Documentary History 9W ttl# ampatgn on tl?e lagara f rontier iMiaM. K«it*«l fisp the Luntfy« Lfluiil "'«'>.,-,.* -'-^*f-:, : THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN ON THE - NIAGARA FRONTIER IN 1814. EDITED FOR THE LUNDTS LANE HISTORICAL SOCIETY BY CAPT. K. CRUIK8HANK. WELLAND PRINTBD AT THE THIBVNK OKKICB. F-5^0 15 21(f615 ' J7 V.I ^L //s : The Documentary History of the Campaign on the Niagara Frontier in 1814. LIEVT.COL. JOHN HARVEY TO Mkl^-iiE^, RIALL. (Most Beoret and Confidential.) Deputy Adjutant General's Office, Kingston, 28rd March, 1814. Sir,—Lieut. -General Drummond having had under his con- sideration your letter of the 10th of March, desirinjr to be informed of his general plan of defence as far as may be necessary for your guidance in directing the operations of the right division against the attempt which there is reason to expect will be made by the enemy on the Niagara frontier so soon as the season for operations commences, I have received the commands of the Lieut.-General to the following observations instructions to communicate you and y The Lieut. -General concurs with you as to the probability of the enemy's acting on the ofTensive as soon as the season permits. Having, unfortunately, no accurate information as to his plans of attack, general defensive arrangements can alone be suggested. It is highly probable that independent of the siege of Fort Niagara, or rather in combination with the atttick on that place, the enemy \vill invade the District of Niagara by the western road, and that he may at the same time land a force at Long Point and per- haps at Point Abino or Fort Erie. An attack of such a general and combined nature, if made, as it. doubtless will be, in foi-ce, you can have no hope of successfully resisting by any other means than a concentration of your whole force at Burlington or Ancaster, leaving for the moment the garrisons at Fort Niagara and Fort George to themselves and those means of defence which it is ex- pected that they possess and will most strenuously exert. With your whole force thus concentrated in an advantageous and open position, the Lieut.-General has no apprehension of your not being equal or superior to anything the enemy can bring against you. On the contrary, if correct information of the enemy's move- ments be fortunately obtained by you in time to enable you to effect your own concentrative movements with that precipitation (that rock which has ho often been fatal to the wuccesH of our opemtioiis) Lieut.-General Druiiiniond feels coiiHdeiit that, notwitlmtanding the proverbial caution of (General HarriHon, an opportunity will l)e afforded you of effecting, by one action, the defeat, capture, or destruction of a considerable part of the eneniy's disposanle force. It is clearlv to be understoofl that the abandonment, even for a moment, by the troops under your command, of their advanced position on the frontier for the purpose of C(mcentratin^ at Burling- ton, is a measure which the Lieut.-General would approve only in the event, clearly ascertained, of the actual atlvance of the enemy in great force froui the westward. If the enemy's principal force be assembled on the Niagara frontier and smaller bodies advance from the westward and from Long Point for the purpose of threatening your rear, it will be sufficient (as no serious attack will in tliat case be apprehended) if you order the troops at Burlington to make a forward movement for the purpose of taking a position, say at Burford or Anctister, or to dispute the passage of the Gi'and River, where the detachments at Long Point and Oxford can fall back on them, and the whole, with such Indians and militia as can be assembled, form a corps of observation sufficient to keep in check the enemy's force and cover your rear. The whole of the troops on the frontier will then become dis- posable, and may, it is hoped, prove sufficient with the powerful appai they will have in Fort Niagara and Fort George and the aid which the squadron will afford them, to prevent the eneuiy's cover- ing army (for it must be recollected that the siege of Fort Niagara will, in all probability, occupy a considerable part of his force) from being able to force back your division from the frontier and by that means greatly facilitate his operations against Fort Niagara by the possession of both banks of the river. In the distribution of so comparatively small a force as you are likely to have for the defence of the Niagara frontier, the arrangement which v^ould naturally strike a military man unac- (Miainted with the character of the enemy he has to contend with, or v/ith the e^^ents of the two last campaigns on that frontier, would \>e to concentrate the troops in some central position from whence they could be moved to either extremity or whatever point was invaded. Such an arrangement, however would leave the extremities of the line open to attack and would actually invite invasion, and the persons and property of the inhabitants would be left exposed to the smallest parties of the enemy's marauders. Experience, more- over, has proved that a small force may be distributed along the frontier without any j^reat risk of being cut off. It is, therefore, Lieut.-Gerteral Dnuninond'H wJHh that the diHtributioii of the force should l)e umde with reference to that of the last and preceding? canipaitfUM (previous to the attacic of the enemy on Fort George on tl;e 27th May last) and that all the statiouH that were then occupied from Fort George to F'ort Erie (but not further) Hhould be now occupied. Change of circuiiiHtances has prescribed a change of strength of several detachments—that at Fort Erie, for instance, the Lieut.-General conceives need not consist of more than one strong company of infantry, with a small party of artillery suffi- cient to man the 24 pounder proposed to be mounted in the southern demi-bastion, and this detachment (if the arrangement pointed out by the Lieut.-Genoral to the acting-deputy-(iuai-termaster-general be made) would be well covered and in perfectsecurity against any- thing short of an invasion in foi'ce—and even in the latter case a small party so posted nught not only very much annoy any craft or vessels which might apjjroach the head of the river, but would operate with infinite advantage in the I'ear of any force which might venture to place itself betwixt two fires by landing between Fort George and Chippawa, and even if cut oti' its loss would be of no importance comparatively with the services which, under an intelligent officei-, it might render. Chippawa should be strongly occupied (the expression is of course relative) and a detachment placed intermediately l>etwixt Chippawa and Fort Erie—say at Frenchman's Creek—and a rapid movement should be made from Chippawa to support the detachments on the right and to oppose any descent made above Chippawa. I now come to a proposition made by you in a former letter to Lieut.-General Drummond for reducing the extent of the works of Fort Niagara, with a view to the reduction of the garrison. Your proposition will be referred to His Excellency the Commander of the Forces, but in the meantime I am directed to observe to you that, considered in a point of view which does not seem to have struck you, Lieut.-General Drummond is so far from being inclined to diminish the defences or the garrison of Fort Niagara (still less wholly to destroy or abandon that fort) that it appears to him that 500 or 600 men of your division cannot be better occupied than in occupying, as they in all probability will, at least ten times their number, and that, it is confidently hoped, for no inconsiderable period. Strengthened indeed as your division will be by the accession of a regiment of upward of 700 strong, (the 103d,) which will join you as soon as the navigation opens, the Lieut.-General is disposed to indulge the hope that much may be done even in the open field agaiiiHt an enemy the greatent part of whoHe force will probably be directed against Fort Niagara. fn the reduced Htate contemplated by your proposal you are aware that that place could not poHsibly hold out for a single day against the powerful means which the enemy will be able to briqg against it. By the adoption of that suggestion, therefore, it appears to the Lieut.-General that we should be voluntarily resigning for a possible but contingent good, all the solid advantages which the ac(|uisition and possession of this fort is capable of affording us, and of which, besides the iniportant one above alluded to, of occupy- ing so large a portion of the enemy's force in its reduction, the benefit to the s(|uadron of a secure harbor in which to take shelter, either from the weather or a superior enemy, is far from being the least—to say nothing of the negative advantage of the loss of that harbor to the eneujy. The occupation of Fort George as a ffank to Fort Niagai-a is essential to the defence of the latter. A battery of a few heavy guns to bear upon the esplanade of Fort Niagara should, therefore, be inniiediately completed in Fort George.