SPECIAL 131 . O N From War to Peace: The Regional Stakes in Afghanistan’s Future Kabir Taneja Editor MARCH 2021 © 2021 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, copied, archived, retained or transmitted through print, speech or electronic media without prior written approval from ORF. INTRODUCTION Kabir Taneja nited States Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s letter to Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani, leaked to the press in March 2021, set forth plan for Afghanistan involves a wider role for a spate of diplomatic statements as regional players such as India, Pakistan, Iran, Uthe Joe Biden administration sought to clarify their Russia and China, the US–Taliban agreement will stance on ending the war in Afghanistan. At the time remain the pivot around which any bilateral or of writing this report, multiple processes were being multilateral system can be constructed. This, by undertaken with urgency to find a resolution to the default, means that while regional players could conflict. The long-running Doha process—where help Washington, D.C. hedge some of its risks, the much headway has been made since 2013 between February 2020 agreement will remain either the the Afghan government and others, and the Taliban, deal-maker or deal-breaker in the negotiations. seems to be dissipating. New forums in Russia and Turkey are taking shape to take the conversations The US war in Afghanistan, now in its 20th further, and more regional and international actors year, has become a virtual shrine for the follies are getting involved. As these cogs attempt to work of American interventionism, the internal in concert, the Biden administration is attempting complexities of Afghan politics, and regional to embed the peace process in a wider regional wrangling over parochial interests in South Asia. framework. This report looks into these regional From the beginning of the conflict in the aftermath stakeholders and their geopolitical stakes. of 9/11 and the start of America’s ‘war on terror’ campaign, the Afghan war moved towards an ad- The US–Taliban deal, signed in February 2020 hoc plan. The narratives that carried it forward— under the administration of Donald Trump, is of defeating Al Qaeda, diminishing the Taliban, today the bedrock of all negotiations around the and institutionalising democratic political systems Afghan conflict. The agreement requires the US in Kabul—have met with limited successes. Even to withdraw its military forces from the country by 1 May 2021. While President Joe Biden’s new Attribution: Kabir Taneja, Ed., “From War to Peace: The Regional Stakes in Afghanistan’s Future,” ORF Special Report No. 131, March 2021, Observer Research Foundation. 2 within these limits, however, the progress made is more than worthy of being protected: women’s rights to education, democratic values, and elections. Throughout the international negotiation As the May 1 deadline looms, this report trains process with the Taliban, India has mostly been an the spotlight on some of the most critical regional outlier, refusing to join the table and preferring and international actors that could help pave to back the democratic process and government the way to a peaceful and stable Afghanistan. In in Kabul. New Delhi’s support in Afghanistan has the first chapter, Ibraheem Bahiss analyses the largely taken the form of institutions, from building nucleus of the issue—the Ghani government dams and supporting education, to training in Kabul, and how it is poised to deal with the members of the Afghan military and providing pressures of coming to a conclusion with the them with equipment and training in policing and Taliban. In her piece, Kriti M Shah focuses on the diplomacy. These have had their limitations, which Taliban itself, and its strong position that allows are revealing themselves today as regional and it to play its cards the way it wants to. Kashish international actors mould policies to cement their Parpiani follows with an essay on the superpower, interests as a cloud of uncertainty hovers around the US, beleaguered in Afghanistan and looking the future Afghan political architecture. Even as it for a plausible exit from the quagmire of a two- is clear that the Taliban will have an influence on decade long war. In the fourth chapter, Sushant Kabul’s power-sharing system in the time to come, Sareen looks at the position of perhaps the most the relationship that different stakeholders will important foreign actor, Pakistan, and how the develop with the group could determine their own Pakistani establishment is looking for an outright view of regional and international security. While victory for its interests via the Taliban. Kalpit one of the critical provisions of the US-Taliban deal A Mankikar, in his chapter, examines China’s is for the latter to cut all ties with Al Qaeda and deny interests in Afghanistan from the view of regional them refuge, most analysts agree that the chances of security and Beijing’s overall approach towards this happening are slim. the Muslim