............................................................. 66 2.9 ANTICOMMONS TRAGEDY OVER THE LONG-RUN ........................................................................................ 67 2.10 ANTICOMMONS TRAGEDY IS SYSTEMATIC AND RATIONAL ............................................................................ 68 2.11 CAVEAT – NOT ALL NON-DEALS ARE TRAGEDIES ........................................................................................ 70 3 EMPIRICAL STUDIES: MORE CATASTROPHE THAN TRAGEDY? ............................................................ 71 3.1 TRAGEDY INCREASES WITH INCREASES IN POPULATION OF ACTORS ................................................................ 72 3.2 HUMANS RESPOND POORLY TO TRAGEDY OF ANTICOMMONS SCENARIOS ....................................................... 72 3.3 HUMANS RESPOND WORSE TO ANTICOMMONS SCENARIOS THAN COMMONS SCENARIOS ................................. 74 3.3.1 No Sense of Loss or Tragedy? ................................................................................................ 78 4 OVERCOMING THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS ...................................................................... 79 4.1 SOLUTIONS TO THE COMMONS TRAGEDY .................................................................................................. 80 4.2 LITERATURE ON ‘GOVERNANCE’ OF ANTICOMMONS ................................................................................... 82 4.2.1 Team Sports Against the Anticommons................................................................................. 83 4.2.2 Gabriel’s ‘Game of Chicken’ Model ........................................................................................ 84 4.2.3 Full Exclusion: Re-Unify the Bundle of Exclusionary Rights .................................................... 86 4.2.4 Group Exclusion: Public Control over Exclusionary Rights ..................................................... 87 © Roy Andrew Partain The Anticommons and International Law Page 5 of 109 4.2.5 Complementary Goods and Services: Integration of Decision Makers .................................. 88 4.2.6 Reduce Institutional Grants of Exclusionary Rights ............................................................... 89 4.2.7 Pervasive Awareness of the Tragedy of the Anticommons .................................................... 91 4.2.8 Evading Regulatory Anticommons......................................................................................... 92 4.2.9 Corporations and Capitalism ................................................................................................. 94 4.2.10 Avoidance of Ruin from Depletion - From Commons towards Anticommons ........................ 94 4.2.11 Strategic Choice -- Comedy of the Anticommons .................................................................. 95 5 APPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW ......................................................................................... 97 5.1 PREVIOUS LITERATURE ON ANTICOMMONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW .............................................................. 97 5.1.1 Bellantuono and EU Coordination ......................................................................................... 98 5.1.2 Major on EU Debt Relief for Greece ....................................................................................... 99 5.1.3 Antarctica, Space, and UNCLOS