• ARMAMENT & TECHNOLOGY Protecting Naval Vessels Threats, Concepts and Systems Bob Nugent In October 2016, an attack on the UAE high-speed logistics vessel SWIFT by anti-ship missiles (assessed as C-801 or C-802 types) inflicted severe damage on the vessel. A similar attack on a Saudi Arabian AL MADINAH Class frigate in january 2017 killed several crew and damaged the ship. hese attacks are a reminder of the missiles such as those that hit the SWIFT. small groups, they are less able to draw on Tcontinuing requirement for navies to Adding to the challenge of protecting na­ the proven principles of protecting naval develop concepts and deploy systems that val vessels are constrained budgets, small­ vessels: stand-off distance, safety in num­ protect their vessels from attacks in an er force structures and, as a result, fewer bers and layered defence. increasingly lethal naval security environ­ ships available to operate for most navies This article will review contemporary naval ment. around the world. This strategic setting vessel protection concepts and systems. It That environment challenges the defence induces trade-offs between offensive and begins with a look at the threat environ­ of ships and forces with a spectrum of defensive systems, as well as hard decisions ment. then presents a conceptual frame­ threats ranging from new generation about what kinds of threats are the most work for naval vessel protection that helps anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles to pressing, and therefore w hich defensive assess the strategic choices available for · The hybrid catamaran HSV-2 SWIFT was originally built for the United States Navy Military Sealift Command, primarily for mine countermeasures and as a sea basing test platform. Then it was leased by the United Arab Emirates' National Marine Dredging Company in 2015, where it was attacked by Houthi fighters in October 2016. high speed jet aircraft. Ships must also systems will have the highest priority in al­ naval design, operation, and acquisition. protect themselves from the "simpler" locating resources. Indeed, the US Navy's It closes with a comparative review of how but more numerous threats posed by "Distributed Lethality" operating concept US, European and especially other navies high speed small craft armed with crew­ now guiding the surface forces is a re­ are choosing to protect their newest frig­ served weapons and grenade launchers, sponse to the critique that modern war­ ates and destroyers -those recently built or low speed and low vi sibility manned and ships have become so focused on defend­ currently under construction. That review unmanned aircraft. shore-based artillery ing themselves against the whole spectrum will use proprietary data drawn from AMI as well as the older generation anti-ship of threats that they are underinvested in International's naval market and technical offensive capabilities that historically de­ databases. fined most fleet and ship designs for the While the article considers concepts and last century. systems that apply to protecting all types of Bob Nugent is a Virginia-based Affili­ And as these fewer surface shi ps operate naval vessels-from aircraft ca rriers to sub­ ate Consultant for AMI International in in coastal or constrained waters such as marines to patrol craft - it focuses mostly Bremerton, WA, USA. the Arabian Gulf, North Arabian and South on the general purpose surface combatant. China Seas, often as single ships or in very Destroyers and frigates represent the main 44 I European Security & Defence · March 2017 LYNX helicopter of the Royal Navy fired its flares as pa rt of a n exercise in the Indian Ocean. body of most navies today and a significant the laser-guided BRIMSTONE missile at a a common missile design for long range part of planned shipbuilding investments range of about 8 nautical miles. (up to 600 NM for some variants) land at­ globally over the next 20 yea rs. They are Longer-range precision anti-sh ip missiles tack and anti-ship variants. KLUB is widely also the types of ships most often operat­ such as EXOCET and HARPOON (maxi­ exported (India, Algeria, Vietnam, China, ing "in harm's way" and are the ships most mum ranges 75-100 NM) are being su­ possibly Iran) and can be launched on likely to be found operating alone in high perseded by the newer generation of short notice from a wide variety of plat­ threat environments, and so provide insight weapons such as India n-Russia n joint ven­ forms. Recent marketing literature on the into how navies are prioritising their invest­ ture BRAHM OS missile - claimed to be system promotes its ability to be adapted ments to protect naval vessels. the fastest ASCM (Anti-Ship Cruise Mis­ to commercial shipping containers for sea, sile) currently in service at an operational road or rail launch, as well as conventional Threats range of up to 250 NM . submari ne tube and surface ship vertical As more navies add to the numbers and launch systems. Threats to naval vessels come from all di­ sizes of ships in their fleet structures, the Missiles like the KLUB series will be increas­ rections. The