world as it continues its crackdown on the Uyghur Muslims in restive Xinjiang. In the The sidelines of the Afghan negotiations could sixth piece, Nivedita Kapoor surveys an old player determine other regional stories. The recently in the Afghan contemporary history—Russia, and announced ceasefire between India and Pakistan is how it continues to play a role despite its limiting being viewed from a US-led Afghan lens. The India- historical baggage. In the last chapter, I look into Pakistan rivalry is also critical to peace in Afghanistan, one of the most underrated players in the Afghan where both New Delhi and Islamabad preside over crisis, another neighbor—Iran, and how its a game of critical strategic, tactical and political one- fractured relations with the US could exclusively upmanship. While the Taliban has its historical, shape its Afghan policy. ideological and political mooring in Pakistan where most of the Shuras are based, New Delhi has backed The aim of this report is to offer a quick but the democratic processes in Afghanistan. India has incisive analysis of regional views on Afghanistan. publicly supported the government of President These explorations should help clarify the Indian Ghani despite increasing hostility towards his perspective through the vantage points of some presidency, both from within the Afghan polity and of the potential partners (or even foes) that New certain quarters in Washington, D.C. Delhi will have to engage with for its own future policies on Afghanistan and the region. 3 THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT: CHASING PEACE Ibraheem Bahiss he intra-Afghan conference held in Moscow in March heralded a new approach to the Afghan conflict – one that could threaten the very survival Capitalising on regional support for an interim of Ashraf Ghani’s government. The arrangement, the Joe Biden administration Tgovernment’s current predicament is the accretion propped up the notion of an interim “participatory of factors both outside and within its control. peace government”, according to a leaked draft US proposal.4 This call for an interim government The Doha accord, signed between the United was part of a broader strategy of the new US States (US) and the Taliban in February 2020, has administration, as announced by Secretary of put the Afghan government in a difficult position.1 State Antony Blinken in a letter to President Ghani The agreement required sacrificing negotiation leaked to the press.5 The letter highlighted three leverage in return for having the Taliban sit at the crucial steps aimed at accelerating a settlement table. As the Doha agreement was not predicated on between the Afghan government and the Taliban. the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, First, it asked the United Nations (UN) to the government had little capacity to extract convene a summit of leaders from the US, Russia, concessions from the insurgents. Considering that China, Pakistan, Iran and India to form a unified he would not be able to gain a favourable deal under approach to the peace process. Second, it hinted such circumstances, President Ghani took a gambit, at the creation of an interim government in the and arguably, delayed the peace process by refusing form of a “written proposal aimed at accelerating to release Taliban prisoners as per the agreement.2 discussion on a negotiated settlement and This ultimately proved counterproductive. For ceasefire.” The letter also mentioned a senior- one, it fuelled perceptions among donor states that level meeting in Turkey “in the coming weeks to the current government was hindering the peace finalize a peace agreement.” process. Top US officials, for example, continued to stress that peace talks were the only path forward to finding a resolution to the enduring conflict in Afghanistan.3 Presumably, this also incensed regional powers such as Iran, Russia and China, who view the peace process as an opportunity to compel the US to withdraw from their strategic underbelly. 4 Two shortcomings of the current government have contributed to its current predicament. The The Afghan government has objected to the plan. first is its Machiavellian approach to domestic For his part, the chairperson of the High Council power-brokering. Powerful warlords like Atta for National Reconciliation, Abdullah Abdullah, has Noor and Marshal Dostum were quickly courted expressed cautious support for the plan. Others, by the government and then just as easily including former President Hamid Karzai and abandoned for short-term gains. Where the some powerful Afghan politicians, such as Abdul government has negotiated political pacts, such as Rashid Dostum and Atta Noor, have also tentatively the National Unity Government agreement, the endorsed the plan. Hezbi Islami Gulbuddin agreement, and the 2020 political participation agreement, the government Ghani has stated that he is willing to step down has consistently been followed by accusations of 9 from the presidency before the end of his term, violating the terms of these agreements.