Notes Introduction 1. Although constructions of the “West” as “a collective heritage, an omnivo- rous melange of cultures” are problematic (see Shohat and Stam 13–15), I use “West/Western” while discussing general representational issues; otherwise, I refer more specifically to the UK or the US. 1 How the World Changed: Narratives of Nationhood and Displaced Muslim Identities 1. I would like to clarify here that Islamic shariat laws such as the Hudood Ordinance or even the Blasphemy Law must not be conflated with the way that these laws have been promulgated in Pakistan since the late 1970s, which still attracts harsh criticism. It is the loopholes within the laws and the Ordinance that have “encouraged violence and injustices against women” and have become the subject of many second-generation writers. However, some writers, such as Nadeem Aslam, are also critical of what they assume to be conservative tendencies within Islam. In most cases, this highlights the novelist’s own limited understanding of Islam, as I discuss in Chapter 4. (see Rahat Imran 78–100). 2. My own work in fact fills the gap left by Bradley and Tate in their book The New Atheist Novel: Fiction, Philosophy and Polemic after 9/11. Chambers argues that Bradley and Tate do not “engage in sufficient depth with the genuine political grievances that drive extremism, or the way in which Anglo- American foreign policy may itself be viewed as a form of terrorism”. Through historical contextualisation of the “9/11 novel” category, I attempt to give “more nuanced accounts of religion, doubt and multicultural politics”. (See Claire Chambers, rev. of The New Atheist Novel <http://www.timeshigher education.co.uk/410565.article>.) 3. In Rushdie’s case, this is just in Shame. Moreover, given that Rushdie’s major work (for example, Midnight’s Children) deals with the Partition and its effects on India rather than Pakistan, I focus only on Shame as a novel that is relevant to this book. Shame provides a critique of 1970s and early 1980s Pakistan that became the subject of second-generation writers of Pakistani origin who situ- ate Pakistan in post-9/11 global context. 4. Benazir’s public image with her head covered by a dupatta signifies the fact that “religion was firmly wrapped up in government”. According to Shamsie, the impact of Zia’s imposed Islamisation was so strong that successive gov- ernments after Zia’s continued to be pressurised by religious parties with regard to Islamic Ordinances promulgated during Zia’s regime; any attempts to repeal these ordinances remained unsuccessful (see Kamila Shamsie, Offence 57). 201 202 Notes 5. Allen highlights the way that anti-racism movements among the Asians who were politically overlooked in the 1970s raised important concerns not only for their political identity but also for their religious difference. Similarly, the Race Relations Act of 1976, that excluded religion or belief as markers of iden- tification, raised important concerns among multi-ethnic religious groups (such as Pakistanis and Bangladeshis) who were still ignored in contrast to mono-ethnic groups (such as Jews and Sikhs). For details, see Allen (8–10). 6. Being myself a Muslim by faith and by culture, I felt very disturbed by this juxtaposition. There are certainly very obvious allusions to Islamic history, such as references to the Prophet’s wives, a mockery of the whole concept of Revelation and words of God taught to the Prophet on Mount Sinai that might be lost on a non-Muslim reader, but cannot be ignored by a Muslim one. Nevertheless, some Muslim readers also defend Rushdie, pleading for freedom for speech, as is evident from the edited collection by Anouar Abdallah, ed. For Rushdie: Essays by Arab and Muslim Writers in Defense of Free Speech. 7. Sebastian Gunther usefully examines different connotations of terms used to describe Arabs (“such as people of the bazaar”, “common people”, “illiterate” or “unlettered”) in relation to Rushdie’s interpretation of people of the bazaar. Gunther further highlights reasons why the message of the Prophet made such an impact on Arabs. Gunther’s discussion provides a rebuttal of Rushdie’s Orientalist interpretation of Arabs and Islam (1–26). 8. Elsayed M.H. Omran discusses the reasons the Prophet’s message made such an impact on pre-Islamic Arabs, and highlights the strong tradition of oral literature among them (see Al-Serat n.p.). 9. Malik discusses a few examples of young British Muslims who, although brought up in secularist traditions, later became affiliated with radical groups (see Malik 28). 10. See the end of the section “Post-independence novels: Narrating Nationhood”. 11. My use of the term “fundamentalism” while discussing Kureishi’s work is informed by Kureshi’s own understanding of the phenomenon of young Asians turning to Islam, which was rampant in 1990s Britain after the fatwa. According to Kureishi, second-generation Asians in Britain were turning to “a particularly extreme form [of Islam] often called Fundamentalism”, although in their Muslim families “the practice of religion … had fallen into disuse”. I use the loaded term “fundamentalism” in order to highlight the ways in which it is often used synonymously with Islamic extremism (see My Son the Fanatic vii). 