Is Time an Anachronistic Concept in Scientific and Metaphysical Philosophy? Dr B S Ramachandra Centre for Fundamental Research and Creative Education Bangalore, India Invited talk in Proc. A Dialog across Traditions: Modern science and ancient insights on reality. Eds. S. Roy, D. Gangopadhyay and R. Srikanth, (PPISR, Bangalore) Oct 25-27, 2016⇤ (Dated: October 25, 2016) The problem of time in natural philosophy and metaphysical philosophy is revisited from a fresh perspective to set the stage for a true dialogue between these, in principle, complementary and yet in practice, conflicting domains and fields. The idea that time could possibly not be a fundamental concept in either or both of these domains is proposed. The problem of time in the scientific context of fundamental physics in general, and candidate theories of quantum gravity in particular, is outlined. A distinction is made between physical and psychological time. It is also pointed out that the topological and geometric structures of the spaces corresponding to these could be drastically di↵erent and has been overlooked. To facilitate the dialogue and acquaint members of each domain to tap the founts of knowledge, wisdom and inspiration in the other, diverse sources have been alluded to and quoted at length in order to bring as much insight as is possible to bear on the issue. I. INTRODUCTION primitive and intuitive and on the verge of being self- evident. But the organization of these questions into a “my own expectation is that the notion conceptual framework that truly defines and addresses of time is extremely natural to us, but only them are not necessarily so self-evident. It is at this in the same manner in which other intuitive point that the departure from the nave philosophical ideas are rooted in our intuition because they musings of everyday life to that of the philosophical are features of the small garden in which we framework[2] takes place. But this departure though are accustomed to living...Intuition is not a radical is, as exemplified by the unending debates being good guide for understanding natural regimes constantly carried out between practitioners of the two so distant from our daily experience. The best domains- is by no means complete. A tangled web guide is provided by the theories of the world of ill-defined concepts and systems of concepts make that have proven empirically e↵ective, and attempts at completeness difficult if not impossible to therefore summarize the knowledge we have attain. There is then no alternative than to seek an about Nature. In particular, general relativ- approach that is in itself as free of previous paradigms ity challenges strongly our intuitive notion of as possible. a universal flow of time. I think we must take its lesson seriously.” –Carlo Rovelli. The concept of time that constitutes an almost universal “When we look at existence in itself, Time backdrop of all philosophical debate and dialogue is and Space disappear. If there is any exten- perhaps the most involved and elusive of all concepts. sion, it is not spatial but a psychological ex- Nevertheless, it is a saving grace to keep in mind, as tension; if there is any duration, it is not Albert Einstein states most clearly in his “Meaning temporal but a psychological duration; and it of Relativity”[3], that “The only justification for our is easy to see that this extension and dura- concepts and system of concepts is that they serve to tion are only symbols which represent to the represent the complex of our experiences, beyond that mind something not translatable into intellec- they have no legitimacy”. In seeking, therefore, an tual terms” –Sri Aurobindo, The Life Divine. approach geared towards representing the complex of our experiences, we need to have no hesitation to discard All natural philosophy and all metaphysical any concepts and system of concepts that cannot be philosophy[1] begins with the need to address cer- so justified. One such concept we hold is that of time. tain questions. The questions themselves may be In many a case, both in natural and metaphysical philosophy, it lacks justification precisely in representing experiences that are primitive and intuitive and yet on which the very foundations of the domains have ⇤[email protected] been laid. In the former namely natural philosophy, 2 it lacks justification due to the circular nature of its discussion carried on by Einstein and Bohr. What is definition. In the latter namely metaphysical philosophy, striking to note is that their discussion, and as Bohm it lacks justification due to the non-existent nature of and Peat point out, -not dialogue, was in the very same its definition. And since any attempt at questioning domain of inquiry namely physics in particular and such a deep-rooted idea runs the risk of illuminating natural philosophy in general. Nevertheless, the two confusion rather than bringing clarity, it is wiser to physicists could not see eye to eye on the issue. What take an approach that is as direct as possible. We started out as a dialogue eventually broke down onto a propose that the scientific and philosophical problems discussion in which each peesisted in adhering to their associated with time are in themselves an outgrowth of own opinion and point of view. In the words of Bohm its definition and how in our view, this concept of time and Peat, itself is perhaps neither well-founded nor well-defined. “Both Einstein and Bohr emphasized particular notions of meaning in the informal language of physics. But while, for Bohr, the meaning of fundamental concepts II. THE DIALOGUE could be ambiguous, in Einstein’s view they had to be unambiguous. The two men engaged in a long series of Before we enter into considerations on natural and meta- discussions about these issues over the following years. physical philosophy, it is important to set the tone and However, in retrospect, it becomes clear that it was spirit of our inquiry. As the great french mathematician never possible to resolve the issues that stood between Henri Poincare warns, “to reject everything or to accept them because their di↵erent uses of informal language everything are two equally convenient propositions. Both implied conflicting notions about the nature of truth and dispense with the necessity of reflection”. Therefore, reality and about what is an acceptable type of scientific true inquiry ought to take its stand on a position of theory. Bohr began to feel that Einstein had turned in a dispassionate freedom and independence. What we mean reactionary way against his own original, revolutionary is simply that one must be prepared to drop all possible contributions to relativity and quantum theory. Einstein, bias and prejudgment in embarking on a quest that for his part, felt that Bohr had become caught in what seeks to draw parallels or even analogies between two he called a “tranquillizer philosophy” which avoided domains of philosophical discourse. In particular, neither fundamental questions. Although the two men had begun is one to loosely take over strict scientific or natural as good friends, indeed Einstein said that he had initially philosophical concepts onto metaphysical philosophy nor felt a real love for Bohr, they eventually drifted apart to force necessarily subjective elements of metaphysical after many years of fruitless argument and exchanges of philosophy to a rigor mortis of scientific thought. Most challenge and response.” often this entails a war of words in the cloudland of theoretical speculation rather than a dialogue. In view of this it would appear that only one endowed with a pure scientific intellect could address issues of What really then is a dialogue and how does it di↵er natural and metaphysical philosophy in an unbiased from a discussion? Suppose two individuals come manner, free of prejudgment. However, the pure sci- together to have a dialogue. When one says something, entific intellect is in itself an ideal easier stated than the other does not in general respond with exactly the realized. In real life, one rarely develpos the capacity same meaning as the first. When the second individual for “suspension,” that according to Francisco Varela, does respond the first sees perhaps an imperceptible involves removing oneself from the habitual stream of di↵erence between what he meant and what the other thought. Suspension does not entail destroying existing understood. This di↵erence allows for the possibility of mental models of reality but rather, as David Bohm something new. And as the dialogue proceeds, these im- calls, ”hanging our assumptions in front of us,” By perceptible di↵erences could spontaneously self-organize doing so, one can begin to notice one’s thoughts and into a new emergent meaning that is the birth of a new mental models as the workings of one’s own mind. And insight or a radical and novel perspective on the topic of as one becomes aware of one’s thoughts, they begin dialogue. In this sense, a dialogue allows for and thrives to have less influence on what one sees. Suspension on the di↵erences. A discussion, on the contrary, cuts allows one to “see one’s seeing.” Alfred Korzybski’s down on and seeks to minimize the di↵erences thereby [2][4] insightful work also draws attention to the fact that, merely settling on one or the other’s point of view. In a discussion, when one wins the argument the other loses. “philosophers, psychologists, logicians and mathemati- In a dialogue both win and arrive at an entirely new cians don’t realize that their works are the products of perspective or a third alternative. the workings of their own nervous systems”.