The Nobility under Akbar and the Development of His Religious Policy, 1560-80 Author(s): Iqtidar Alam Khan Source: Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, No. 1/2 (Apr., 1968), pp. 29-36 Published by: Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25203020 Accessed: 16-08-2014 08:23 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 14.139.43.12 on Sat, 16 Aug 2014 08:23:08 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE NOBILITY UNDER AKBAR AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS RELIGIOUS POLICY, 1560 80 By Iqtidar Alam Khan The significant changes that were introduced in the organization of Mughal government and the accompanying shifts in Akbar's administrative and religious policies during the period 1560-80 have remained for long a favourite subject of study for a number of modern historians. The existing interpretation of these changes seems largely to run parallel to Abul FazFs line of argument which seeks to explain the growth of institutions and policies in terms of the unfolding of Akbar's personality. Abul Fazl often tries to ignore, or brush as measures or aside the outcome of **cvil advice**, all those decisions which appeared to him inconsistent with Akbar's policy during the last 25 years of his reign.1 The impression is a created by Abul Fazl reinforced by similar tendency in Badauni, who, from an opposite on point of view, quite frequently mixes up his comments some of Akbar's enlightened measures of the later with the events of the earlier period phase when there was hardly any ground for him to find fault with Akbar from a doctrinal angle. Under the influence of these interpretations modern historians also tend to disregard facts that are inconsistent with Abul Fazl's theory of Akbar's gradual "unveiling" of himself as "the superman*', through the introduction, one after another, of his policies based on the principles of Sulh-i Kul and universal kingship. This has often resulted in reducing discussion of Akbar's religious policy and his relations with the Rajputs largely to speculation based on selected facts that have been highlighted by Abul Fazl and Badauni. It may further be pointed out that the whole problem of the nobility under Akbar is generally sought to be understood in terms of their relations with the king, which is no doubt an important aspect to be considered, but not the sole one; and the exclusive attention given to this has served to hide from view many other equally important factors such as the pattern of racial and religious alignments within the nobility, tribal or clan ties among groups of nobles, their relations with other sections of the people, etc., which interacting among each other determined to a large extent changes in the role and standing of the nobility. In this an is made to a paper attempt suggest reappraisal of Akbar's early policies by raising certain points which tell against the accepted interpretation. The views put forward here are no means purely tentative and by based on an exhaustive analysis of the available evidence. The of this article will be served if it succeeds in purpose stimulating fresh thinking about some the so of well-known generalizations often repeated in the textbooks. A significant aspect of the transformation that came about in the nature and functioning of the institutions of the Mughal Empire in the 16th century was the evolution of a homo out geneous nobility of the multiracial and religiously heterogeneous elements brought together by Akbar. An analysis of the list of nobles who accompanied Humayun to in Hindustan 1555 shows that the nobility inherited by Akbar consisted chiefly of two 1 A an glaring example of such attitude is Abul Fazl's attempt to create an impression as if the mahzar Akbar as an (1579) recognized arbitrator not only between the orthodox schools of Muslim juris but also prudence between different religions and sects. It is significant that he fails to give the text of the document, which according to Badauni was drafted by Shaikh Mubarik, and is reproduced both in the Tabaqat-i Akburi and Muntaklmb-ut-Tawarikh. Cf. Akbar Nama, Bibliotheca Indica, III, 269-70. This content downloaded from 14.139.43.12 on Sat, 16 Aug 2014 08:23:08 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 30 THE NOBILITY UNDER AKBAR AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS RELIGIOUS POLICY racial groups,2 the Persians and the Turanis; and of the two the Turanis enjoyed a pre dominant position. The nobility left behind by Humayun had thus essentially a Turani complexion. The Persian nobles with the exception of Bairam Khan, Mirza Nijat, and Mirza Hasan were simply exalted scribes who could exercise but little influence on state policies.3 But for the promotions received by a few (hardly three or four) persons of Persian origin,4 the composition of the nobility remained unaltered during the regime of Bairam Khan. But after Bairam Khan's fall the situation gradually changed. As is apparent from the accompanying tables, two new elements of local origin entered the imperial service between 1560 and 1575. These new elements were the Rajput chiefs and the Indian Muslims (mostly Shaikhzadas, the majority of whom belonged to the families living on madad'i mash grants or enjoying zamindari rights). At the same time, there was a marked increase in the relative strength of the Persians especially in the higher grades.5 The net result of this process was the gradual fading away of the Turani complexion of the nobility as well as the erosion of the Chagatai traditions and customs of state organization,6 thus indirectly facilitating Akbar's quest for an alternative theory of kingship in the subsequent years. The Persian nobles seem to have improved their position in the period 1562-677 mainly by earning promotion in the course of military operations during the revolts of sections of the nobility. It may be noted that except for the temporary desertion by Asaf Khan in 1565-66, none of the revolts which took place in this period were staged by the Persians, or for that matter by any other non-Turani section of the nobles.8 Even the ' See Appendix 1. For this analysis the list of nobles accompanying Humayun in 1555 as given by Abul Fazl is taken as (he sample with (he modification (hat the following six persons (hen known lo be minor attendants or officials at Humayun's court have been excluded: Baqi Meg, yatish begi, Khwaja Abdus Samad, Mir Saiyed Ali, Khwaja Ataullah, diwati-i khak, Mir Shihab Nishapuri, Khwaja Aminuddin Mahmud. Cf. Akbar Nama, Bibliotheca 342. 3 Indica, I, cf. Appendix I. Turanis were 52-9 per ceni of the total. But if it is kept in mind that a number of Turani nobles including Mun'im Beg were left behind in Afghanistan there is every reason to believe that the actual was much 4 percentage higher. I have noticed only four such persons: Haji Muhammad Khan Sistani, Wali Beg, Shihabuddin Ahmad Khan, and Jahan. 4 Khwaja cf. Appendix 1. The figure for the absolute number of nobles for the period 1565-75 is arrived at by putting together the names contained in Abul Fazl's lists for various campaigns and expeditions of these years. Although this figure cannot be treated as conclusive, still, for a tentative study of (his kind, it can be accepted as a reasonably good sample. Commenting on Mirza Sulaiman's arrival at the court in 1575, Badauni observes: "At this time (the Emperor) revived the old tora-i chaghutui. For some time, in order to exhibit it to Mirza Sulaiman, they spread royal tables in diwankhana and the tawachis entertained the soldiers. But when the Mirza departed, all these (revived customs) departed too.1' (Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh, II, 216.) The English translation 220) of this passage is inaccurate and misleading. 7 (II, cf. Appendix I.Although their strength in absolute numbers fell from 31 37 percent in 1555 to 2727 per cent in 1565 this docs not a decline in their This fall in was more 75, necessarily prove position. percentage (he result of (he sharp rise in (he to(al number of the nobles with (he expansion of (he empire. There was a corresponding fall in (he absolute strength of the Turanis as well. What is more important is the fact that in the higher grades the Iranis had come to equal (he Turanis and (heir percentage was also considerably higher (38-54 per cent). This clearly suggests rapid promotion of the Persian nobles during the period. There were six major rebellions between 1562 and 1567: (a) Revolt by Mirza Sharfuddin, 1562-63. (b) Shah Abul Mnali's revolt, 1564. (r) Abdullah Khan's revolt, 1564. (d) Ali Quli Khan's revolt, 1565-67.