subsu rface, surface, ai r, space once firm dividing line between ASCM and ingly difficult to identify, locate and destroy and increasingly the electronic/cyber do­ LACM (Land-Attack Cruise Missile) is blur­ prior to launch, making post-launch neu­ mains all represent threat axes when plan­ ring. A mission kill or even sinking of an tralisation by sea-based air/missile defence ning ship or force defence. As described in adversary's ship - even those as small as systems the main line of missile defence our recent article on contemporary anti­ corvettes - ca n have a dramatic political -for the fleet or the homeland. submarine warfare challenges, investments effect, as shown in the attacks on UAE and in modern, and increasingly missile-armed, Saudi Arabian ships, along with a similar Conceptual Framework: submarines are drawing increased atten­ attack on the IN S HANIT off Lebanon in Active and Passive, Kinetic tion to the lack of modern ASW capa bilities 2006. and Non-Kinetic (systems and trained personnel). The Russian KLUB series of missiles (NATO Judging from defensive systems equipping designation SS-N-27/SS-N-30) is one ex­ In reviewing the difficult strategic choice frigates and destroyers being built now, the ample of this increasingly complex missile of what systems to acquire to protect the threat from the air - missiles and aircraft­ threat confronting the next generation of vessels, two general categories can be remains the priority driving ship protection air and missile defence systems. KLU B uses seen. Active measures reach out to deter concepts and investments. The resources devoted to radars, other sensors, combat Passive Active management systems and weapons that Small Calibre Guns (up to 40 mm) are optimised for air and missile defence - Medium Calibre Guns (up to 127 mm) outstri p those for anti-submarine and anti­ Acoustic Decoys Short Range Missiles surface defence systems. Medium Range Missiles Anti-Torpedo Torpedoes The Air Threat Matrix Di rected Energy-Laser Conventional short ra nge weapons include Stealth Design Features Electronic Warfare-Jamming airborne weapons typically used in direct Speed Directed Energy/Pulse attacks at short range- bullets and bombs Maneuver from helicopters and manned fixed w ing Cover and Concealment (clutter in aircraft. Attacking platforms ga in stand-off near-shore environments) Intelligence & Electronic Surveillance advantages with tactica l missiles such as --~L----------------------~ March 201 7 ·European Security & Defence I 45 • ARMAMENT & TECHNOLOGY or destroy the threatening platform (air­ craft, ship, boat, submarine, land-based launcher) prior to the employment of the weapon (shell, projectile, missile, torpedo) that will damage the ship. And in the event of an attack, active systems neutralise or destroy the weapon that is directed at the ship. Active naval protection is mainly per­ formed by guns (especial ly small cali bre, high rate of fire close-in weapons systems) and missi les. Passive means that contribute to force or ship defence have traditionally been intel­ ligence, long range sensors, communica­ tions and command/control systems that provide the location, classification, posture and, finally, notification of the attack of a threatening platform. These systems en­ able ship countermeasu res such as maneu­ vre and emissions control that en hance the protection of the threatened platforms. On The AEGIS system has been developed continu ously to stay one of the the ship itself, systems such as chaff, flares, most modern m issile, an d especially BMD, assets. decoys (physical and electronic), noisemak­ ers and the like that aim to counter the Non-kinetic protection, heretofore mostly locating resources for protecting naval ves­ attack system's guidance and control prior electronic warfare and related systems, sels. to the weapon reaching its effective en­ counter the threat by directing energy in Directed Energy systems, however, blur gagement range. ways that neutralise critical elements of the some of the distinctions above and offer Another related way of categorising naval threat platform or system without its com­ the prospect of "changing the game" on protection systems is whether they are ki­ plete physical destruction. ship protection in which guns and missiles netic or non-kinetic. Kinetic systems pro­ For the purposes of this article, th is frame­ remain the predominant technolog ies. tect by physical impact or destruction of work serves as a "menu" to evaluate how As noted by Congressional Research Ser­ the threatening platform and/or weapon. navies, ship and system designers are al- vice nava l expert Ron O'Rourke: "The (US) Navy is currently developing th ree poten­ Ship Class Displacement Air Defence Missile System tial new weapons that could improve the Tons (FLO) ability of its su rface ships to defend them ­ ..Bangladesh SHADH INOTA(C13B) 1,300 8-cell FL-3000N selves against enemy missiles - solid state lasers (SSLs), the electromagnetic ra ilgun Brazil TAMAN DARE 2.400 16-cell SYLVER VLS with MBDA (EMRG), and the hypervelocity projectile (Barroso) Common Anti-Air Modular (HVP) (.