Although the Russian delegation agreed to the participation of the Ukrainian delegation, its head, Leon Trotsky, tried to dis- credit it; he even invited a delegation from the Ukrainian So- viet Government, and tried to prove that the Rada no longer existed. The Germans favored Ukrainian participation inthe The Anarchism of Nestor conference because they wanted to secure their supplies and Makhno, 1918–1921 put pressure on the Bolsheviks. By the peace treaty between the four Central Powers and An Aspect of the Ukrainian Revolution Ukraine, concluded on February 9, 1918, Ukraine, including Kholm, was recognized as an independent republic. Austria promised to unite Bukovina with East Galicia and set up a new Michael Palij Ukrainian Crown Land with political and cultural rights within the monarchy. In return, Ukraine agreed to provide the Central Powers with at least one million tons of surplus foodstuffs.16 Subsequently, the Rada sought Austrian and German aid in expelling the Russian forces, believing that an adequate force could be composed of the existing Ukrainian units in the Aus- trian Army and the Ukrainian prisoners held by the Germans. They asked that these troops, estimated at thirty thousand men, be employed in Ukraine. The Central Powers refused, arguing that the time required to bring the troops from other areas was too great, though they undoubtedly were also anxious to assure their own control of Ukraine. Through the ensuing deployment of the Austrian and German armies, Ukraine became in effect an occupied nation. The Austro-German forces, including some Ukrainian troops, followed the railways, meeting little Bolshevik resis- tance; by the end of April Ukrainian territory was cleared of Soviet Russian troops. On March 29, 1918, at Baden, an agreement was made on the partitioning of spheres of interest. Germany received northern Ukraine, the Crimea, 16 Lipatov, 1920 god na Chernom more, pp. 173—78, 212; Chamber- lin, Russian Revolution, 2:325—27; Lukomskii, Memoirs, p. 251; Rakovskii, 1976 Konets bielykh, pp. 78–79, 129. 44 bombardment and street fighting, Kyiv was captured and the Rada was forced to evacuate to Zhytomyr.13 In this critical situation the only recourse was to make a separate peace with the Central Powers to obtain their support in defending the country. Consequently, on January 22, 1918, in its Fourth Universal, the Rada announced: “On this day the Ukrainian People’s Republic becomes independent, self- sufficient, a free sovereign state of the Ukrainian People.”14 This document only confirmed that the political bond between Ukraine and Russia was severed by the Bolshevik invasion. Aid from the Central Powers, however, was conditional upon cessation of the war against them. France and Britain had granted Ukraine de facto recognition at the end of Decem- ber 1917 and had tried to persuade the Rada to continue the war against the Central Powers. The Allies, however, were not in a position to give military assistance, for the only access was via Bolshevik-controlled Murmansk and Archangel or Vladivostok. The Rada feared that the peace negotiations between theBol- sheviks and the Central Powers, begun at the end of December at Brest-Litovsk, might result in Germany’s ceding Ukraine to the Bolsheviks. Moreover, the desire for peace was so strong among the Ukrainian population that the Rada would have been “unable to withstand this current, especially if the Bolshe- viks managed to conclude peace with the Austro-Germans.”15 Under these circumstances, the Rada sent a separate delega- tion to Brest-Litovsk to make peace with the Central Powers. 13 Denikin, Ocherki, 5:135; see also Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvi-zheniia, pp. 168—69; Rudnev, Makhnovshchina, p. 83; Rakovskii, Konets bielykh, pp. 33–34. 14 Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, p. 169; Kubanin, Makhnovshchina, p. 151; Semanov, “Makhnovshchina i ee krakh,” p. 55; Nikulin, “Gibel’ makhnovshchiny,” p. 187; Rudnev, Makhnovshchina, p. 83; Rakovskii, Konets bielykh, p. 81; Trotskii, Materialy i dokumenty po istorii Krasnoi Armii, 2, pt. 2:187. 15 Rakovskii, Konets beilykh, pp. 81–82, 134. 43 Soldiers, and Peasants on December 17 in opposition to the Rada. However, the Bolsheviks controlled only 60 of the 2,500 delegates, and the Congress expressed confidence in the Rada, protesting the ultimatum. On December 18 the Secretariat re- jected the ultimatum arguing that it was impossible “simulta- Contents neously to recognize the right of a people to self-determination, including separation, and at the same time to infringe roughly on that right by imposing on the people in question a certain Prelude to Revolution 5 type oi government. The Destruction of National Autonomy . 5 The Bolshevik delegates, enraged by the unexpected turnof The Political Awakening . 