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Deposit guide Contact: email Shame: In Defence of an Essential Moral Emotion By Daniel James Turnbull A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Philosophy) Birkbeck College, University of London I hereby declare that all the work presented in this thesis is my own, except where otherwise indicated. Daniel James Turnbull 1 Shame: In Defence of an Essential Moral Emotion ABSTRACT I argue that shame is an essential moral emotion, and that the capacity to feel shame is vital to allow us to pick out certain types of moral value. I do this by sketching out a general role for moral emotions, distinguishing shame from other moral emotions, notably guilt, and then arguing that shame has a distinctive role to play as a moral emotion that cannot be played by guilt. By marking out a key role for the emotions in moral life, I am able to address two key concerns about moral judgement. First, I am able to explain how we overcome frame problems, allowing us to notice and appropriately conceptualise moral concerns, against a backdrop of everyday life. Second, I can give an account of the apparent intrinsically- motivating nature of moral judgements. Shame, in central cases, is based on self-assessments of inadequacy; we judge ourselves to be less than we should be. This is contrasted with guilt, which centres on judgements of transgression against moral norms. It is also contrasted with embarrassment and humiliation, neither of which are primarily moral emotions. Shame has a distinctive role to play as a moral emotion. It is capable of picking out cases of moral value that guilt cannot; in particular, supererogatory value and cases of wrongdoing by collectives, in the absence of individual culpability. Pace the claims of numerous psychologists and philosophers, shame is not necessarily a dangerous emotion; rather, only certain types of shame have the potential to do damage to those experiencing them. Situationist arguments threaten the role of shame as a moral emotion, by suggesting that there are no robust character traits; these claims are mistaken. Therefore, I am able to sustain the conclusion that shame has a vital role to play in moral life. 2 Shame: In Defence of an Essential Moral Emotion TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................................... 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................................................... 3 PREFACE ............................................................................................................................. 5 INTRODUCTION: PLACING SHAME IN MORAL LIFE .................................................. 6 CHAPTER ONE: THE EMOTIONS AND MORAL JUDGEMENT..................................... 9 A Role for the Emotions in Moral Judgement .................................................................... 9 Neosentimentalist Ethical Theories .................................................................................. 17 Nichols’ Sentimental Rules Objection.............................................................................. 23 The Conflation Problem................................................................................................... 30 CHAPTER TWO: THE STRUCTURE OF EMOTIONS ..................................................... 33 Cognitivist Theories of Emotion ...................................................................................... 33 Problems for the Cognitivist View ................................................................................... 38 An Alternative to Emotional Cognitivism ........................................................................ 43 Emotions and Moral Judgement ....................................................................................... 52 CHAPTER THREE: SHAME ............................................................................................. 58 Heteronomy versus Autonomy......................................................................................... 61 Localised versus Globalised............................................................................................. 70 The Content of Shame Judgements .................................................................................. 74 Shame: Not All Bad, Then ............................................................................................... 83 CHAPTER FOUR: EMOTIONS RELATED TO SHAME .................................................. 86 Embarrassment and Humiliation ...................................................................................... 86 3 Shame: In Defence of an Essential Moral Emotion Guilt ................................................................................................................................ 98 Distinguishing Shame and Guilt: Social vs. Individual .................................................... 100 Distinguishing Shame and Guilt: Eliciting Situations ...................................................... 103 Distinguishing Shame and Guilt: Role of the Self............................................................. 107 Two Sides of a Coin? .......................................................................................................... 109 Guilt and the Voluntary ...................................................................................................... 111 CHAPTER FIVE: SHAME AS A MORAL EMOTION .................................................... 120 Shame as an Inferior Moral Emotion to Guilt (1): Shame is Superfluous ....................... 120 Shame as an Inferior Moral Emotion to Guilt (2): Shame has Negative Effects .............. 122 In Defence of Shame (1): Shame is a Necessary Supplement to Guilt ............................ 130 Shame and the Supererogatory .......................................................................................... 132 Shame and Collective Guilt ................................................................................................ 136 In Defence of Shame (2): Not all Types of Shame Carry the Same Risk of Negative Effects ..................................................................................................................................... 145 Limitations of Empirical Work ........................................................................................... 145 Alternative Outcomes of Shame Episodes ......................................................................... 147 CHAPTER SIX: THE SITUATIONIST CHALLENGE TO SHAME AS A MORAL EMOTION ........................................................................................................................ 153 Social psychology and the Fundamental Attribution Error ............................................. 153 From Empirical Results to Situationism ......................................................................... 157 Responding to the Situationist Critique of Shame as a Moral Emotion ........................... 161 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 172 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................. 173 4 Shame: In Defence of an Essential Moral Emotion PREFACE A work of this nature inevitably has many intellectual influences, many of which no doubt evident from the text. Iris Murdoch, Michael Stocker, David Wiggins, John McDowell, Martha Nussbaum, Richard Wollheim and, in particular, Ronald de Sousa are among the philosophers whose published work has had the most profound impact on the shape of this thesis. However, while interaction with these thinkers has influenced the content of my work, it is membership of a living, breathing philosophical community that has provided its animating spirit. The central manifestation of this effect has been through my primary supervisor, Miranda Fricker. Over the past five years she has read numerous drafts, and offered insightful comments and suggestions. Her patience, enthusiasm and judiciousness have improved this thesis in every way; quite simply, it would not exist in anything like its current form but for her guidance, and I am extremely grateful for it. Thanks are also due to my temporary supervisors, Jen Hornsby and Sam Guttenplan, as well as my secondary supervisors, Sue James and Michael Garnett, all of whom made welcome and helpful comments, to the benefit of the final result. The wider postgraduate philosophy community at Birkbeck have also been incredibly supportive, not least through their probing questions at our graduate seminars and more informal discussions. Going further back, I must also thank Peter Goldie, who sadly passed away recently, and Rai Gaita for their