12. The setting of the film is slightly different from the short story’s. Whilst the film is set in Bradford, the short story is set in London. 13. Both Shamsie and Aslam foreground increasing Islamophobic feelings in the West towards practising Muslims who are more ritualistic than other Muslims; the most commonly targeted examples of this performative aspect of faith are the beard and hijab. 14. See Part IV “The Taleban” in Anatol Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country for more details of drone attacks in Pakistan; see also Noam Chomsky, Hopes and Prospects. 15. Wherever I use the word “America” rather than “the US”, it is because the writers have originally used this word. People in the subcontinent generally refer to the US as America and to US citizens as “Amreekan” (Americans). Notes 203 16. My use of the term “fundamentalism” rather than “extremism” here simply highlights the ironic connotations that Hamid ascribes to this word. 2 Responding to 9/11: Contextualising the Subcontinent and Beyond 1. Appadurai links indigenous rivalries between India and Pakistan to contem- porary global politics. According to Appadurai, social, historical and political conflicts within the subcontinent contribute to negative perceptions about Muslims, perpetuating the fallacy “that they [Muslims] truly belong not to a terrorized minority but to a terrifying majority, the Muslim world itself” (see Appadurai, Fear 111). 2. As a result of Zia’s foreign policy (Pakistan’s stand on Afghanistan and the decision to accommodate Afghan muhajir) and his efforts to Islamise laws, varying ethnic, sectarian and national groups began to mushroom in Pakistan. For example, there was: (a) an influx of Afghanis in the wake of the Afghan War; (b) a rise in Shia–Sunni conflicts resulting from Zia’s promo- tion of Sunni Islam due to his own affiliation with a Sunni religious party, Tablighi Jamaat (Society for Spreading Faith); the launch of the Muhajir Qaumi Movement or United National Movement (MQM) in 1984, designed to protect the rights of immigrant communities against Sindhi natives. Actually, the Sindhi–Muhajir conflict worsened in the 1980s as a result of new waves of immigration by Pakistani Pashtuns and Afghan refugees to urban centres of Sindh; rifts between religious communities – for exam- ple, the rise of the Ahmidiyya community when the religious freedom of Ahmadiyya community was curtailed in 1984 by a highly repressive military ordinance issued by General Zia. 3. The language riots in Sindh and Baluchistan gave a new dimension to identity consciousness in Pakistan. (see Ijaz Khan, “Contending Identities” 50–70). 4. My use of “our” clarifies my own positionality and interest in the topic; being Pakistani, I understand how our identities have been shaped by these linguistic and ancestral belongings. 5. The Ahmadiyya community differs from other Muslim communities in its opinion about Khatam-e-Nabuwat (the finality of prophethood). Rather than believing that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) is the last prophet of God, they believe in the continuity of prophethood. Besides Bhutto’s constitu- tional declaration of Ahmadis as non-Muslims, Zia also promulgated the notorious anti-Ahmadiyya Ordinance XX that added Sections 298-B and 298-C to the Pakistan Criminal Code. Through this Ordinance, Ahmadis were deprived of most of their basic human rights and their freedom of faith. 6. Asghar et al. argue that “Pakistan, a predominantly Muslim yet ethnically diverse society, presents an interesting case study in paradoxes related to the teaching and learning of biological evolution. The country’s inherited colonial education system, including modern science education, continues to be shaped by the Islamisation project initiated by the military ruler General Zia-ul-Haq in the early 1980s. Evolution features visibly in bio- logical sciences curricula at the high school, college, and university level. 204 Notes Nevertheless, conflicting religious perspectives on the origin and creation of life continue to influence scientists’ notions, teachers’ pedagogic deci- sions, and the content of secondary biology textbooks related to evolu- tionary theory” (Ashgar, Wiles and Alters n.p.). 7. The most significant examples are those of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. The devastation of these countries in the name of the US-led “war on terror” is a part of US global politics. At the same time, US policy in Chechnya and Kashmir and America’s “long record of relatively uncritical support of Israel” against Palestine are clear examples of US ventures against Muslim countries in particular. (For details see Esposito, Unholy War 152–157.) 8.