12 events, walked out of the Congress. Later they and their sym- The Cultural Awakening . 15 pathizers in the Kyiv Soviet, numbering altogether nearly 125, went to Kharkiv, where they joined the Bolshevik-controlled 1. The Ukrainian Revolution 32 Congress of Soviets of the Donets and Kryvyi Rih basins. The Central Rada .................... 32 This rump group appointed a Central Executive Committee The Hetman State ................... 48 that announced it was henceforth to be considered the sole 2. The Partisan Movement 61 legal government of all Ukraine. In the name of this puppet regime Lenin’s Soviet Russian government waged war against 3. The Socioeconomic Background of Peasant Un- Ukraine. rest in Makhno’s Region 68 In early December the Bolsheviks had concentrated troops, mainly workers and sailors from Petrograd and Moscow, 4. The Peasants and the Ukrainian Government 76 near the Ukrainian border under the command of Vladimir A. Antonov. They were later joined by various local elements. 5. The Anarchism of the Peasants and Makhno 83 The Bolshevik invasion of Ukraine, which began on January 7, 1918, in four separate attacks, was greatly facilitated by 6. Nestor Makhno 97 insurrections of mostly non-Ukrainian groups in the cities and 7. Makhno’s National Consciousness 108 at railroad stations along their route. The Rada’s forces were outnumbered, inadequately equipped, and disorganized by the 8. Makhno, the Bolsheviks, and the Central Rada 117 impact of the Revolution. The Bolsheviks occupied one city after another: Katerynoslav (Ekaterinoslav) on January 10; 9. Makhno’s Visits with Kropotkin and Lenin 129 Poltava, January 20; Odessa, January 30; Mykolaiv (Nikolaev), February 4; and on February 8, after eleven days of heavy 10. The Origin of Makhno’s Partisan Movement 138 11. Organization and Tactics of Makhno’s Partisan Army 148 42 3 12. The Overthrow of the Hetman and the Estab- proletariat. Russia cannot exist without the Ukrainian sugar lishment of the Directory 166 industry, and the same can be said in regard to coal (Donbas); cereals (the black-earth belt), etc.”11 13. Makhno and the Directory 204 At first the Bolsheviks tried to prevent stabilization of the Ukrainian government by spreading incendiary appeals, 14. Makhno and the Bolsheviks 211 fomenting class hatred, and sending Bolshevik bands into Ukraine. These actions were to be followed by armed upris- 15. Nykyfor Hryhor’iv 229 ings of Russian soldiers and workers. On December 12, the 16. The Bolsheviks Break with Makhno 252 government discovered a revolt planned for Kyiv on the next day. Its leaders were arrested, and the Russian units involved 17. The Volunteer Army and Makhno 257 were disarmed and deported to Russia.12 Subsequently the First Ukrainian Corps, under General Skoropads’kyi (later 18. Makhno’s Army Outlawed by the Bolsheviks 310 hetman) and some Free Cossacks„ disarmed the Russian Second Guard Corps led by the Bolshevik Evgeniia B. Bosh, 19. Makhno between Wrangel and the Bolsheviks 320 which was moving from the front to aid the uprising in Kyiv. They too were returned to Russia. 20. The Last Phase of the Makhno Struggle 345 The tension between Ukraine and Soviet Russia mounted when the Secretariat ordered troops in Ukraine not to obey the order of the Bolshevik government and denied the right of the latter to negotiate peace for Ukraine. On December 17,the Bolsheviks sent the Rada an ultimatum that “recognized the complete independence of the Ukrainian Republic” but at the same time accused the Rada of disorganizing the front by recall- ing Ukrainian troops, disarming Bolshevik troops in Ukraine, and supporting General Aleksei M. Kalendin’s counterrevolu- tionary rebellion in the Don Basin. These practices were to be abandoned within forty-eight hours or the Bolshevik gov- ernment would consider the Rada “in a state of open warfare against the Soviet Government in Russia and in Ukraine.“2 Simultaneously the Council of People’s Commissars induced the Kyiv Soviet to call an All-Ukrainian Congress of Workers, 11 Trotskii, Materialy i dokumenty po istorii Krasnoi Armii, 2, pt. 2:210; Grazhdanskaia voina, 3:511; Rudnev, Makhnovshchina, pp. 80—81; Efimov, “Deistviia protiv Makhno,” p. 208. 12 Teper, Makhno, p. 93. 4 41 Although the collapse of Kerensky’s government favored the course of Ukrainian independence, the establishment of a strong and stable government proved very difficult in an atmosphere of social and economic chaos, the administrative inexperience of the leaders, and the Bolshevik threat. The Prelude to Revolution Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia radically changed the course of the Ukrainian national revolution. Prior to and dur- ing 1917, the Bolsheviks had opposed any Russian suppression The